This page contains a Flash digital edition of a book.
Country Watch


it is a very steep decrease from the level of initial support in 2004 (recording support at 73 percent). This represents approximately a 40 percent drop in support since 2004.


The biggest barrier to Turkey’s accession to the EU, then, may be Turkey itself. Turkey began ne- gotiations in 2005, but as of 2014 only one of the 35 required acquis chapters has been closed. Even if Turkey manages to close the 13 chapters it opened in November 2013, the country is a long way from EU member status. If Turkey wishes to bolster support for EU accession, it needs to strive to find a way to efficiently get through all acquis chapters. In doing so, Turkey will also have to work to find a resolution to the Cyprus issue. If Turkey can do these things with minimal stagna- tion, negotiation barriers, or other mishaps, there may be hope for EU accession.


* Submitted by Rachel Catlett


Deal Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program Set To Begin In January


On November 24, 2013, Iran and the six world powers, United States, France, Germany, Britain, China, and Russia, reached an interim deal regard- ing Iran’s nuclear program. The agreement was an- nounced in the middle of the night in Geneva after long, tortuous days of negotiations between the world powers and Iran. The deal is intended as a first step towards a comprehensive nuclear agree- ment between Iran and the West. The interim deal is for a period of six months and Iran has agreed to halt enriching uranium above five percent, and dilute its stock of 20 percent enriched uranium. Iran has also agreed to delay installation of new centrifuges, devices used to enrich uranium. Fur- thermore, the country will halt work on the heavy- water reactors that could eventually provide the country with a source of plutonium, an essential element of weapons of mass destruction. In re- turn, Iran will receive modest relief of sanctions and limited access to its frozen currency accounts


overseas that is estimated to be less than $7 bil- lion.


Both sides seemed cautious yet pleased with the negotiations. The U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, and his Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Ja- vad Zarif, spent many days closely negotiating the nuclear program. Such intense direct negotiations between these two powers are novel since the two countries have barely had any official contact in the past 34 years. In fact, the only official nego- tiation between the countries was in the form of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. The Tribu- nal was established in 1981 by the two countries to resolve certain claims by nations of one state party against another. However, not everyone was happy with the interim deal. Most notably, Benja- min Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister, expressed his concerns about the agreement. “Today the world has become a much more dangerous place because the most dangerous regime in the world took a significant step towards obtaining the world’s most dangerous weapon,” he stated in a cabinet meeting in November. Additionally, some of the Persian Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, an adversary of Iran in the region, expressed res- ervations about the deal.


The technical talks between the two sides, which included varying implementation measures, start- ed on December 9, 2013. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the entity responsible for regulating Iran’s nuclear program. Part of the No- vember deal includes unlimited and unannounced visits by the IAEA to Iran’s nuclear sites. However, Iran briefly broke them off after the United States blacklisted additional Iranian companies and indi- viduals under the current sanctions. Nevertheless, the two sides resumed talks to set a date for the implementation of the deal. The implementation talks will begin January 21, 2014.


Hesitation over a genuine deal between the two sides is not only international. Many U.S. legisla- tors in Congress have expressed concern about


ILSA Quarterly » volume 22 » issue 3 » February 2014


13


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72  |  Page 73  |  Page 74  |  Page 75  |  Page 76  |  Page 77  |  Page 78  |  Page 79  |  Page 80  |  Page 81  |  Page 82  |  Page 83  |  Page 84  |  Page 85  |  Page 86  |  Page 87  |  Page 88  |  Page 89  |  Page 90  |  Page 91  |  Page 92  |  Page 93  |  Page 94  |  Page 95  |  Page 96  |  Page 97  |  Page 98  |  Page 99  |  Page 100  |  Page 101  |  Page 102  |  Page 103  |  Page 104