Trans RINA, Vol 156, Part C1, Intl J Marine Design, Jan - Dec 2014 ARTICLE
HUMAN-SYSTEM INTEGRATION WITHIN A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SHIP DESIGN TEAM: AN INSIDE VIEW
C Greenbank, BMT Reliability Consultants Ltd, UK D Richards, Coventry University, UK (DOI No: 10.3940/rina.ijmd.2014.c1.33a)
SUMMARY
Good ship design has many facets but a key tenet is the understanding of the Operational environment and the practical challenges faced by Seafarers. It is important that their needs
paper presents the Human-System Integration (HSI)
within the associated engineering constraints and the limitations imposed by the regulatory framework, not forgetting the commercial considerations. This
are taken into account, yet that also needs to happen view from within a
multidisciplinary ship design team, and highlights the practical challenges and opportunities of adopting a HSI approach to ship design. A key element to this is balancing the user-centred approach with the real-world constraints of the project to achieve an optimum outcome for the client and the Seafarers who will live and work on the ship.
1. INTRODUCTION
The design and build of a new ship is an understandably complex process that invariably requires a large multidisciplinary design team. Ensuring that the human element in the design and operation of the system is not forgotten requires a systematic approach with the Human Factors Specialist as an integral member of that design team. To address a subject as diverse as the ‘human element’ other industries have successfully adopted the Human-System Integration approach
to give the
structured (and now proven) framework necessary to influence good design practice. The
underpinning
discipline of Human Factors is based on the scientific study of how humans interact with each other and complex systems and is itself based disciplinary approach that
on a multi- draws on principles from
several of the human sciences (such as Psychology, Ergonomics, Physiology) If we examine the nature of how Human Factors is applied we can see that it has much in common with the traditional engineering process with the focus on the interaction between the human and the system; whilst offering new perspectives on how to more effectively manage human performance at the design and operation levels. Much as engineers focus on the requirements and constraints of a system, a Human Factors approach examines requirements and inherent constraints of both the engineered and human elements of the system. Thus supporting the development of a robust solution that allows for both elements to be integrated effectively. Human Factors within any multidisciplinary team is about understanding people within the design team, the stakeholder community and seafarers that will ultimately live and work on board and influencing design to optimise the integration of the person into the engineered system.
Human error is still viewed as the most prominent underlying cause of marine accidents
[1]. With the
emergence of new technology one could be forgiven for assuming that
the assistance of decision support
technologies minimises (if not altogether eliminates) the likelihood of human error. Unfortunately this is rarely the case. What we begin to see is the nature of human error change according to the ‘flavour’ of technology being introduced. For example, the use of automation could be argued to remove the human from the decision process and thus reduce the opportunity for the fallible operator to make mistakes; however
surprise” [2], “automation bias”
incidents of “automation [3],
and “mode
confusion” [4] are reported when we see an increase in the levels of automation. Such instances of human error are failures of human-system integration, whereby the user perception of how the system functions is markedly different from how it does function. The design team and indeed the client are often not the end users of the equipment; system behaviour that is entirely sensible to someone with detailed understanding of system logic may leave the end user at a complete loss when the system appears to be behaving illogically to an event. Despite improvements in technology the potential for human error is still a significant factor worthy of consideration for safety, efficiency effectiveness.
and cost
Although the shipping industry has a relatively good safety record, marine incidents also have a high potential for catastrophe [5]. For example, a loaded tanker carrying Liquefied Natural Gas has the potential to blow up a whole city [6]. Although this is highly unlikely, this extreme example highlights the serious ramifications that can be associated with marine accidents that go well beyond the hull loss such as environmental impact, financial loss of vessel and longer term business impact, public perception and confidence.
According to the Shipping and Safety Review 2014 [1], an average of 139 ships were lost per year between 2002
© 2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
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