Court Watch
heightened in 2011, resulting in dozens of deaths. In April 2011, then-UN Secretary-General Ban Ki- moon released an official statement requesting a ceasefire between the two nations, as well as serious diplomatic dialogue. The Cambodian gov- ernment also petitioned for the ICJ to clarify its original judgment, hoping to “peacefully and defi- nitely settle the boundary problem.” Meanwhile, Thailand maintained that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction to settle the border dispute.
On November 11, 2013, the ICJ released an offi- cial interpretation of the 1962 judgment concern- ing the Temple of Preah Vihear. The ownership of the promontory upon which the Temple is situated was one issue not specified by the original ICJ rul- ing, and the ruling required concessions for both sides. The Temple and promontory are to remain under Cambodia’s control; however, the official in- terpretation also limits Cambodian territorial claims to the Temple and the promontory. The ICJ denied Thailand’s claims that it lacks jurisdiction to settle the border dispute.
While the interpretation was by no means a vic- tory for Thailand, both sides had some territorial gains. Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has expressed her intentions to work with Phnom Penh and the Cambodian government to resolve any outstanding issues. Cambodia has also agreed to honor the ICJ’s ruling.
* Submitted by Joshua Ash
Democratic Repbulic of the Congo: M23 Group Ceases Armed Rebellion
On December 12, 2013, leaders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the M23 militia signed separate peace declarations at a ceremony in Nairobi Kenya. In its declaration, M23 agreed to cease its operations as a rebel group and to orga- nize as a political party. In its separate declaration, the DRC announced that it is seeking to reinte- grate M23 soldiers back into civil society. Unlike
past deals in the DRC, and in Africa in general, this declaration by the DRC does not give defeated warlords high ranking positions in the country’s military, nor does it grant amnesty to those who broke international laws. The DRC has stated that it will not reintegrate those who committed war crimes or crimes against humanity but will seek to prosecute them instead.
A November deal, negotiated in Uganda, was re- jected by the DRC, not because they took issue with the substance of the deal, but rather with the title of it. The DRC would not accept the Uganda- negotiated “accord” because it felt that the word “accord” gave too much legitimacy to M23.
The DRC has been in conflict with various rebel groups for over two decades, with millions of people displaced or killed by warfare, famine, and lack of basic healthcare. Militant groups and the FARDC (the official military of the DRC) have raped, pillaged, and murdered. Most of the fight- ing has been centered in eastern DRC, with the FARDC battling the multitude of armed groups that operate in the region.
M23 takes its name from the March 29, 2009 peace agreement between Uganda and the Na- tional Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). The CNDP was a Tutsi rebel group backed by Rwanda to fight a proxy war with the Demo- cratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group made up of mostly Rwandan Hutus in the eastern part of the DRC. As part of that agreement, CNDP rebels were integrated into the FARDC, a concession that the DRC would later come to regret.
Despite the presence of over a dozen other rebel and armed self-defense groups in DRC, the peace deal with M23 is important for myriad reasons. M23, which formed in 2009, was made up of some of the most notorious killers in the DRC’s history, including FARDC members who were integrated from CNDP, other former CNDP members, and members of Thomas Lubanga’s UPC/FPLC. Many
ILSA Quarterly » volume 22 » issue 3 » February 2014
9
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100 |
Page 101 |
Page 102 |
Page 103 |
Page 104