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Court Watch


In 2006, Alwan and Hammadi were granted ref- ugee status and permitted to live in the United States, even though they were arrested by Iraqi authorities for partaking in the insurgency against U.S. troops. U.S. Homeland Security officials ac- knowledged its failure to properly review Alwan’s records, claiming that its original screening pro- cess had gaps because it was a newly formed administration. Now that it has filled those gaps, Homeland Security is able to effectively cross reference individuals’ names and fingerprint data with intelligence information and watch lists. The FBI investigated Alwan since September 2009 for his involvement in the insurgency from 2003 un- til May 2006. Alwan recruited Hammadi to aid in the shipment of weapons and cash to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Alwan and Hammadi were arrested in May 2011. Alwan is charged with conspiracy to kill US nationals abroad; conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction; distributing information about improvised explosive devices; conspiracy to trans- fer, possess, and export Stinger missiles; and at- tempting to provide material support to terrorists and al-Qaeda. Hammadi is charged with attempt- ing to provide material support to terrorists and conspiracy to transfer and possess weapons. If convicted of all the charges, both Alwan and Ham- madi could be sentenced to life in prison.


* Submitted by Christine Long


Bahrain’s Military Court Sentences Over 110 Protestors in One Week


From October 3 to October 6, 2011 Bahrain’s mili- tary court, the National Safety Court, sentenced over 110 protesters to prison terms between one to 25 years for crimes ranging from rioting to at- tempted murder. The Bahraini civilian defendants are mostly Shiites demonstrating against the rul- ing Sunni monarchy. During this time period, the protesters who were sentenced included politi- cians, professional soccer players, university stu- dents, and groups of women.


The National Safety Court is a special military court established to try protesters, opposition leaders, rights activists, and supporters of the anti-gov- ernment demonstrations. Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa created the Court during a state of emergency in March 2011. The National Safety Court has been internationally criticized for try- ing civilians in a military court; rendering severe punishments; violating due process; and lacking transparency. Amnesty International describes the court as “a parody of justice” and Human Rights Watch describes it as a “travesty of justice.”


Shiites compose 70 percent of Bahrain’s popu- lation and they have been discriminated by the Sunni monarchy for years. Once King Khalifa suc- ceeded his father in 1999, he promised a constitu- tional monarchy with a newly elected Parliament. However, legislative appointments and gerryman- dering have allowed Sunnis to maintain power. The government has institutionalized discrimina- tion against the Shiites by limiting their rights in housing, education, and employment. Military and security forces consist mostly of Sunni foreigners because they forbid Shiites from joining.


Anti-government protests by Shiites have regularly occurred throughout Bahrain since late 2009. The revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia inspired Bahrainis to effectively unite and lead their own uprising against their oppressive government. Bahrain’s rev- olution began in February 2011, when protesters seized Pearl Square and camped there for weeks. In March, Khalifa ordered a crackdown on the pro- testers. With the aid of 1,200 Saudi troops, Khal- ifa’s forces removed protesters and demolished the square’s monument. Then Khalifa declared a state of emergency lasting until June. Khalifa’s forces crushed the uprising and suppressed the protesting Shiite opposition with mass arrests, torture, job dismissals, and increased discrimina- tion. The emergency laws allowed forces to search houses without a warrant and to eradicate any or- ganization that threatens the government, includ- ing political parties. Even though the official state


ILSA Quarterly » volume 20 » issue 2 » December 2011


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