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A15 ONTHE TRAIL OF A TERRORIST relations with Pakistan in fight against Taliban


An evolving danger A key figure in Pakistan’s terrorist landscape is Sajid Mir, aka Sajid Majid, whose decade-long trail traces the rise of the Lashkar-i-Taiba militant group as a threat to the West. Indian and U.S. authorities allege that Mir played a key role the Mumbai attacks. Te Pakistani government says it does not support or condone Lashkar and has cracked down on it since the Mumbai attacks.


Khan told FBI that Lashkar recruited him to scout a potential target in Maryland, according to court testimony


Sajid Mir


Accused Pakistani chief of terrorist operations in India, Australia, Europe and the


United States. A French court convicted him in absentia in 2007.


Plotted attack on Australian targets that was foiled by authorities


Mir served as Lashkar’s Deputy Director of international operations and had direct access to Lakhvi


Accused of directing Headley’s


reconnaissance for Mumbai attacks,


Denmark plot


Mumbai Attacks


Nov. 26, 2008 Mir accused of


working alongside Major Iqbal and other suspected ISI officials in Mumbai plot and other operations


Major Iqbal


allegedly directed Headley to gather military


intelligence in India


Masoud Khan


Pakistani-American operative


ARRESTED in Virginia in 2003 and CONVICTED of terrorism


Faheem Lodhi Pakistani operative


CONVICTED of Lashkar’s 2003 terror plot in Australia


Willie Brigitte French


operative


CONVICTED in France for Lashkar’s 2003 terror plot in Australia


LASHKAR-I-TAIBA


Pakistani militant group founded by Hafiz Saeed and Abdallah Azzam and supported by Pakistani security forces as a proxy army against India in the fight against India over the Kashmir region. Pakistan says it has cracked down on Lashkar in recent years.


Longtime allies. Former Lashkar trainees convicted as ringleaders of al-Qaeda plots


SOURCE: ProPublica


IMAGES BY ASSOCIATED PRESS, AFP AND THE FAMILY OF MASOUD KHAN; GRAPHIC BY CRISTINA RIVERO/THE WASHINGTON POST


TALIBAN AL-QAEDA


Ideological mentor of Osama bin Laden, helped found forerunner group of al-Qaeda


Zaki-ur-Rehmane Lakhvi Pakistani


Military chief of Lashkar


ARRESTED, 2009


David Coleman Headley


Pakistani-American


ARRESTED, 2009 Pleaded guilty to Mumbai and Denmark plots


Former DEA informant who joined Lashkar in early 2002


Major Iqbal


INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE Pakistan’s spy agency


Investigators suspect he was an ISI officer and liaison to Lashkar who helped fund and direct Headley before the Mumbai attacks. Interpol circulated a warrant for his arrest


In the 1990s and early 2000s, Pakistani military and intelligence helped fund, train and arm Lashkar, according to court cases and investigators. Pakistani officials say they have worked hard to put an end to that support


Headley met with a top al-Qaeda figure to plan Denmark attack


French court case and U.S. investigators allege Mir


worked closely with military trainers in Lashkar camps. Some counterterrorism officials say Mir is a former Pakistani military officer


PAKISTAN ARMY


the army,” Brigitte testified. “About 15 Pakistanis conducted these inspections with an equal number of Americans. . . . We were told they were CIA officers who were searching for the presence of for- eign jihadis.” The trainees trekkedbackdownfroma


hiding place after the CIA teams left, Brigitte andKwon testified.


mumbai.AAA Topic: XXXXXXXX


Run Date: 11 / 14 / 2010 Size: 71p10 x 7” Artist: rivero


Talent-spotting In November 2001,Mir gave the train-


ees disappointing news: Their dreams of martyrdomhad been crushed. Mir said Lashkarwould not send them


to fight in Afghanistan, because the U.S. military operation was almost over and had closed the border to aspiring foreign fighters, according to the testimony of Kwon and Brigitte. Mir approached a handful ofmilitants


about operations in the West. First, he invited two of the Virginia militants — Kwon and Masoud Khan, a tough Paki- stani-American—to dinner in Lahore. At the restaurant, Mir introduced


themto a Lashkar chief who wore “tight Western clothes” and a “nice trimbeard,” Kwon testified. The chief jokingly called himself “the Disco Mujahid.” He asked themtoundertakemissions intheUnited States entailing “a lot of propaganda, information-gathering and e-mailing,” saidKwon,who declined the proposal. Khan later told FBI agents that the


