Country Watch
prosecuted because they had yet to ratify the Rome Statute amendments, which prohibit such attacks. On September 14, 2013, Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was entered into force one month later.
On September 27, 2013, the United Nations Se- curity Council passed a resolution demanding the destruction of Syria’s chemical arsenal. Specifi- cally, the resolution mandated that Syria abandon its chemical arsenal, and that weapons inspec- tors be given free access to Syria’s military facili- ties. While the resolution also endorses plans for a political transition, it noticeably omits attributing blame for the August 21 sarin attack, and it does not provide for punitive actions should Syria fail to comply. Instead, the resolution relies on Chap- ter 7 of the United Nations Charter regarding en- forcement provisions via strikes or sanctions.
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The resolution aims to disarm Syria’s chemical weapons cache by 2014. First, inspectors over- saw the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons production, mixing, and filling equipment. As of the November 1, 2013 deadline, the OCPW has confirmed that Syria has destroyed 22 of 23 of its declared sites. This will prevent further weapons from being manufactured. After the November deadline, inspectors will support, monitor, and verify the destruction of those weapons by the June 30, 2014 deadline. Instead of United Nations inspectors, like those who inspected the August sarin attacks, chemical experts from the intergov- ernmental group Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will undertake the disarming of Syria’s chemical weapons.
Although a widely praised action, destroying an entire chemical arsenal in the midst of a civil war is unprecedented. While the OPCW is accus- tomed to on-site inspections of chemical weap- ons abuses, they have never actively dismantled a national chemical-weapons program during a civil war against armed opposition that has also been accused of using poisonous gases. More-
over, neither the Syrian government nor its op- position groups have arranged a cease-fire that would allow OPCW specialists access to weapon sites in rebel-held areas. While most facilities and stockpiles are in areas controlled by the Assad regime, Walid Muallem, Syria’s foreign minister, has stated that seven of the 19 declared sites are in combat zones. Thus, protecting those special- ists has become a significant concern; nations like Russia have offered armed guards to support the United Nations guards and Syrian military personnel tasked to protect OPCW specialists. OPCW teams were expected to have overseen the destruction of Syria’s chemical-weapons- manufacturing program by November 1, 2013. In the months following, they aim to destroy, dismantle, and deliver into safekeeping Syria’s chemical weapons cache.
*Submitted by Steven Wu Egypt Does Not Extend State of Emergency
On October 22, 2013, the Egyptian Prime Min- ister’s media advisor, Sherif Shawqy, announced that the Egyptian government does not plan to extend the state of emergency that was initially imposed on August 14 and that expires mid-No- vember 2013.
The decision not to extend the state of emer- gency is likely premised upon the fact that the Egyptian constitution requires the government to subject a state of emergency to a public referen- dum after three months.
Former president Hosni Mubarak imposed a state of emergency for much of his 30-year rule, in a supposed battle against terrorism. Declar- ing a state of emergency gives security forces greater power to arrest individuals, restrict public gatherings, and restrict press freedoms. It grants security forces powers to detain people for any period of time and for virtually any reason. The state of emergency was lifted shortly after Muba-
ILSA Quarterly » volume 22 » issue 2 » December 2013
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