XXI


Figure ES.5: The range of estimated potential emission reductions in various NSA studies.


Figure ES.5a: Emission reduction potential of pledged commitments by NSAs.


70 Individual commitments 0.53 60 0.46 50 1.85 0.02 0.45 0.55 3.7 3.7 8 40 19 Ranges


Scaled up potential based on assumptions


40 2ºC scenario Single Initiatives 0.4 0.74 1.40 5.5


59 56


Current policy scenario


Unconditional NDC scenario


Multiple Initiatives 65


No policy baseline


Figure ES.5b: Scaled up potential emission reductions based on single and multiple initiatives.


* Data-Driven Yale, NewClimate Institute, and PBL Netherlands


Source: Based on data in table 5.2. Note: a) For studies that include ranges, median estimates are provided with ranges indicated in fi gures ES.5a and ES.5b. b) Studies that are cross-hatched evaluate single and multiple ICI goals rather than individual actors’ recorded and quantifi ed pledges. They rely on assumptions of future scaled-up impact and therefore represent potential rather than a quantifi ed analysis of individual actors’ NSA pledges. c) Extrapolation of 2025 estimates has been made.


compared with current policy. A more comprehensive assessment of all non-state and subnational climate action occurring globally is limited by the current low level of available data and lack of consistent reporting on non-state and subnational climate action.


compared with full unconditional NDC implementation, and up to 1.85 GtCO2


e/year (range 0.2–0.7 GtCO2 e/year (range 1.5–2.2 GtCO2


Non-state actors need to adopt common principles when formulating their actions. Such principles should include clear and quantifi able targets based on relevant benchmarks, technical capacity of the actors, availability of fi nancial incentives and the presence of regulatory support.


6. Fiscal policy reform can play a key role in creating strong incentives for low-carbon investments and reducing GHG emissions. Revenues from carbon


However, the additional emission reductions under full implementation of pledged commitments made so far by individual non-state actors are still quite limited: up to 0.45 GtCO2


e/year) by 2030 e/year)


pricing can be used for reducing other taxes, increase spending on social issues or compensating low-income households. Well-designed fi scal reform packages can reduce the costs of mitigating emissions, thereby making these fi scal reforms more socially acceptable. The use of carbon pricing to reduce GHG emissions is still only emerging in many countries and generally not applied at a suffi cient level to facilitate a real shift towards low- carbon societies.


Fiscal policy is a key government tool for managing and infl uencing the national economy and can be used to tax fossil fuels or subsidize low-emission alternatives as a way of infl uencing carbon emissions and ultimately investments in the energy sector.


Pricing of carbon emissions through taxes or domestic emissions trading systems is, in many countries, part of the national climate policy and is referenced in many NDCs as one of the possible policy tools to be used. Before 2005, when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, hardly any emissions were covered by carbon taxes or


Annual GHG emissions in 2030 (GtCO2e)


America's Pledge (2018)


Kuramochi et al. (2017) Yale-NCI-PBL* (2018) 1a


Yale-NCI-PBL* (2018) 1b Roelfsema (2017)


Arup and C40 Cities (2014)


Global Covenant of Mayors (2018) Compact of Mayors (2015)


The Climate Group (2017)


Erickson and Tempest (2014) Roelfsema et al. (2018)


CDP and WeMeanBusiness (2016)


Graichen et al. (2017) Yale-NCI-PBL* (2018)


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85  |  Page 86  |  Page 87  |  Page 88  |  Page 89  |  Page 90  |  Page 91  |  Page 92  |  Page 93  |  Page 94  |  Page 95  |  Page 96  |  Page 97  |  Page 98  |  Page 99  |  Page 100  |  Page 101  |  Page 102  |  Page 103  |  Page 104  |  Page 105  |  Page 106  |  Page 107  |  Page 108  |  Page 109  |  Page 110  |  Page 111  |  Page 112