728 J. B. Andrews et al.
TABLE 1 The fate of REDD+ pilot projects in Tanzania. These data are for REDD+ pilot projects supported by the Norwegian Embassy1.
Location Lindi
Kilwa
Kondoa Kigoma
Communities issued carbon credits
Yes2 No
Zanzibar No Kilosa
No No No
Shinyanga No Rungwe No
Communities selling carbon credits
No2 No2 No2 No2 No No No
No2 1An additional REDD+ project, in Yaeda Valley, is selling carbon credits as
of 2019 but was not part of the original Norwegian project. 2Data from personal communication to JBA from May 2017 onwards (also see Simonet et al., 2014), updated using online databases as of March 2019.
communities have been motivated with the promise of carbon payments, yet nothing has materialized and there is marked frustration. Internal conflicts emerge when land zoned for high protection contains clove trees; families now plan to revive clove production, to capitalize on im- proved market prices. Community members also feel that the government and/or project is failing to provide them with the anticipated financial assistance. Finally, there is a technical disagreement over the calculation of the value of Zanzibar’s terrestrial carbon (Ravikumar et al., 2017; Supplementary Material 1). In short, outcomes are mixed. There is only weak evidence of slowing deforestation in some shehia, reductions that cannot be directly linked to the Hifadhi ya Misitu ya Asili programme; furthermore, although the programme yields important co-benefits these cannot substitute for increased carbon storage. To some extent the experiences of Hifadhi ya Misitu
ya Asili mirror those from other Tanzanian REDD+ sites (Table 1), and the broader global situation (Sunderlin et al., 2015; Seymour & Busch, 2016). Most notably none of the Norwegian initiative projects appear to have yet generated carbon payments. The measurement, reporting and verifi- cation required for carbon certification demands technical expertise that community-based projects struggle to access (Phelps et al., 2010), leading to long delays, no payments and faltering
communication.More specifically, some studies reveal internal conflicts over land zoning as a common oc- currence (Larson et al., 2013; Dokken et al., 2014), often ex- acerbated by corruption and elite capture, as in Unguja (Benjaminsen, 2014;but seeSutta &Silayo, 2014) and else- where (e.g. Scheba & Rakotonarivo, 2016), as well as failure to reach desired levels of participation (Eilola et al., 2015). Although there are reports of successful community engage- ment in some cases (e.g. Uisso et al., 2019), elsewhere disen- franchisement is emphasized (Bartholdson et al., 2019).More generally, REDD+ projects exist within a complicated web of
NGOs, consultants, government agencies, businesses and international bodies. From the perspective of communities living at the forest edge, and the local organizations that act on their behalf, navigating these networks demands daunting levels of human and social capital.
Recommendations for where REDD+ could work
Not all drivers of deforestation are the same Perhaps themost trenchant critique ofREDD+is that it isun- able to counter political and economic interests that stand to gain fromthe conversionof tropical forests.Examples of these business as usual scenarios are the soy industry in Brazil and oil palm industry in Indonesia, where REDD+ is effectively outbidby commercial
profit-seekers.Links betweencommer- cial logging companiesandgovernmentministers, or between agricultural subsidies and corruption, are a persistent global challenge (e.g. Sills et al., 2014;Capitani et al., 2019). Nonetheless, situations differ by context. On Pemba the
primary drivers of deforestation are local: households ex- tracting fuel and timber, and their expanding agricultural/ clove production. Communities also have interests in the fruits and medicines available in the forest, and children hunt forest birds
andmammals.Althoughthere is some illegal offtake by government and commercial interests, this is not a significant driver of deforestation in comparison to uses by local communities (Terra Global Capital, 2014;Blomley et al., 2016). Even the revival of the historically important clove indus-
try (Sheriff, 1987) on Pemba differs structurally from that of large scale business as usual operations. After a slump in the 1990s, clove prices are currently rebounding towards a his- torical high (Brzoskiewicz, 2018). Although cloves are grown in agroforestry plots and agroforestry is a major source of loss of native forest, there are three factors that mitigate this to some extent. Firstly, cloves are locally-owned, albeit sometimes by affluent families with roots in Oman (reflect- ing the flight of the wealthiest land-owning class to that country after the 1964 revolution); nevertheless, both local and Oman-based clove-owning families have strong kin ties on the island, and are not equivalent to foreign corpor- ate interests. Secondly, cloves are not grown in conventional plantations, but in an agroforestry matrix. As such, cloves do not pose a landscape-level threat comparable to oil palm or soy mono-cropping. Thirdly, because forests interspersed with clove trees contribute to land considered forested by verification standards (because the woody biomass still holds carbon), there is little opportunity cost for communi- ties attempting to maximize carbon storage as they can benefit simultaneously from cloves and carbon. In short, Pemba is not a case where REDD+ is chal- lenged by conventional plantation economies or land grabs.
Oryx, 2021, 55(5), 725–731 © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Fauna & Flora International doi:10.1017/S0030605319001376
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