Trans RINA, Vol 156, Part C1, Intl J Marine Design, Jan –Dec 2014 and 2013, and even though the annual loss rate is
improving there were still nearly two ships lost per week in 2013. The financial cost of human error in the Marine industry has been reported as being as high as $2.7M per day excluding the cost of casualties [7]. With a steadily increasing demand for more shipping to meet economic demand, it is prudent to take steps to systematically address the human error component that could lead to vessel or human loss. Even if the loss rate continues to fall in percentage terms, it is still possible that public opinion will not accept any regular instances of larger vessel accidents. The insurance community alone predict exposure levels could increase to up to $700m for one fully loaded large ship in the not too distant future [1].
2. THE BENEFIT OF CONSIDERING HUMAN FACTORS
Human Factors has increasingly found itself represented across all major industry sectors and
domains.
Traditionally it was initially viewed as part of the engineering process, often within the safety case for new systems. However, leading industries have found that adopting a Human-System Integration (HSI) approach during design activity offers the potential to address safety and usability concerns, and also to reduce the cost associated with not only accidents but the financial burden of re-design after the system enters service. If engineered components are not integrated correctly then the system as a whole may not always function as intended. The same is true of the human who is every bit as much a part of the system as Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC), the electrical system and the other areas that drive design. The importance of Human Factors therefore needs to be not only represented well within the Design Team, but also well understood in terms of what the benefits of the discipline can bring. This however can only occur within an environment that allows the process of HSI to be discussed and of course for the Human Factors team member to demystify some of the preconceptions commonly associated with Human Factors.
Although it is well established that human error is cited as a causal factor in the majority of accidents across industries, the concept of human error can itself become a stumbling block when trying to integrate Human Factors into the design. This is because the term is also misunderstood by many people who either dismiss it as a technical way of blaming the person who made the mistake or regard human error as something that cannot be managed when faced with the apparent difficulty of doing so. Human error is simply a means of identifying that there is an incompatibility between the system and the human which may result in an
event that is
unanticipated. It is important not to define this mismatch as an abnormal factor, and not simply use it as a way of apportioning blame. Whether it
is a human or system
constraint the importance lies in the identification of the mitigation to be provided within the wider systems
engineering approach. This could be simply a change that involves an element of a visual
display (providing
more/less information to an operator), changing the design to avoid the issue entirely, adopting procedures to attempt to allow a task to be performed more efficiently or safely, or simply ensuring that adequate training reflects the identified issue.
In general people underestimate how much is known about human performance. It is possible to predict during the design phase many aspects of a design which could limit human performance during the life of the system. In some respects this is no different from noting that the incompatibility between a component and the environmental temperature resulted in a failure. The effective management of safety and effectiveness within design teams necessarily involve engineering judgment, common sense and the formal safety process. Human Factors is very much a part of this process as the potential for error tends to be compounded by several issues rather than a single root cause [8]. Relatively small (and simple) errors are easily overlooked as humans tend to be resilient and able to adapt in order to arrive at a solution (thus hiding that the failure has the potential to be more serious than it first appears). The Human Factors specialist is sometimes accused of focussing on small issues that, to the rest of the design team, have little consequence. However,
focussing on the ‘knock on’
effect of single instances of design flaws can not only head off safety issues, but increase operational efficiency (at human and consequent system levels) and has the potential to
reduce cost
software/procedure/training changes. Sometimes that involves getting architecture,
into the depths
associated with required of
the and sometimes it is about optimising
accommodation and recreational space. The ship is the seafarer’s workplace and home – and like it or not the two relate when it comes to human performance. Small changes to the design, layout and specification of the ship can therefore contribute to the overall goal of safety and efficiency.
Although it is useful to draw analogies with systems engineering, it is also important to remember that people are incredibly complex and many things drive a given response at a given time. It is possible to train people and establish procedures on how to safely enter a tank for example, but if a colleague is in trouble then there is a basic urge to help them; 50% of workers who die in confined spaces are attempting to rescue other workers who have
found themselves in difficulty [1]. Well
documented procedures provide mitigation for perceived risks, but it is equally predictable that a second person may also put themselves at risk when faced with the situation – despite the training and procedures designed to keep them safe. What is more useful to the overall objective of improving safety is to consider the realistic human response to a given situation as part of the validation of the mitigation. The response will almost always be rational to the person at the time - as people
system
C-172
©2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
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