Lashkar bosses asked him to conduct surveillance of an unnamed chemical plant in Maryland. The request shows that Lashkar was gathering intelligence onU.S. targets as early as 2001. About two months later, Mir told Bri-


gitte to return to France as the group’s “sector chief” there. Mir ordered him to keep quiet if arrested. “He absolutely did not want it known


that I had trained at a Lashkar camp,” Brigitte testified. The handling of Brigitte — veiled


threats, secretive communications — would later intensify the suspicions of French investigators thatMir had ties to Pakistani intelligence. Their indictment describedMir as Brigitte’s “case officer.” “Brigitte was told: Go back and wait,”


said a former top French intelligence official. “That’swhat intelligence services do. Brigitte was a clandestine operative. . . .He obeyed orders.But I don’t think he realized that he had become an agent of an intelligence service.” Around the time Brigitte left, a Paki-


stani-American arrived. His name at the time was Daood Gilani, but he would become known to the world as David ColemanHeadley. Headley, now 50, differed from Mir’s


other proteges. He was older, a ladies’ man,aglobe-trotter.BorninWashington, he moved to Pakistan as an infant and attendeda topmilitary school.Returning to the United States at 17, he lived in Philadelphia and thenNewYork and slid into heroin dealing. After a 1997 bust, he became aDrugEnforcementAdministra- tioninformant, spyingondrugtraffickers in Pakistan. Once casual about his Muslim faith,


Headley radicalized in the late 1990s.U.S. officials say he was still a DEA informant when he began training in the Lashkar camps in early 2002. Although the Paki- stani instructors thought he was too old and too slow for combat, the charming Americanhit it offwithMir.


pect thatPakistani spieshadplayeda role in theAustralian plot. “In the heart of Lashkar there are


camps that train individuals for themis- sion of eliminating those who talk,” Bri- gitte testified. “And you understand that the Pakistani army and Pakistani intelli- gence were stakeholders in these opera- tions.” Bruguiere took advantage of French


laws allowing him to pursue terrorist conspiracies across borders. He worked with investigators in Virginia, Australia and Britain.Mir’s name, he said, popped up everywhere.


Preparing themasterpiece In 2005, Mir joined a Lashkar unit


dedicated to attacks in India and em- barked on a secret mission. He crossed the border into India at its only land port of entry with Pakistan, blending with Pakistani cricket fans flocking tosee their national teamplay in India, according to U.S. and Indian anti-terrorismofficials. Mir’s movements for 15 days in India


DAVID SILVERMAN/GETTY IMAGES


Mourners pray behind the shroud-covered body of Rabbi GavrielHoltzberg at the funeral for the ChabadHouse emissary and his wife, Rivka, both killed in the terror attacks inMumbai in 2008. Their 2-year-old son,Moshe, survived the attack.


Mir decided to cultivate this man of


two worlds as a clandestine operative, according to documents and officials.


Unleashing the network In December 2001, Lashkar took part


ina commando-style attackonthe Indian Parliament thatkilledadozenpeople and left India and Pakistan on the brink of war. Washington designated Lashkar as a


terrorist group.Pakistani authoritiesout- lawed the group and briefly held Saeed, its spiritual leader, under house arrest. But in reality, investigators say, nothing much changed. “Lashkar was the only major jihadi


outfit toescape thePakistani crackdown,” wrote Stephen Tankel, author of the forthcoming book “Storming the World Stage:The Story of Lashkar-E-Taiba,” in a recent academic report. “Lashkar served as a major provider of military training for jihadi actors in the region.” In early 2002, Mir led an overseas


buying spree for military equipment. He sent his British quartermaster, Abu Kha- lid, on four trans-Atlantic trips.AbuKha- lid reported to Mir via e-mail as he worked with three of the Virginia mili- tants, including Khan. They helped the Briton buy an unmanned airborne vehi- cle and more paintballs than the U.S. Marine Corps needs for a year of drills. The procurement endedwhen the FBI


arrested 11 Virginia militants in mid- 2003. A search ofKhan’s home turned up guns, a terrorist manual and photos of theWhiteHouse and FBI headquarters.


