and the absence of government relief for pastoral- ists, the livelihoods of many Tuaregs (a pastoralist ethnic group) were devastated, leaving masses of people living in extreme poverty and food insecu- rity, which in turn allowed the ranks of the armed rebel factions to swell and coerced others to steal and loot. Figure 2 confirms that, on a broader scale, violent
civil conflict events on the African continent were more frequent in countries that were also harder hit by climate- and weather-related disasters.18 Te total number of people affected by such disasters in 2000–2013 is significantly correlated with the total number of violent civil conflict events (p = 0.33) as well as the number of fatalities in these events (p = 0.33).19 Of course, correlation does not imply cau- sality. Countries that were particularly vulnerable both to climate- and weather-related disasters as well as to violent civil conflicts include most coun- tries in the Greater Horn of Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, and the Sudan), Mali, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. Tere is also anecdotal evidence that climate-
and weather-related disasters—and specifically the inability of governments to mitigate their impacts—have contributed to civil conflict in Middle Eastern countries. Te Syrian civil war, for example, broke out aſter the country faced devas- tating droughts between 2006 and 2010. With such vast proportions of territory unsuitable for agri- culture and herding, 80 percent of the catle died by 2009, while water shortage and arid weather destroyed the livelihoods of more than 50 percent of the farmers and herders, sparking mass migra- tion toward the cities. Te reduced availability of wheat and barley also pushed up bread prices and increased food insecurity, especially among the drought-affected population.20 In total, 2–3 mil- lion people were affected by the drought, 800,000 of whom became vulnerable to extreme poverty, losing almost everything. Inadequate responses by the Syrian government to the crisis further antag- onized the population. Although it is likely that the government’s failure to adequately respond to the 2006–2010 drought was one of the factors that triggered the protests in March 2011, it is important to consider this event alongside a list
of longstanding political, social, and economic grievances.21
Epidemics Spread More Easily in Countries Plagued by Political Instability and May Increase the Risk of Civil Conflict Despite the global progress in medical research, coverage of vaccination against common infectious diseases, and the reduction in malnutrition rates, the recent Ebola outbreak in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone has underscored not only the lack of health system capacity to deal with highly infec- tious diseases in these countries, but also the threat that health shocks can pose to social and politi- cal stability. In most cases, the risk of social unrest is not
related to the occurrence of a health shock per se, but is rather associated with the perception of inadequate responses and policies by governments and international actors. For example, the Liberian government’s August 2014 decision to impose a
Violent civil conflict events on the African continent were more frequent in countries that were also harder hit by climate- and weather-related disasters.
quarantine in Ebola hot spots of the capital, which was made against the recommendations of interna- tional health experts and local health officials, has resulted in violent clashes between the army and residents of these communities. Although isolating Ebola-affected areas was a successful strategy used in some rural areas in past outbreaks in the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo,22 the implementation of a quarantine in densely populated urban areas pres- ents a whole new set of challenges and may even help spread the disease as people in these areas are forced to crowd together for humanitarian aid.23 With quar- antined residents already living in precarious condi- tions, the failure of public authorities to effectively deliver basic human services to these communities,
CONFLICT AND FOOD INSECURITY 55
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