Trans RINA, Vol 156, Part C1, Intl J Marine Design, Jan -Dec2014
Implementing good Human Factors practices into the design can make considerable through life savings.
It
can also avoid costly re-works as a result of design mis- specifications. For example, for the UK Royal Navy’s Single Role Minehunters, it was discovered, after having accepted the first of five ships into service, that it was difficult to recover the Remote Control Mine Disposal System back on board the ship in high seas. To address the problem, a better crane with a remote control facility was installed; a platform for the operator was made and an additional recovery hook and pole was provided. This was a simple manual handling problem which was overlooked during development which eventually cost £1.9 million to make the design changes to overcome these difficulties. The Human Factors National Advisory Committee for Defence and Aerospace [19] describes examples of the benefits of taking a wider socio- technical/HFI
approach to equipment design. The
developer of an aircraft engine who adopted such an approach reduced the number of tools required for the line maintenance of a new turbine from over 100 to just 10; fewer specialist skills were needed further allowing a consolidation
in the number of maintenance trades
required which also resulted in an overall reduction in training time.
The Human Factors Engineering (HFE) component of HFI is usually the starting point for the HFI process. One of the objectives of HFE is to minimize the potential for error and promote the performance of assigned activities as efficiently and effectively as possible. Human error can be a direct cause or a significant contributing factor for accidents on-board vessels and offshore facilities. However, ‘Human Error’ in itself is not
incidents.
an explanation to the It
is merely the
cause of accidents and very beginning of an
explanation. Human errors are systematically connected to features of an operator’s training, their tools and tasks as it has its roots in the wider socio-technical system. The question of ‘Human Error’ alone is an oversimplified belief in the roots of [20]).
failure (Dekker,
From a Human Factors perspective, safety is all about the error ‘troika’: prevent error; trap error, or mitigate its consequences (Helmreich, Merritt and Wilhelm, [21]). Prevention of
design (as seen in many computer interfaces which will not accept an invalid input) or countermeasures in ship operations.
examining its practices and culture) – a more systemic approach. Reason [22] advocates this latter approach for removing the
underlying poor training; communication) is factors promoting error,
suggesting that addressing the ‘general failure types’ (such as poor tasking; poor scheduling; poor design; poor procedures;
poor planning and bad the most cost effective approach.
Such Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) are conditions which substantially increase the likelihood of human error in a given situation. O’Hare [23] divided PSFs into those external to the person (for example, environmental conditions; equipment design; operating manuals and procedures; training provided and poor supervision) and those internal to the person (including their emotional state;
physical condition; stress and experience; and task knowledge).
The US Department of Defence specifies four generic categories of barrier to poor human performance that may be applied in any system.
Ideally, safety critical
systems should be defended at the highest level possible (and at multiple levels). The hierarchy of barriers from MIL-STD-882C [24] is:
Design for minimum risk – Eliminate the hazard from the system if possible. Design the system so the accident cannot happen.
Incorporate safety devices – Design into the system automatic devices which, when a specified hazard occurs,
prevent the system from dangerous state.
Provide warning devices – These should activate early, leaving the operator time to stop a critical system state developing. procedures
Develop System-induced errors system
(competency organizational
error may be achieved by equipment through procedural
However, even
when an error has been committed, there should be procedures which trap the error in a timely manner. Continual crew monitoring of position should ensure that even if an error has not been prevented or trapped, the ship should not enter an unsafe condition (i.e. the error should be
mitigated). Other approaches take an
integrated human/system approach to error prevention, such as formal error identification methods. These deal specifically with hardware and procedures rather than looking more widely across the organisation (e.g.
assurance), and reflect training – Provide
adequate training in procedures to operate equipment in a safe manner.
deficiencies in the
implementation of the HFI processes. They include mistakes in designating the number and type of personnel,
operating policies, training data
responsibilities, and maintenance
requirements, and support. Design factors are related to these errors and include aspects of the system hardware, software, procedures, environment and training which affect the likelihood of human error. They result from human incompatibilities with the design of equipment. Taking an integrated Human Factors approach in the design process avoids mis-matches between
resources, logistics, entering a fatigue; and
system
design and human capabilities. The objectives of HFI and HFE are to provide systems and equipment that reduce the potential for human error, increase system availability, lower lifecycle costs, improve safety, and enhance overall performance (McSweeney, Pray, and Craig, [25]). The key to demonstrating the utility of Human Factors is not to count the cost of investing in it, but to calculate the savings that it makes on a through- life basis.
C-8 ©2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
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