This page contains a Flash digital edition of a book.
East—have recently emerged as active partners in technical and economic cooperation in develop- ing regions, especially Africa. Official development assistance—or foreign aid—from the emerg- ing donors rose from US$4.6 billion in 2005 to US$10.4 billion in 2009 (Figure 2). Tese donors contributed about 10 percent of global aid flows in 2008.6 China is fast becoming a major investor in


Africa, although Chinese engagement in Afri- can agriculture is both more diverse and smaller than is generally perceived (see Box 12). In 2000, China moved to consolidate this cooperation by establishing the Forum on China–Africa Coopera- tion, which meets every three years. As part of this initiative, China has significantly boosted its aid budget in recent years, with a stronger emphasis on agricultural development. Overall aid from China to Africa is estimated to have almost quadrupled from US$684 million in 2001 to US$2,476 million in 2009.7 At the 2010 United Nations High-Level Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals, China pledged to establish 30 demonstration cen- ters for agricultural technologies in other develop- ing countries, dispatch 3,000 agricultural experts and technicians to these countries, and invite


FIGURE 2 Aid from emerging economies, 2005–09


10 12


2 4 6 8


0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009


Source: Reproduced from K. Smith, Non-DAC Donors and Humanitar- ian Aid: Shifting Structures, Changing Trends (Somerset, UK: Develop- ment Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011). Notes: Aid data are for official development assistance (ODA). OECD is Organ- isation for Economic Co-operation and Development; BRICS is Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa; and DAC is Development Assis- tance Committee.


5,000 agricultural personnel from these countries to China for training. By 2011, China had already established 14 centers for agricultural research in a number of African countries. India is also bolstering its cooperation with Africa. For example, the Africa–India Forum


■ ODA from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE


■ Foreign assistance from BRICS


■ ODA from other non-OECD DAC members


for at least three years. During this time, Chinese experts will demonstrate how the centers can develop income-generation activities to boost sustainability (while also looking for new business opportuni- ties for their institutes and firms). In another experiment, Chinese com-


panies began to lease some of the old Chinese aid projects in the 1990s, as they were privatized: Sukula sugar complex in Mali, Magbass in Sierra Leone, and Koba in Guinea, for instance. In 2004, China’s Ministry of Commerce started to encour- age country-specific opportunities for Chinese agricultural investment: cotton in Egypt, fruit and nuts in Nigeria, sisal


in Tanzania, tobacco in Zimbabwe, and nonspecific crops in Zambia, Ethiopia, Guinea, Benin, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Cameroon. As of yet, few of the existing Chinese


investments in Africa appear to be larger than 5,000 hectares. Several larger Chinese biofuel projects proposed in Zambia (jatropha), Ethiopia (sugarcane), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (maize) have stalled or been abandoned. As a Chinese official commented in Tanzania: “Agriculture is risky. It is hard to have [a] ‘win–win.’” Land transfers frequently pres- ent food security risks for local


communities, and large Chinese farms are no exception. However, surprisingly little evidence exists for the common assumption that the Chinese plan to use African land for China’s own food security. China imports no grain from Africa—instead, cotton, sesame seeds, and tobacco head the list. Chinese agroprocessing companies have con- tractual partnerships with local small- holders who grow cotton (in Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia) and tobacco (in Zimbabwe). The majority of Chinese farms appear to produce food for local markets. The evidence, at least for now, does not support the rumors.1


NEW PLAYERS 71


US $ Billion


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85  |  Page 86  |  Page 87  |  Page 88  |  Page 89  |  Page 90  |  Page 91  |  Page 92  |  Page 93  |  Page 94  |  Page 95  |  Page 96  |  Page 97  |  Page 98  |  Page 99  |  Page 100  |  Page 101  |  Page 102  |  Page 103  |  Page 104  |  Page 105  |  Page 106  |  Page 107  |  Page 108  |  Page 109  |  Page 110  |  Page 111  |  Page 112  |  Page 113  |  Page 114  |  Page 115  |  Page 116  |  Page 117  |  Page 118  |  Page 119  |  Page 120  |  Page 121  |  Page 122  |  Page 123  |  Page 124  |  Page 125  |  Page 126