Warship 2015: Future Surface Vessels, 10-11 June 2015, Bath, UK
personnel and systems across the entire system lifecycle, and this is influenced significantly by
the design
decisions made early in the process. HFI provides a valuable mitigation by
contributing significantly to
design risk reduction at these early stages The cost savings normally follow the standard 1:10:100 ratio [12], where an HFI issue identified early in the programme would cost very little to resolve, yet the cost of resolving the issue increases by a factor of ten (or more) if the issue is identified by users later in the programme. The cost of resolution of issues found in-service is high for the military owner, therefore the appropriate contracting for HFI provides mitigation against costly rework once the warship is accepted and enters service. The cost of such changes once in-service is upwards of 100 times what it would have cost if identified through a structured HFI programme.
Although it is not easy to put the benefits of HFI in financial terms, the US Air Force believe an effective Human Factors programme saves between 40 and 60 times its cost during the life of the system. In one US fighter jet programme alone it has led to cost savings in maintenance, manpower and support estimated at over $4 Billion [13]. The Canadian department of
The HFI tools and approaches used in different
programmes may vary, and it should be noted that the greatest benefit of HFI at each of the stages could switch to different stakeholders at different points in the design cycle, yet the consistent theme throughout is the detailed understanding of how best
to integrate humans and
technology. People are one of the biggest costs in the system lifecycle, and both the single most likely mitigation against disaster and the mostly likely cause of accidents. Although people are fundamentally a good proposition when it comes to safety, in the percentages where things do go wrong human error will very likely be cited as a causal factor. The cost of people therefore has at least three strands; 1) the cost of employing them, training them and retaining them; 2) the cost saved by human mitigation for failure; 3) the cost of mistakes and/or the indirect costs resulting from unavailability of the asset.
National
Defence found similar results when they invested $3.3 million across 31 Human Factors programmes. This resulted in an immediate saving of $3.5 million (an upfront 106% return on investment) then $131 million saved through reduced manning; and another $2 million saved by the elimination of a shipboard display shown to be unnecessary by the Human Factors programme. For a Human Factors programme which cost $3.3 million it eventually saved $136 million [14].
The cost of design deficiencies is a matter that is easily forgotten when it comes to weighing up whether to commit funding to changing the design, or instead trying to devise a training or procedural mitigation. Assigning cost to the physical effort required to make the design change is easy, and the cost can be large depending on the nature of the issue and the stage of the design process. However, that cost
is paid only once. Poor
design has a cost every day and every time the deficient system is used – although that may be low each time, it may rapidly add up through a combination of reduced efficiency and additional training
requirements.
However, what is particularly interesting from the HFI perspective is that any design compensation
which requires based on procedure and/or training,
introduces uncertainty into the safety argument as it is not possible to be sure that the person will do as trained, rather than what is logical, when under high workload conditions [11]. For example, how many times does one pull a door marked ‘push’ simply because it has a handle? No amount of procedure or training will stop that happening. The issues and complexity of response only get more difficult to predict when you scale up the system complexity to marine systems and life at sea, and
Although the HFI process requirement has existed for a number
of years within defence programmes and
procurements, the scale of its involvement is variable. Whilst HFI does have a cost, it is minor in comparison with the benefits it can offer. If a discipline could reduce through life cost, reduce risk and improve safety one might think it would be a part of every ship build. The challenge is therefore how best to communicate the benefits of HFI to those responsible for operating and contracting for new ships [4].
8. CONCLUSION
To date the perception of Human Factors Engineering is that is it principally concerned with ensuring that systems are
safe. although safety is an important life cost, out
There is now a growing realisation that driver
improve whole for the
consideration of HF, this is only part of the objective of a structured HFI programme. In addition HFI seeks to reduce through
performance and reduce programme risk – all of which can lead to military and/or commercial advantage.
This paper has set the contention that the
overwhelming likelihood is that investment in robust HFI within a design programme will result in cost savings, rather than cost increases. Whilst the degree to which these savings impact the various stakeholders varies, that only highlights the necessity for stakeholders in future warship design to understand more clearly what HFI can bring to them if it is contracted and costed for correctly. However, what
is clear from global reviews of the
defence industry experience of HFI is that “investments in HFI implementation will have a positive, and probably large, return on investment” [1].
system
it is easy to see how relatively small issues with design set up the potential for a Human-System Integration failure.
© 2015: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
C-199
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100 |
Page 101 |
Page 102 |
Page 103 |
Page 104 |
Page 105 |
Page 106 |
Page 107 |
Page 108 |
Page 109 |
Page 110 |
Page 111 |
Page 112 |
Page 113 |
Page 114 |
Page 115 |
Page 116 |
Page 117 |
Page 118 |
Page 119 |
Page 120 |
Page 121 |
Page 122 |
Page 123 |
Page 124 |
Page 125 |
Page 126 |
Page 127 |
Page 128 |
Page 129 |
Page 130 |
Page 131 |
Page 132 |
Page 133 |
Page 134 |
Page 135 |
Page 136 |
Page 137 |
Page 138 |
Page 139 |
Page 140 |
Page 141 |
Page 142 |
Page 143 |
Page 144 |
Page 145 |
Page 146 |
Page 147 |
Page 148 |
Page 149 |
Page 150 |
Page 151 |
Page 152 |
Page 153 |
Page 154 |
Page 155 |
Page 156 |
Page 157 |
Page 158 |
Page 159 |
Page 160 |
Page 161 |
Page 162 |
Page 163 |
Page 164 |
Page 165 |
Page 166 |
Page 167 |
Page 168 |
Page 169 |
Page 170 |
Page 171 |
Page 172 |
Page 173 |
Page 174 |
Page 175 |
Page 176 |
Page 177 |
Page 178 |
Page 179 |
Page 180 |
Page 181 |
Page 182 |
Page 183 |
Page 184 |
Page 185 |
Page 186 |
Page 187 |
Page 188 |
Page 189 |
Page 190 |
Page 191 |
Page 192 |
Page 193 |
Page 194 |
Page 195 |
Page 196 |
Page 197 |
Page 198 |
Page 199 |
Page 200 |
Page 201 |
Page 202 |
Page 203 |
Page 204 |
Page 205 |
Page 206 |
Page 207 |
Page 208 |
Page 209 |
Page 210