Trans RINA, Vol 157, Part C1, Intl J Marine Design, Jan –Dec 2015
of little things really does matter when it comes to human reliability in complex systems [3]. What may appear to be a trivial issue at the micro level makes far more sense when viewed at the macro level of the system.
The concept of "human error" can itself become a stumbling block when trying to integrate Human Factors into the design. The term itself is also misunderstood by many people who either use it as a way of excusing the design of technology and blaming the user who made the mistake. It may also be viewed by some as something that is inevitable and cannot be managed when faced with the apparent difficulty of doing so. Human error should instead be viewed as a consequence of an incompatibility between the technology and the human which may result in an event that is unanticipated. It is important not
factor, or to use it as a way of apportioning blame. Whether
it of a visual
importance lies in the identification of the mitigation to be provided
approach. This could simply be a change that involves an element
(providing more/less
to define this mismatch as an abnormal is a human or system constraint, within the wider systems engineering display
the
information to an operator), changing the design to avoid the issue entirely, adopting procedures to attempt to allow a task to be performed more efficiently or safely, or simply ensuring that adequate training mitigates the identified issue [4].
The perceived remit of Human Factors is somewhat limited for many non-experts in the field, ranging from preconceptions that it is only about, for example, the 'ergonomic' design of seating, workspace, and the design of human computer interfaces.
Although there is a
tangible element in the oversimplification, the reality is that Human Factors, as a discipline, is far more wide- ranging and ultimately
offers far greater benefits to
warship design. "Systems are not just metal, plastic and lines of code; the human is as much a part of the system as anything else" [4]; and, like any other component, the failure to integrate it correctly can result in a range of unintended consequences. The integration of a new technology component within a system requires
the
consideration of parameters such as size, weight and power (SWAP), interface standards and environmental considerations (noise and heat generation, susceptibility to vibration etc). These factors and the processes, data sources and standards which support their consideration are well understood by the engineering community. However, the same thinking is often not automatically applied to the integration of
the human component,
relying instead on the user's ability to adapt design of the technology and to the resulting working environment. Furthermore, there is a lack of understanding of the extent to which this ability to adapt is highly variable, both between individuals and within the same individual operating under different conditions and circumstances. This in
part explains the variability of human
performance in complex systems and the associated vulnerabilities.
Even with the emergence of advanced automation and autonomy one could be forgiven for assuming that the assistance of decision support technologies mitigates (if not altogether eliminates) the likelihood of human error. Unfortunately this is rarely the case. What we begin to see is the nature of human error change according to the 'flavour' of technology being introduced. For example, the use of automation could be argued to remove the human from the decision process and thus reduce the opportunity for the fallible operator to make mistakes; however
incidents of "automation surprise" [5],
"automation bias" [6], and "mode confusion" [7] are reported when we see an increase in the levels of automation. Such instances of human error are failures of human-system integration, whereby the user perception of how the system functions is markedly different from how it actually functions. The design team and indeed the client are often not the end users of the equipment. The intended system behaviour, that is entirely sensible to someone with detailed understanding of system logic, may leave the end user at a complete loss when it appears to be behaving illogically to an event. Despite turning to advanced technology to solve the problem, the potential for human error is still a significant factor worthy of consideration for safety, efficiency
and cost
effectiveness. However, despite this tendency to focus on human error, the more common situation is actually human recovery. The human ability to creatively solve a novel problem has been the critical factor in averting disaster throughout history, yet these events are rarely newsworthy and feature less highly in perceptions of human risk. Whilst the human element of the system is a causal factor in the majority of accidents, yet is also one of the most widely cited safety mitigations [3].
A key future challenge integration of
is therefore 'Human Factors' the effective thinking as part of a
holistic systems engineering approach. The most effective way to achieve this is for more engineers to understand the impact and scope of Human Factors in their everyday work. This has implications for how Engineering
is taught and
demonstrate that knowledge via an accredited route. 3. THE REALITY OF HUMAN FACTORS
In general, people underestimate how much is known about human performance. It is possible to predict during the design phase many aspects of a design which could limit human performance during the life of the system. In some respects this is no different from noting that the incompatibility between a component and the environmental temperature resulted in a failure. The effective management of safety and effectiveness within design teams necessarily involve engineering judgment, common sense and the formal safety process. Human Factors is very much a part of this process as the potential for error tends to be compounded by several issues rather than a single root cause [2]. Relatively small (and simple) errors are easily overlooked as humans tend
how future Engineers
C-196
© 2015: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100 |
Page 101 |
Page 102 |
Page 103 |
Page 104 |
Page 105 |
Page 106 |
Page 107 |
Page 108 |
Page 109 |
Page 110 |
Page 111 |
Page 112 |
Page 113 |
Page 114 |
Page 115 |
Page 116 |
Page 117 |
Page 118 |
Page 119 |
Page 120 |
Page 121 |
Page 122 |
Page 123 |
Page 124 |
Page 125 |
Page 126 |
Page 127 |
Page 128 |
Page 129 |
Page 130 |
Page 131 |
Page 132 |
Page 133 |
Page 134 |
Page 135 |
Page 136 |
Page 137 |
Page 138 |
Page 139 |
Page 140 |
Page 141 |
Page 142 |
Page 143 |
Page 144 |
Page 145 |
Page 146 |
Page 147 |
Page 148 |
Page 149 |
Page 150 |
Page 151 |
Page 152 |
Page 153 |
Page 154 |
Page 155 |
Page 156 |
Page 157 |
Page 158 |
Page 159 |
Page 160 |
Page 161 |
Page 162 |
Page 163 |
Page 164 |
Page 165 |
Page 166 |
Page 167 |
Page 168 |
Page 169 |
Page 170 |
Page 171 |
Page 172 |
Page 173 |
Page 174 |
Page 175 |
Page 176 |
Page 177 |
Page 178 |
Page 179 |
Page 180 |
Page 181 |
Page 182 |
Page 183 |
Page 184 |
Page 185 |
Page 186 |
Page 187 |
Page 188 |
Page 189 |
Page 190 |
Page 191 |
Page 192 |
Page 193 |
Page 194 |
Page 195 |
Page 196 |
Page 197 |
Page 198 |
Page 199 |
Page 200 |
Page 201 |
Page 202 |
Page 203 |
Page 204 |
Page 205 |
Page 206 |
Page 207 |
Page 208 |
Page 209 |
Page 210