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Page 54


www.us-tech.com


Identify Imitations To Avoid Counterfeit Parts


Continued from page 48


increase the risk of dealing with counterfeit components. If an author- ized distributor must go outside their usual line card for a specific compo- nent, steps should be taken to ensure that the additional source supplying the needed component is authorized or is the actual manufacturer of the component.


Know Your Supplier A third tip is to take additional


precautions when authorized compo- nents suppliers are not available. If


the obsolete component can improve the chances of avoiding a counterfeit component. The supplier should be willing


to supply a copy of their counterfeit mitigation policy and information about how the component has been verified as authentic. The supplier should be willing to provide docu- mentation regarding the component’s origin, and allow full inspection of the product upon receipt. In many applications, counter-


feit parts can introduce issues of reli- ability and unwanted risk, in addi- tion to compromising the performance of a final product. Knowing how to identify counterfeit parts is one way to eliminate them from the supply chain. Buying compo- nents only from author- ized sources is another way.


Manu facturers, dis-


Labels for parts can also be counterfeited, which may be revealed by inconsistent coding schemes.


obsolete components are needed for an existing application, an author- ized supplier simply may not be available. In such a case, having some familiarity with a supplier for


Light-Guided Connector Assembly


Use this new, patented system to double your productivity* when assembling circular and rectangular connectors. The Light Director™ system uses light fibers driven by super-bright LED lamps to individually illuminate target cavities in the connector being assembled. When you enter the wire code printed on unconnected wires or touch a wire terminated at the other end, software turns on the appropriate fiber, thereby causing a bright, flashing light to project from inside the target cavity guiding you to the proper insertion point. Correct insertion is confirmed by the elimination of light from that location, whereas insertion into an incorrect cavity leaves the flashing light visible.


 


® Model M3U PC-based cable test system. Electrical test after build possible.





 Pinning. Probed guided assembly also available.


 and voice commands.


 your mating connector and we will mount and program it at no charge.


www.cableeye.com/LightDirector Tel: (800) 776-0414


 unconnected wire with probe or finger.


*Field testing has shown a doubling of assembly speed while practically eliminating errors.


 flash. Computer also reads pin number in natural voice.


  insertion.


CAMI Research Inc. 


CAMI ®


tributors, and customers who are members of the Electronic Components In - dustry Association (ECIA, www.eciaauth or ized.com) are quite serious about eliminating counterfeit components and main- taining the integrity of the supply chain, for the good of this nation and for


the good of the world. Contact: Allied Electronics, Inc.,


7151 Jack Newell Blvd. South, Fort Worth, TX 76118 % 866-433-5722 Web: www.alliedelec.com r


June, 2013


Is This the Right Way to Eliminate Counterfeits?


Continued from page 52


would violate the JEDEC standard. This will definitely cause procure- ment problems for the DLA unless JESD 31 is changed. The original components manu-


facturers continue to say the DLA and its subcontractors, such as Raytheon or Lockheed, should buy product from the original manufac- turer and their certified distributors only. If they were to do this, most manufacturers believe that 80 per- cent of the DLA procurements would be guaranteed to be authentic with a known chain of custody. DNA would not be necessary for sales directly to DLA from the AVL. If the DLA were to accomplish


this, it would require significant changes to its procurement rules. The DLA must establish an approved vendors list (AVL) of qualified suppli- ers starting with the existing QML (Qualified manufacturers list) suppli- ers and their authorized distributors. These are manufacturers that have been audited by DLA insuring com- pliance to military requirements, and they supply commercial product with similar high quality standards. The DLA DIBBS bidding board


must be sent only to the approved vendors (AVL) first and if it is not bid by them (20 percent) the no-bids can be opened up to QSLD-certified bro- kers (Qualified Suppliers List of Distributors) and distributors. This will be followed by an engi-


neering review by DLA of these third parties, including a source inspection


of the product testing and C of C insuring best compliance possible. These brokers and distributors should DNA mark the components so if there is a counterfeit product found later the DLA knows who shipped it to them. This is a good use for the DNA


marking. The DLA should also require product bagged in tamper- proof bags — using technology not unlike what commercial off-the-shelf drugs use — to insure the user in DLA is getting the exact unmolested part procured under the new rules. Military subcontractors are moving towards these procurement practices particularly after NDAA 2012 Section 818 was implemented. Buying from brokers and dis-


tributors is inherently risky. It should only be done as a last resort when purchasing from the original manufacturer or authorized distribu- tor becomes unwieldy because of smaller purchase lot sizes. The government, through cur-


rent FARs (Federal Acquisition Regulation), buys from the cheapest bidder. This policy is obviously fraught with danger. Cost should not be a consideration when the lives of members of our military are at stake. They have volunteered to defend our nation, our people and our freedoms; let’s not give them weapons that will kill them instead of our enemies. Contact: Lansdale Semiconductor, Inc., 5245 South 39th Street, Phoenix, AZ 85040-9008 % 602-438-0123 fax: 602-438-0138 Web: www.lansdale.com r





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