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Page 10


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TechWaTch


Knowing the Unknown: A Strategy for IoT Cybersecurity


By Umang Doshi, Cybersecurity and Technology Management Consultant T


he Internet of Things (IoT) is limitless, endlessly connecting seemingly unrelated objects in-


to a functioning ecosystem. That rea- son alone is enough to place cyberse- curity at the top of the list when de- veloping an IoT enterprise or ex- panding an existing one. Surprisingly though, for the


most part, it is not. Too many organ- izations have tunnel-vision, are fo- cused on achieving a fully function- ing system, and fail to identify poten- tial security vulnerabilities, despite the fact that even a single threat can have a multiplying effect on the un- derlying assets. Given the complexity of a high-


ly meshed network of objects, it is es- sential to identify all key assets, net- work source, destination, predefined recommended path and appropriate communication protocol


for en-


hanced trust and integrity. To minimize or eliminate the


possibility of impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks while pro-


tecting privacy in IoT, security plan- ning has to dive into the unknown and identify security vulnerabilities at this early stage of development — the design phase.


IoT Security Design An emphasis on agile develop-


ment in which a product is rushed to market may explain why cybersecu- rity is given little if any thought in the design phase — a potentially fa- tal oversight. A motivated malicious attacker will seek to identify initial design vulnerabilities and continu- ously assess any new vulnerabilities introduced through life expectancy of the object, specifically any hardware device or application within the IoT. One example of a vulnerability


waiting to be exploited is failure of a software development department to efficiently integrate with the security incident response department. This omission illustrates several major shortcomings that deserve detailed


scrutiny before introducing the prod- uct to the marketplace: insufficient security awareness and training for engineers and system architects, lack of IoT product security and privacy re- sources, and inexperienced or imma- ture incident response processes. From the beginning, identifying


“vital assets” is mandatory for devel- oping cybersecurity strategy. A risk assessment approach will help deter- mine those assets that store and/or process data with intrinsic value (fi- nancial, competitive and proprietary) and extrinsic (data with regulatory or legal implications). Concurrent with risk assess-


ment is determining and defining the entirety of the organization’s ecosys- tem, including partners, suppliers and business networks. This evalua- tion needs to occur in the design stage along with continuous periodic assessment of strength of security governance — in particular, identity access and authentication, and con- nectivity controls. The latter is part of the protocol at this stage. Unfortu- nately, the same cannot be said for the former.


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Threat Impact What is often missing is a


threat impact analysis (TIA), which contains extensive connectivity and loss assessments. Metrics for the lat- ter include confidentiality, integrity and availability. Each metric in the TIA is categorized in a key area and assigned a value. From there, the next step is to apply a formula for calculating risk — a common step for a number of disciplines and one that deserves a closer look during soft- ware design. Much of this may seem theoret-


ical and, for some, impractical, par- ticularly in an early stage of develop- ment. It is certainly a major under- taking for harried engineers who un- derstandably have other priorities pushed upon them by deadline-con- scious upper management. Is it right or even realistic to


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deal with security issues when so lit- tle is known during the design phase? The recent experience of a large commercial and consumer product company demonstrates that the answer is a clear “yes.” The company initiated a review


to identify and assess integration of secured processes during develop- ment of new IoT software to enable interaction with multiple smart home products including HVAC, am- bient lighting, security surveillance, televisions, and various types of oth- er devices with sensors and intercon- nectivity. The products were supplied by different vendors. Besides monitor-


ing and collecting data for the local area network (LAN), ensuring against additional data collection during product lifecycle was a priori- ty so that the product could comply with applicable local laws and ensure consumer privacy. After extensive interviews with


the board of directors and upper management, and reviews of the ini- tial technical documentation, includ- ing architecture, the team quickly discovered and identified multiple deficiencies. These included security measures involving default identifi- cation enabled, immaturely defined access control and disabled passcode authentication in some interfaces. One need not be an expert in this


field to project the results had the re- view not been conducted in the early stage of development. The company would have been faced with multiple costly retrofitting requirements such as expensive redesign and develop- ment. The entire ecosystem would have been vulnerable to attack. Fur- ther assessment involving penetra- tion testing revealed network security deficiencies, most notably unencrypt- ed network traffic of authentication credentials, requiring implementa- tion of cryptographic controls for in- tegrity and confidentiality. The company’s experience illus-


trates the challenge of managing known unknowns. By detecting pos- sible attack vectors at the earliest possible time, the company reduced its vulnerabilities, increased its IoT defenses and averted expensive retrofits. Other benefits that justify incorporating security planning in the design stage are improvement of the decision-making process in all as- pects in which an IoT circuit is estab- lished, and solidifying and safe- guarding IoT infrastructure through proactive management. A third and no less important


component for security is improved communication and collaboration. Software professionals, consultants and senior management can “know the unknowns” by implementing these steps before infrastructure components are unnecessarily jeop- ardized. The result is likely to be a less iterative cycle of mitigating risks, reducing overhead costs while enhancing operational efficiency and organizational productivity. It is better to evaluate the pos-


sibility of security flaws long before someone exploits them. That some- one is out there — a motivated, mali- cious attacker looking for design vul- nerabilities who is persistent about finding them as long as there is an IoT. That is reason enough for re- quiring cybersecurity planning at the earliest possible time — the design stage of development. r


February, 2020


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