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Page 49 Tracking Down Counterfeit ICs By Alan Lowne, CEO, Saelig Co., Inc. T


oday’s most prevalent counter- feit chips reportedly represent $169 billion in potential risk


per year for the global electronics world, according to market research firm IHS iSuppli. The most vulnera- ble chip types include analog ICs, microprocessors, memory ICs, and programmable logic devices common- ly used in large volumes in commer- cial and military applications. While much of the scrutiny of counterfeit


untested, and some may not even contain a silicon die.


Parts Authentication Some electronics distributors


have instituted well-advertised screening services to verify the verac- ity of components. Turnaround times are often offered “as little as two days”. These companies have invest- ed heavily in equipment and training for operators who can perform criti- cal anti-counterfeiting processes. These techniques include: x-ray, x- ray fluorescence analysis (XRF), destructive decapsulation, heated


solvent testing, visual inspection, and solderability testing, with ensu- ing complex, detailed reports. All this is expensive and only viable for large volume production runs. We’re looking for an ideal solu-


tion here. What the electronics man- ufacturing industry needs is a test tool that can verify the identity of received ICs quickly and economical- ly, using a statistically significant procedure; a tool that is suitable for all devices and packages; a tool that is simple to use without requiring detailed operator training; a tool that can quickly report “good/suspect/fail”


results; a tool that can grow as new ICs become available.


Help Is Here The good news is that such a


commercially-available device is now available, the ABI Sentry Counter feit IC Detector. Sentry is a PC-driven product that uses a complex Pin - Print™ Test Algorithm to check the validity of parts in seconds. The prod- uct is very simple to use and enables any receiving department to operate the equipment with minimal training. The analysis takes place in the back-


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ABI’s Sentry tester detects fake ICs quickly.


devices has been in the defense industry, by sheer numbers most reported counterfeit issues are with commercial components. IHS also claims that 2011 was a record report- ing year for counterfeits — having tripled in the past two years — lead- ing to potential failures. Other sources say that in the last five years, imitation ICs have accounted for more than 8 percent of global component trade, which is equivalent to lost sales of $6 Billion. Counterfeit electronic compo-


nents are not a new phenomenon, but China’s new export laws have resulted in an explosion of counter- feit parts hitting the electronics mar- ket worldwide.


Re-Marked Product The most common counterfeiting


technique is re-marked product. The counterfeiter removes the printing from the chip package and puts on a new mark — perhaps a different brand, a different speed or a different part number — and sells the semicon- ductor to a buyer who is incapable of ensuring the product is “real”. In some cases, for example when the fake IC is just an empty package containing no chip inside, the product fails before it leaves the factory — but this failure still requires expensive rework. In cases where the wrong chip has been mounted in systems that were designed for a chip of a different speed or guaranteed to operate at a wider temperature range, the failure may not occur until the system is in the field. Field repairs can typically cost ten times as much to fix as those caught before shipping. Counterfeiting can also use


devices known as “pulls” which are retrieved from discarded scrap boards. After rebranding with anoth- er manufacturer’s logo, they are slipped into the supply chain for pur- chase by unwary buyers who natu- rally assume that they are buying the genuine article. Another less-known technique


is for staff to surreptitiously produce components using the normal manu- facturing capabilities in “ghost shifts” which take place outside of standard hours. However, the chips created that way include many man- ufacturing faults, they may be


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