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Trans RINA, Vol 156, Part C1, Intl J Marine Design, Jan - Dec 2014


1.2(b) Maritime Accidents, Situation Awareness and Crew Fatigue


An analysis of the most recent EMSA accident reviews [26] (Figure. 7) revealed that “Cargo Ships” is the largest category of vessels involved in accidents in and around EU waters. This category also represents the largest number of ships including general and refrigerated cargo ships, Ro-Ro ships, bulk carriers and car carriers. Within this category most accidents happen with general cargo ships (approx. 80%) within the range of 500 – 5000 GT. Another category


with relatively high numbers of


accidents is the category of “Fishing Vessels” due to their specific operational use and their relatively limited size. From the same EMSA source an overview of the number of vessels involved in the different types of accidents in EU waters during the period 2007 – 2010 is shown in Table 1. To put these figures into perspective, it should be noted that per year approximately 20,000 merchant vessels are recorded as calling at EU ports and approx. 600,000 as port movements.


14% 11% 36% 23% 10% 6%


Cargo ships Tankers Container ships Passenger ships Fishing vessels Other vessel types


Figure 7: 2010 accidents by ship type [26]


no of accidents per type 2007 2008 2009 2010 Sinkings


Collisions/Contacts Groundings


Fires/Explosions Other Total


Cargo Ships Sinkings


Collisions/Contacts Groundings


Fires/Explosions Other Total


55 61 28 32 304 308 292 288 197 217 177 143 91 89 67 83 115 79 62 98 762 754 626 644


2007 2008 2009 2010 11 10 6


6


132 120 93 97 108 115 76 72 29 26 30 17 50362042 330 307 225 234


Table 1: Top, the total number of ships involved in accidents, bottom the number of cargo ships involved in accidents [26]


A study by Baker and McCafferty [27] noted that human error continues to be the dominant factor in maritime accidents and that failures of situation awareness and situation assessment predominate. Approximately 50% of maritime accidents are initiated by human error, while 30% occur due to failures


of humans to avoid an


accident. In an analysis of accidents involving commercial vessels in Australia, Canada, Norway, UK and the USA they concluded:


 Human error continues to be the dominant factor in approximately 80 to 85% of accidents


 Failures of situation awareness and situation assessment overwhelmingly predominate


 Human fatigue and task omission are closely related to failures of situation awareness and the accidents that result


Situation Awareness is the ability of an individual to possess a mental model of what is going on at any one time and also to make projections as to how the situation will develop. In a review of non-technical skills within the maritime domain Hetherington et al [28], reported on a study that observed 71% of all human error types on ships were situation awareness related problems. They also reported that there was an increasing requirement for ‘non-technical’ skills in crewmembers. These are an additional set of competencies that are used integrally with technical shipping skills, such as those required to manoeuvre the vessel. These skills encompass both interpersonal


awareness, communication, team


and cognitive skills such as situation working, and


leadership. Over the last 25 years research in the aviation, medical, and nuclear power industries has identified and implemented training in these fundamental skills. Given the significant potential cost of accidents to both insurers and operators, there is an opportunity to develop interventions with the support of key industry stakeholders using a transfer of innovation from other transport sectors such as aerospace.


A review of fatigue in the shipping industry by Houtman et al., [29] concurred that fatigue may be a causal factor in collisions and groundings in between 11% to 23 % of the cases. It also suggested that fatigue as a cause of accidents like collisions or groundings is underreported, due to crew on watch being unlikely to admit that they had been tired or stressed. Hetherington et al [28] presented a survey of 1,000 maritime officers, in which 77% felt that fatigue has


significantly risen in the


previous 3–10 years, and 84% felt that stress was also more prevalent, supporting the need for interventions to resolve these key issues. Fatigue is defined by the IMO as “a reduction in physical and/or mental capability as the result


of physical, mental or emotional exertion


which may impair nearly all physical abilities including: strength; speed; reaction time; coordination; decision making; or balance.”


This implies that fatigue can be


understood and measured in many different ways. This presents a challenge in relating research that has been


©2014: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects


C-9


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