SCHOOL QUALITY, CLUSTERING, AND GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY 47
evidence from KwaZulu-Natal shows that school fees and per-learner govern- ment subsidies improve school quality, decreasing the LER and implying that more progressive allocation of subsidies can improve the quality of schools located in under-resourced communities. Policy implications are discussed in the final section.
Dependence of School Quality on Local Resources School quality is a function of school inputs, which in the context of South Africa are determined by local resource availability (through school fees) and government subsidy. Here “school quality” does not mean learning achieve- ments or educational outcomes. We assume that a given outcome is a func- tion of not only school quality (inputs)—including the availability of qualified teaching staff—but also of learners’ family backgrounds and their own efforts and ability. This chapter focuses on the resources available to schools. Distinguishing between school inputs and educational outcomes is impor- tant. To analyze the determinants of educational outcomes, it is necessary to use some outcome measures such as test scores at the individual level or school averages. Qualified empirical analyses prove significant causal effects of school inputs on achievement (for example, Card and Krueger 1996; Angrist and Lavy 1999; Case and Deaton 1999; Krueger 1999; Hoxby 2000; Dustman, Rajah, and Soest 2003), though the literature has in general drawn mixed con- clusions (Hanushek 1998), and causality seems to depend on subjects (Steele, Vignoles, and Jenkins 2007).
In the context of South Africa, Case and Deaton (1999) show that school resources, measured by LER, can explain test scores using variations in the ratio from that under apartheid.
More directly van der Berg (2007) used matriculation test pass rates to ana- lyze the effects of school resources and socioeconomic factors on learners’ learning performance. School fees, LER, and average teacher salary signifi- cantly influence the matriculation pass rate. Interestingly, former depart- ments also have a significant effect on the rate. However, if the sample is restricted to formerly African schools, LER loses its statistical significance, implying that resource variations within this group are not relatively large. The level of school fees, correlated with local socioeconomic factors (as dis- cussed later), significantly explains the matriculation pass rate even within formerly African schools.5
5 In his paper, van der Berg (2007) argues that historical factors, such as former departments, teacher quality, and school management, are more important than school resources in deter- mining school performance. Former departments are clearly correlated with matriculation pass rates. This tendency did not change even with progressive changes in school resource allocation
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100 |
Page 101 |
Page 102 |
Page 103 |
Page 104 |
Page 105 |
Page 106 |
Page 107 |
Page 108 |
Page 109 |
Page 110 |
Page 111 |
Page 112 |
Page 113 |
Page 114 |
Page 115 |
Page 116 |
Page 117 |
Page 118 |
Page 119 |
Page 120 |
Page 121 |
Page 122 |
Page 123 |
Page 124 |
Page 125 |
Page 126 |
Page 127 |
Page 128 |
Page 129 |
Page 130 |
Page 131 |
Page 132 |
Page 133 |
Page 134 |
Page 135 |
Page 136 |
Page 137 |
Page 138 |
Page 139 |
Page 140 |
Page 141 |
Page 142 |
Page 143 |
Page 144 |
Page 145 |
Page 146 |
Page 147 |
Page 148 |
Page 149 |
Page 150