This page contains a Flash digital edition of a book.
even tually gave way to the strategic logic of international re- lations. Both the USSR and Iran recognized boundaries and started working within the international system. ISIS may have a harder time “normalizing” its outlook, because it ex- pressly adheres to an extremist interpretation of Islam. We will have to wait and see if the jihadists of ISIS could become like the revolutionaries of Iran.


I think Jordan and other countries are hardening against ISIS and seeing the need for active resistance. Even Al Qaeda renounced ISIS as too polarizing and extremist. So far, ISIS has not been able to advance beyond the Sunni Arab–domi- nated parts of Iraq and Syria—areas that were devastated by civil war beforehand. But the situation is very tricky: Iran and Russia support the Syrian president Assad, whose forces


Russia and Ukraine As a scholar of Russian politics, Kate Graney is closely following the crisis in Ukraine, from Crimean history to Russia’s stakes to Putin’s endgame: One issue not much covered in the news from Ukraine is that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we had been making really good progress on nuclear arms control, and that’s now derailed. Maybe we even had a false sense of opti- mism that the problem was over, but it’s not. The basically good relations between Russia and Europe and the United States over the past 20 years allowed us to forget that this is still a frightening relationship. Events in Ukraine are bad in and of themselves, and Russia should not be starting a war in eastern Ukraine, but what is perhaps most distressing is the way Russian rhetoric is framing it: that the West needs to remember Russia is a nuclear power and can destroy them. Crimea specifically has a unique history. Catherine the Great first annexed it back in the 1760s, so it was part of Russia for 200 years, until Stalin transferred it to Ukraine in the 1950s—not that long ago. There are real historical ques- tions about where Russia ends and Ukraine begins. While of course the Ukrainian leadership had to say that Putin’s re- annexation was illegal and they would get it back, my sense is that it’s a done deal.


But what Russia is doing in eastern Ukraine is brazenly breaking international norms. I don’t think Putin wants to reconstitute the Soviet Union, but he has pretty effectively told us and the European Union and NATO that things are going to be different now. There are a lot of layers here. There’s his reassertion of superpower status. And then the actual occupation of Ukraine is a very concrete way of say- ing to its neighbors, the other former Soviet republics, that Russia is very serious. Then on a domestic level, I think Putin was spooked by how Ukraine’s leader Yanakovich was toppled—the two of them were in the same position, essen- tially czars of their realms, and then all of a sudden people were protesting in the streets and Yanakovich lost power and fled.


could perhaps defeat ISIS in the medium to long run, while the US and Turkey are backing his opponents in the civil war. Meanwhile, the US wants to maintain decent relations with Iran in hopes of completing negotiations to bring the Iranian nuclear program under control.


Even if ISIS were defeated soon, it would leave the area with no order at all. With so many weapons in so many hands, the ensuing chaos might be even worse than the rule of ISIS. The residents are becoming habituated to ISIS the longer it holds power. Any attempt to defeat it must take seriously the consequences of a breakdown in political order. • Government professor Feryaz Ocakli specializes in international relations, the political economy of development, and Middle East- ern and Turkish politics.


I don’t think the Ukraine would split up willingly, and for now Russia has frozen things where they are, leaving people in eastern Ukraine not knowing—are we part of Russia or not? That’s a very effective strategy for another Putin agen- da: this ambiguity makes it much less likely that the EU will let Ukraine join it. I don’t see Putin as a super mastermind, but he’s smart, he understands how Europe works, and he has played this situation well. As oil prices drop and the Russian economy shrinks, I think he’s going to hold on even tighter. I fear the situation is just going to fester, which is tragic for the people living there.


The only thing that gives me optimism is the long-term perspective. Throughout Russian history we see this push and pull with the West, so I think the pendulum will swing back eventually. • Government professor Kate Graney is the author of a book on Russian ethnofederalism called Of Khans and Kremlins.


 SPRING 2015 SCOPE 17


Page 1  |  Page 2  |  Page 3  |  Page 4  |  Page 5  |  Page 6  |  Page 7  |  Page 8  |  Page 9  |  Page 10  |  Page 11  |  Page 12  |  Page 13  |  Page 14  |  Page 15  |  Page 16  |  Page 17  |  Page 18  |  Page 19  |  Page 20  |  Page 21  |  Page 22  |  Page 23  |  Page 24  |  Page 25  |  Page 26  |  Page 27  |  Page 28  |  Page 29  |  Page 30  |  Page 31  |  Page 32  |  Page 33  |  Page 34  |  Page 35  |  Page 36  |  Page 37  |  Page 38  |  Page 39  |  Page 40  |  Page 41  |  Page 42  |  Page 43  |  Page 44  |  Page 45  |  Page 46  |  Page 47  |  Page 48  |  Page 49  |  Page 50  |  Page 51  |  Page 52  |  Page 53  |  Page 54  |  Page 55  |  Page 56  |  Page 57  |  Page 58  |  Page 59  |  Page 60  |  Page 61  |  Page 62  |  Page 63  |  Page 64  |  Page 65  |  Page 66  |  Page 67  |  Page 68  |  Page 69  |  Page 70  |  Page 71  |  Page 72