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www.us-tech.com
July, 2014
Avoid Performance Concerns Caused By Counterfeit Components
By Jeffrey Paulownia
nents and integrated circuits (ICs) have invaded the supply chains for a wide range of commercial, industrial, and military electronic design projects. And while they might represent a financial advan- tage (for someone), such counterfeit devices typi- cally represent a compromise in performance and reliability compared to the genuine components and ICs from original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). Counterfeit electronic devices do not need to comply with performance and safety specifica- tions. Because they are counterfeit, they are not tested or approved to any standards. Counterfeit electronic components can represent serious finan- cial liabilities to manufacturers. Manufacturers can be held responsible for accidents that result from problems with counterfeit electronic compo- nents. Counterfeit electronic components are not always easy to identify, but by following some sim- ple guidelines, they can be spotted and avoided. Counterfeiting of electronic components has
C
grown into international business valued at bil- lions in US dollars per year. Counterfeit parts can start as new parts that are relabeled, to misrepre- sent those parts as having higher grades of per- formance. Or counterfeit parts can be old parts that are misrepresented as new parts. They might have even been components or ICs that were defec- tive and scrapped by the original manufacturer, but salvaged by a counterfeiter and recycled to be sold as new devices. Counterfeit parts need not only be expensive components, since relatively inexpensive electronic components are also victims of counterfeiting. Consumers who have purchased products with counterfeit components or ICs are often not aware of it, and many consumers view counterfeiting of electronic components as “a vic-
Light-Guided Connector Assembly
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and voice commands.
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unconnected wire with probe or finger.
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flash. Computer also reads pin number in natural voice.
insertion.
CAMI Research Inc.
CAMI ®
ounterfeit electronic components have become more than a minor concern for users of electronic products. Counterfeit compo-
timless crime,” since the counterfeit parts often provide satisfactory performance and remain undetected in many applications. Many applications for electronic products can-
not afford the decreased performance and reliability represented by a counterfeit component or ICs, how- ever. For applications in medical electronic systems, for example, an under-performing counterfeit elec-
terfeit components and ICs, to the extent that the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is now exploring possi- ble solutions to simplify the identification of coun- terfeit electronic devices in military and Department of Defense (DoD) applications. DARPA (
www.DARPA.mil), for example, has established its Supply Chain Hardware Integrity for Electronics Defense (SHIELD) program to com- bat counterfeiting in electronics. It is seeking pro- posals for some form of identifying component or dialet, no more than 100 X 100µm in size, that would contain a full encryption engine, sensors, and other mechanisms to authenticate a compo- nent. It would be added to a component, microchip, or its package but without electrical connections to the existing device, to provide close to 100 percent assurance against counterfeiting. DARPA refers to the dialet as low in cost (less than a penny per component) but robust and reliable. Component authenticity is checked by scanning the dialet with a handheld or automated prober. Manufacturers and distributors seeking to
The SHIELD program from DARPA uses an identifying mechanism or dialet on each electronic component to greatly increase the difficulty of counterfeiting any compo- nent so treated. (Photo courtesy of DARPA,
www.darpa.mil.)
tronic device can literally mean a matter of life and death. Similar serious consequences can occur from under-achieving counterfeit parts in defense elec- tronics systems, where the failure of a single part can jeopardize lives and missions.
Military Hard Hit by Fakes Military electronics applications have been
particularly hard hit by a growing influx of coun-
avoid counterfeit electronic components can sidestep problems through improved inventory management, by performing proper sampling and inspection of incoming components. By acknowledging the dan- gers of using counterfeit components, and establish- ing an anti-counterfeiting policy, a manufacturer or distributor can help fight against counterfeiting. Other methods of combating counterfeit electronic devices include the use of improved quality-control methods, improved communications in the supply chain, the use of registered trademarks and copy- rights, and by joining trade associations for support against counterfeiting. Use of anti-counterfeiting technologies can also help, such as embedding trade- marks in electronic devices, avoiding the use of
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