past, as well as for their potential to provide varying perspectives and generate discussion. The room was almost full to capacity, with over 150
planners, architects, other professionals and citizens in attendance. Bula began by citing Malcolm Gladwell’s book Outliers, in which he said an accident generally takes the accumulation of seven errors. In the Olympic Village story, many things were done well; but errors were definitely made, and identifying these pointed to significant lessons learned. Geoff Meggs provided an overview of the milestones
of the Olympic Village development, up to the commis- sioning of an audit and the securing of outside advice, including bringing in new teams for legal, real estate, and construction purposes. The point—that the City lacked the relevant expertise and management struc- tures/frameworks—was mentioned by a number of panelists. This could be taken as Lesson One. Michael Geller observed that with municipalities
like Surrey and West Vancouver, and organizations like sfu and ubc, all getting into the land development game, the thought of the day had been, why shouldn’t the City of Vancouver do the same thing? He believes that the City could have completed the Olympic Village successfully if there had been the right man- agement mechanisms in place from the outset, (again, Lesson One). Geller noted that the planning, designing and con-
struction of buildings for the Olympics was a unique undertaking with distinct challenges. The Winter Olympics happens every two years, and has only been hosted in Canada three times. The City had made the deliberate decision to initiate the development as a demonstration project with the intention to be a show- case on the world stage as the greenest in the world. However, the cost implications of that decision were not clear at the time, and other speakers touched on the fact that the decision was not made by citizens. This was Lesson Two—not to make significant deci- sions without all relevant information and the bankrollers (taxpayers) on board. Nancy Knight focused her presentation on the
recent work at ubc: 3,000 housing units planned, 500 of which will be rental. The University began the pro- cess understanding that it was innovation on a grand scale, with high risk; however, they also knew that risk transfer was important. Other speakers also empha- sized that point—that the City had taken all the risk. This is Lesson Three—municipal governments should not accept significant financial risk on behalf of taxpayers. Knight also touched on Lesson One: both ubc and sfu have arms-length development agencies that act as the prime decision makers on issues related to development. The City could have, and likely should have, used a similar model, she said. Doug MacArthur was the final panelist, and
acknowledged that mistakes were made; however, he
stressed the importance of remaining objective and critically evaluating what happened so that the lessons are learned and future projects will benefit. He argued that the Olympic Village project had become a high- cost, high-risk commercial development, which is not what it was intended to be in the beginning. If those intentions had been made clear from the beginning,
The sixth lesson was that the most significant success/failure factor for the project was the very high cost of the land and the expectations for financial return. When UBC builds rental units for its University community, it doesn’t expect the same rate of return on the land as they would otherwise. Yet the City wasn’t willing to take a financial loss on its $193 million dollar investment. Some of the panelists argued that if the City had not placed such high financial expectations on the project, the City and the taxpayers might not be in their current financial situation.
the right market decisions could have been made—but the intentions weren’t clear at the outset (Lesson Four) and outcomes became dependent on political decisions. MacArthur also referred to Lesson One— that the model and management structure that were used were not appropriate: A city government should not be involved in a high-cost, high-risk, commercial development project. A fifth lesson related to the potentially high costs
of sustainability. The Olympic Village pushed green development to the limit. How much more did the project cost because it was “green”? To make it the greenest in the world, the cost to the taxpayer was sig- nificantly more, especially since it strove for leed platinum. While municipalities should focus on invest- ing in initiatives like green neighbourhood energy and more efficient waste management and reduction, the City, in hindsight, could have simply raised the bar, instead of making huge leaps in “green” development. The sixth lesson was that the most significant suc-
cess/failure factor for the project was the very high cost of the land and the expectations for financial return. When ubc builds rental units for its University commu- nity, it doesn’t expect the same rate of return on the land as they would otherwise. Yet the City wasn’t willing to take a financial loss on its $193 million dollar investment. Some of the panelists argued that if the City had not placed such high financial expectations on the project, the City and the taxpayers might not be in their current financial situation.
35
p l an c ana da | summe r · étÉ 201 1
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56