of other financial instruments for urban goods and services. The real, direct costs associated with development choices must also be both transparent and apparent. The implication of this analysis is not to
simply reverse the subsidies and subsidize efficient development, as is sometimes rec- ommended. Though this may be warranted in certain circumstances, in the absence of accurate pricing, this simply represents a subsidy to counter the effects of an exist- ing, systemic subsidy. Rather, the aim is to create a level playing field of accurate pric- ing across all development types and locations. This would result in a recalibra- tion, in which prices for the urban goods and services related to the less efficient development would typically increase, and for more efficient development would typi- cally decrease. This in and of itself would be a powerful force in curbing urban sprawl. It would do so without limiting choice or dictating densities. Those who favour low density or more distant loca- tions would be free to choose them, but now the prices they pay would represent the actual costs associated with that devel- opment, and would not be borne unknowingly by others. Mispricing artificially inflates the
demand for sprawl, and artificially reduces the demand for more efficient develop- ment. This is not what a properly functioning market, one based on accurate price signals, would deliver. To some it might seem dubious that an approach that relies more on the market could deliver more sustainable, efficient urban form.
However, by definition, the job of the mar- ket is the efficient allocation of resources, and sprawl is, in essence, a gross misalloca- tion of resources. But only a market that is functioning correctly—that is, one based on accurate price signals and good infor- mation—will deliver these results. It is therefore difficult to conceive of a convincing rationale for the status quo— a de facto policy of subsidizing sprawl and discouraging sustainable urban development. As planners, it is imperative for us to understand these often complex and opaque forms of mispricing, as they play such a key role in driving urban develop- ment patterns. This means recognizing not only how they operate in general, but iden- tifying specifically how they operate within the context of our own municipalities— through what specific financial instruments or programs (including property taxes, user fees, development charges), and with what outcomes. In most cases this will require an objective audit and analysis of a municipal- ity’s existing policy landscape. Ultimately planners need to be routinely
involved in the development of municipal fiscal policy and programs, to ensure that these support planning objectives, and to make it clear to politicians and the public when they do not. It is important that the issues around mispricing be raised so that we can have an informed debate leading to conscious and transparent decision-making around municipal finance and urban form. Finally, awareness of this issue needs to be raised among citizens and activists, so that
pressure can be brought to bear on politicians. Planning approaches to sprawl that rely
on regulation and design are not enough. Indeed, regulation in the form of too pro- scribed zoning or overly complex approval processes are often cited as contributing to sprawl. Mispricing is not the only reason for sprawl; regulatory obstacles remain and planning approaches would need to be bet- ter aligned with a more efficiently operating market. But real progress in mov- ing toward sustainable, efficient communities cannot be made without addressing the mispricing issue. For a more in-depth exploration of this
theme, please refer to my 2010 book, Perverse Cities: Hidden Subsidies, Wonky Policy, and Urban Sprawl from ubc Press. ■
PAMELA BLAIS, PHD, MCIP, RPP, is a city planner and principal of Toronto-based Metropole Consultants. In her 20-year career as an urban planning consultant, her work has included reurbanization strategies and research; long-term regional growth planning; municipal economic development strategies; innovative land use policies for industrial areas; urban regeneration strate- gies; sustainable urban form, community design and infrastructure; and research on the impact of technology on urban form. She can be reached at: pblais@metropole
consultants.com
REFERENCES AND NOTES
1. Malenfant EC, Milan A, Charron M, Belanger A. Demographic Changes in Canada from 1971 to 2001 Across an Urban-to-Rural Gradient. Statistics Canada Research Paper. Catalogue no. 91F0015MIE—No. 008; April 2007.
2. Thompson W. The City as a Distorted Price System. Psychology Today 1968;2(3):28-33.
3. Mispricing is also the result of a failure to attach a price to the costs of “externalities” such as air pollution, public health, congestion, greenhouse gas emissions and global warming that are asso- ciated with sprawl. While this plays a role in creating sprawl as well, pricing of externalities is not the focus of this discussion. Here the focus is on the oft-overlooked mispricing of the already priced and market-traded goods and ser- vices that are part of market decisions that shape urban form.
4. Speir C, Stephenson K. Does Sprawl Cost Us All? Journal of the American Planning Association 2002;68(1):56-70.
5. City of Ottawa. Report to Corporate Services and Economic Development Committee and Council; 28 June 2004.
6. Blais P. Perverse Cities: Hidden Subsidies, Wonky Policy and Urban Policy. UBC Press; 2010.
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