Trans RINA, Vol 155, Part C1, Intl J Marine Design, Jan -Jun 2013 information/knowledge relating to the task and the


environment (held either by individuals or captured and processed by devices) changes as the situation develops (Stewart, Stanton, Harris, Baber, Salmon, Mock, Tatlock, Wells and Kay, 2007).


Note that the data that underlies DSA is dispersed across human and non-human components in the system. There is also implicit communication of information rather than a detailed exchange of mental models.


In this case the


agents (human and technological) were co-located, however in a larger ship there is no reason why this should always be so. The agents (may be separated by some distance.


There are six basic propositions underpinning DSA (Stanton, Stewart, Baber, Harris, Houghton, McMaster, Salmon, Hoyle, Walker, Young, Linsell and Dymott, 2006).





SA can be held by both human and non-human agents (as depicted in Table 1); technological artefacts and human operators each have some level of SA in as much as they both hold pertinent information pertaining to the situation.





There multiple views on the SA of the same scene for different agents (again, as shown in Table 1): the radar, Navigator and Coxswain all have


situation, 


slightly as


different views on illustrated in their


the same perception,


comprehension and projection of the unfolding incident.


Non-overlapping and overlapping SA depends on the agent’s goals: the goal of the radar is to detect objects in the environment; the goal of the Navigator is to determine the level of risk presented by an object; the goal of the Coxswain is to decide on the appropriate response for the crew ensure the safety of the boat.


In terms of


Endsley’s model it could be asserted that the different agents are primarily concerned with representing different stages of SA, rather being


Table 1 Agent


Radar (Non-Human)


Navigator (Human)


Coxswain (Human)


 


than microcosms of SA in themselves: the radar perceiving;


the Coxswain projecting ahead.


Communication between agents may be in the form of non-verbal behaviour; implicit customs and practice, formal communication channels (as in BRM/MRM) or via interactions with equipment interfaces.





SA holds loosely-coupled, JCSs together: the relationship between the radar, Navigator and Coxswain in the example in Table 1 is held together by the by their respective levels (or stages) of awareness of a potentially dangerous obstacle in the environment and subsequently assessing the most appropriate response.


One agent may compensate for degradation in SA in another agent: for example the Coxswain may be unaware of the


informed by the radar or the other member.


rocks until he is crew


The concept of DSA was subsequently investigated across a much larger team that that utilised in the previous example in the analysis of activities in the operations room of a Type 23 frigate during a variety of simulated engagements. Originally, the Type 23 frigate’s primary task was of anti-submarine warfare but this has been expanded to include air and surface warfare.


All


engagements possessed a number of common discrete steps: plan


resources and strategy; control


external resources (to the operations room and ship); posture platform for attack; identify and classify targets; assess threat and allocate targets; engage targets and re- allocate assets and weapons. For each of these steps the data (or information) requirements and the properties of those data were identified, irrespective of who (or what in terms of sensor systems or equipment) held the data. As engagements progressed, the map of personnel and/or equipment holding


various pieces of information


changed and the communications patterns could also be tracked across the operations room.


DSA as part of a response to unexpected rock formation (taken from Dobbins, Harris, Smoker, Hill, Forsman, Brand, Dahlman and Stark (2010).


Input


Senses rocks ahead of the HSC


Sees rock formation on radar/navigation display


Sees Navigator interrogate radar/navigation display and charts


Process


Compiles picture of extent of rock formation, distance and bearing


Determines rocks may present a risk to the HSC


Determines rocks present a risk to the craft and crew


Output


Displays information (along with projected tack) in appropriate colour to alert crew.


Needs to quickly determine new route to avoid the rock formation


Initiates new route/revision as instructed by the navigator


the Navigator comprehending and


C-6


©2013: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects


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