Because the Virginia crew had played


paintballwar games as they radicalized, a somewhat skeptical news media dubbed them “The Paintball Jihadis.” Lawyers and Muslim activists complained about over-zealous prosecution. Nonetheless, the defendantswere sen-


tenced to long prison terms. At the trial, Mir’s roleinLashkar surfacedpubliclyfor the first time.But the group stillwasn’t of much interest to the public or law en- forcement, anti-terrorismofficials say. The trial revealed evidence of Lash-


kar’s dangerous alliance with al-Qaeda. Prosecutors cited a 2002 incident when U.S. and Pakistani forces captured a key al-Qaeda coordinator in a shootout at a Lashkar safe house in Faisalabad. He had the phone number for Lash-


kar’s chief of international operations — Mir’s boss.


The Australian plot As the FBI closed in on the Virginia


contingent, Mir launched a plot on the other side of theworld. In calls and e-mails in 2002 and 2003,


he prepared Brigitte, the Grouchy Frenchman, for a trip to Australia. Mir directed British operatives to send $5,000toBrigitte,askinghisquartermas- ter in an e-mail: “How is our French Connection Project going?” Brigitte arrived in Australia in May


2003 and joined forces with Faheem Lodhi, a Pakistani-born architect and militant who had worked for Mir in the camps.With Lodhi’s help,Brigitte settled into a new life in Sydney, quickly marry-


ing a formerAustralianarmy intelligence officerwho had converted to Islam. At Mir’s direction, Brigitte collected


maps and photos of targets taken by his new wife, though she resisted his de- mands that she provide himwith intellli- gence. Lodhi created an alias and a ficti- tious business to obtain bomb chemicals and maps of the electrical grid. He com- pileda 15-pagemanual formakinghome- madepoisons, explosives anddetonators. Investigators believe the duo planned to bomb amilitary base or a nuclear plant. The plot was foiled by French agents,


who were hunting Brigitte as part of a larger investigation. They learned hewas in Sydney and alerted Australian intelli- gence. Police deported him to France in October and captured Lodhi afterwatch- ing himthrowsatellite photos ofmilitary bases in a dumpster and call Mir from a phone booth. Mir sent Lodhi an e-mail asking for “fresh news about our friend,” according to court documents. “Our friendhas returnedtohis country


andhis governmenthashim,” theAustra- lian operative responded. Lodhi was sentenced to 20 years for


preparing a terrorist act. Investigators think the plot was related to Australia’s troop presence in Iraq andAfghanistan. The judge’s verdict noted Mir’s role


and called him a “shadowy figure” who deployed operatives for “terrorist actions inAustralia.” Brigitte’s deportation put Mir in the


sights of Bruguiere, France’s best-known terrorist hunter. Questioned by Brugui- ere inNovember 2003, Brigitte discussed Mir in a tone of respect and fear. His account made French investigators sus-


are unknown. But Indian investigators think he was part of an operation — spying, terrorist scouting or both — in- volving a dozen Pakistani “cricket fans” who went missing after crossing the border. Indian spy-hunters eventually caught one: a suspected ISI agent with a false identitywhomthey accused of espi- onage. Later that year, Mir turned to Gilani,


his top American agent, who by now had completed five stints at Lashkar camps. Gilani had also survived a close call in New York that summer, when his es- tranged third wife reported his activities with Lashkar to federal agents. His trav- els around the world continued, unim- peded. Soon, Gilani met with Mir and other


Lashkarbosseswho toldhimhehadbeen chosenas leadscout for abig job.Hewent to Philadelphia in November on Mir’s instructions and legally changed his name from Daood Gilani to David Cole- man Headley to conceal his Pakistani origin. Armed with his new identity, Headley


returned to Pakistan. In July 2006 he received $25,000 for a new assignment. The money came from a man he knew only asMajor Iqbal, according to officials and court documents. U.S. and Indiananti-terrorismofficials


suspect Major Iqbal was a serving ISI officer and a liaison to Lashkar. Accord- ing to anti-terrorism officials and U.S. court documents, Major Iqbal and Mir became Headley’s handlers. They in- structed himto use themoney to open a front company and beginreconnaissance in the city that was their next target: Mumbai.


COMINGMONDAY: The Attacks and the Aftermath


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