South Africa Compared to the other BRICS members, South
Africa has had a bit of a unique recent history. Many countries experienced strong growth leading up to the 2007 recession, but South Africa’s metalcasting industry began to contract in 2002. After producing 511,616 tons that year, metalcasters’ total production slid to 368,700 in 2006. South Africa rebounded in a major way from the global recession, reaching an all-time high produc- tion of 538,944 tons in 2010, but production again has decreased in recent years, falling to 375,000 in 2012.
南非
相较于其他金砖国家成员，南非有相对独特的发展历 程。许多国家经历了强劲的增长导致了2007年的经济衰 退，但南非的铸造业2002年就开始下滑。在当年产量达 到511,616吨后，总产量下滑至2006年的 368,700吨。 南非在全球经济衰退时反而产量反弹，2010年达到历史 最高产量538,944吨，但最近几年产量又在下降，2012 年下降到375,000吨。
T e participation of the member countries in the group
apparently presents insurmountable heterogeneities, in addition to the game of interests, often confl icting. Will there be egalitarian or proportional criteria? What kind of mechanisms will there be for veto and vote? Regarding the convictions or sanctions for the member countries, what will be the limits? On the other hand, does this represent a progressive alliance to justify excessive authoritarianism and social exclusion, peculiar to members of the BRICS? Finally, each country still depends on the current sys-
tem, and therefore, will act with all caution. Each country interprets or feels the BRICS in its own way, thus hinder- ing economic, fi nancial, commercials and political integra- tion processes. T e respective governments may use this union more
to demonstrate that their countries are not isolated, either because they are able to oppose the arrogance of the West, or they want to save their own image in the national con- text, or be able to demonstrate that they do not submit to the most powerful. Perhaps the only benefi t to Brazil would be to build a
political and commercial environment closest to the group, and thus be able to improve the relationship for our spe- cifi c demands with the leaders of each country. Finally, in the medium term, the Brazilian casting
industry should not have any advantage of direct real growth due to the creation of the BRICS Investment Bank. In the long term, changes in the sectors covered in the
fi rst stage, such as in agriculture, infrastructure, mining, machines and equipment, and fi nally energy, may bring some indirect benefi ts to the Brazilian metalcasting industry.”
组织产生冲击。
金砖国家的合作，显然具有不能逾越的民族差异 性，还有利益博弈，因此冲突是不可避免的。是否存 在平均主义或者按比例分配的标准？将会采用什么样 的否决和选举机制？成员国之间的信任和制裁的底线 是什么？另一方面，尤其对于金砖成员来说，这是否 代表着一个为过度独裁主义和社会排斥辩解的进步联 盟？
最后，我们注意到每个国家仍依靠现有的体制，因 此，他们将非常谨慎。每个国家对于金砖组织的理解 不同，这也阻碍了其经济、金融、商业和政治的一体 化进程。
每个国家的政府可能更多地通过这个联合体来向外 界透露：他们并不是彼此孤立的，他们有能力压制西 方的强势，或者他们考虑的是自己的国家形象，体现 他们不向西方强势妥协的姿态。
对于巴西来说，唯一的利好可能是通过营造与金砖 组织最为密切的政治和商业环境，为满足自身利益， 改善与其他成员国领导人的关系。
最后，中期来看，巴西铸造业不会因金砖国家开发 银行的成立而获得任何直接的实实在在的发展优势。 长远来看，金砖国家开发银行的成立将会给第一阶 段所覆盖的行业，例如农业、基础设施、采矿、机械 设备以及能源行业带来一些间接的利好。
September 2014
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