HEALTH & SAFETY
formulated such an approach in 1988 via their “Tolerability of Risk” [TOR] guidance. It identified a level of risk that was ordinarily accepted by substantial groups of workers in UK industry. This level represented the dividing line between what is just about tolerable to an individual in their working life and is unacceptable for all but exceptional groups [e.g. fisherman and divers]. This value was an individual risk of fatality of 1 in 1000 per annum.
This guidance also identified a maximum level of risk to the general public that society should be prepared to tolerate. This threshold was set an order of magniutude lower at 1 in 10,000 per annum, recognising that the public are unlikely to get direct benefit from exposure to a given industrial risk. This threshold corresponded to the average annual risk of dying in a road traffic accident, hence ensuring that their overall risk exposure could not be significantly increased through any industrial endeavour.
Conversely, the guidance defined a lower bound of tolerability whereby risks lower than this are considered broadly acceptable without further action. This threshold was set at an individual risk of fatality of 1 in 1 million per annum corresponding broadly to the risk of death from naturally occurring events such as lightning, over which we have little or no control. A risk below this threshold will clearly not significantly increase the risk to an individual and hence is considered broadly acceptable.
These thresholds, which have remained unchanged ever since, establish three distinct risk tolerability regions as illustrated in Figure 1. Risks that fall within the middle region are only considered tolerable if all reasonably practicable measures have been taken to reduce risk and that the time, cost, effort and inconvenience of implementing further risk reduction measures are grossly disproportionate to the benefit obtained. This is the basis of the HSE’s principle of “ALARP” [As Low As Reasonably Practicable] which we will explore in more detail in a future issue.
The HSE’s “Reducing Risk, Protecting
Unacceptable region
Risk cannot be jusfied save in extraordinary circumstances
Tolerable only if risk reducon is impraccable or if its cost is
grossly disproporonate to the improvement gained
Tolerable if ALARP
region Risk is taken only if a benefit is required
These criteria are generally accepted internaonally as applicable for
hazardous industries
Tolerable if cost of reducon would exceed the improvement
Broadly acceptable region
Risk generally insignificant. Risk reducon usually not required (unless reasonably praccable)
Workers & Public 10-6 IRPA
IRPA: Individual Risk Per Annum Figure 1: Tolerability Of Risk “Carrot Diagram”
People” document [Reference 1] sets- out the HSE’s current expectations on risk based decision making and is founded on the original TOR guidance.
Care should be taken when using these risk tolerability criteria as the defined thresholds represent an individual’s total risk exposure. For example, a typical hazardous development may contain a number of hazards. The risk from each of these hazards may, in isolation, be shown to be tolerable but when they are summated this may no longer be the case. As such, we must be mindful of considering the total risk picture presented by our activities and judging that totality against these acceptance criteria.
It is important to note that simply assessing the effect on individuals via this approach may not be sufficient in demonstrating a risk to be tolerable. Large scale, emotive incidents raise questions of responsibility for safety and public accountability in a way that accidents to individuals do not. As such, society is likely to be much less tolerant of these. Consideration must therefore be given to wider societal effects and implications. We will touch on this in a future issue although it is unlikely to be a major issue for the Wind Industry as, unlike a nuclear power station or major chemical plant, an incident is unlikely to affect large numbers of people.
Whilst this article has focused on safety
www.windenergynetwork.co.uk 23
risks, it is equally appropriate that business, security and environmental risks may be considered for tolerability. There is little benefit in having a process which is demonstrably safe to the workers and public if the risk it poses to the environment or business continuity is intolerable.
Gareth Ellor
Risktec Solutions Ltd
www.risktec.co.uk
Workers 10-3 IRPA
Public 10-4 IRPA
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