A14
EZ SU KK ONTHE TRAIL OF A TERRORIST In pursuit of Mumbai masterminds, U.S. weighs attacks from A1
right through her head and out the other side . . . Do it. I’m listening. . . . Do it, in God’s name.” The three-day siege ofMumbai left 166
dead and 308wounded.Twenty-six of the deadwereforeigners, includingsixAmer- icans. The attacks inflamed tension be- tween Pakistan and India at a timewhen the nuclear-armed foes were trying to improve their relationship.The repercus- sions complicated the U.S. battle against Islamic extremism in South Asia and thrust Lashkar into the global spotlight. Two years later,Mir andhis victims are
at the center of a wrenching national securitydilemma confrontingtheObama administration. The question, simply put, iswhether the larger interests of the United States in maintaining good rela- tions with Pakistan will permit Mir and other suspects to get awaywithone of the most devastating terrorist attacks in re- cent history. As President Obama’s recent trip to
India made clear, the Mumbai attack remains a pivotal and delicate issue in relations among the United States, India andPakistan.Despite thediplomatic sen- sitivities, administration officials say they are pursuing those responsible. “The U.S. government is completely
determined to see justice done in the case,” said a seniorU.S. counterterrorism official who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of pending prosecu- tions. “Sometimes it takes time.” For fivemonths, ProPublica has exam-
ined the investigation of the attacks and previous cases documenting the rise of Lashkar. This account is based on inter- views with more than two dozen law enforcement, intelligenceanddiplomatic officials from the United States, India, Pakistan, France, Britain, Australia and Israel, including front-line investigators. ProPublica also interviewed associates and relatives of suspects and victimswho had not discussed the case with journal- ists and reviewed foreign and U.S. case files, some of them previously undis- closed. Thesedocuments andinterviewspaint
the fullest portrait yet of the mysterious Mir, whose global trail traces Lashkar’s evolution. His name has surfaced in in- vestigations on four continents, his web reaching as far as suburban Virginia. Fleeting glimpses of him appear in case files and communications intercepts. A French court even convicted him in ab- sentia in 2007. But he remains free and dangerous, according to U.S. and Indian officials. ProPublica’s investigation leads to an-
other disturbing revelation: Despite iso- lated voices of concern, for years the U.S. intelligence communitywas slowtofocus on Lashkar and detect the extent of its determination to strike Western targets. Some officials admit that counterterror- ism agencies grasped the dimensions of the threat only after theMumbai attacks. The FBI investigation into the killings
of the Americans has focused on a half- dozen accusedmastermindswho are still at large: Mir, top Lashkar chiefs and a man thought to be a major in Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). U.S. officials say Washington has urged Islamabad to arrest the suspects. “We put consistent pressure on the
Pakistanis to dealwith Lashkar and do so at the highest levels,” said the senior U.S. counterterrorism official. “There has been no lack of clarity in ourmessage.” ButU.S. officials acknowledge that the
response has been insufficient. The effort to bring to justice the masterminds — under a U.S. law that makes terrorist attacks against Americans overseas a crime — faces obstacles. A U.S. prosecu- tion could implicate Pakistani military chiefs who, at minimum, have allowed Lashkar to operate freely. U.S. pressure on Pakistan to confront both themilitary and Lashkar could damage counterter- rorismefforts. “It’s a balancing act,” a high-ranking
U.S. law enforcement official said. “We can only push so far. It’s very political. Sajid Mir is too powerful for them to go after. Too well-connected. We need the Pakistanis to go after the Taliban and al-Qaeda.” Pakistani officials said they had no
information on Mir. They denied allega- tions that thepowerful ISI supportsLash- kar. “Allegationsof ISI’s cadresoperatingin
connivance with the militants . . . are based on malicious intent,” said a senior Pakistani officialwho spoke onthe condi- tion of anonymity because of the issue’s sensitivity. ISI “remains top-to-bottom transparentandrestsunder the complete control of the civilian government . . . There isno questionthat the government thinks that all militants are enemies of the state.” Ayear ago, Pakistan charged Lashkar’s
military chief and six less-influential sus- pects in theMumbai attacks.But the trial soon stalled over legal complications and conflict with India, raising fears among U.S. and Indian officials that the prosecu- tion will collapse in a court system that rarely convicts accused extremists. The U.S. investigation turned up 320
potential targets abroad — only 20 of them in India — including U.S., British andIndianembassies,governmentbuild- ings, tourist sites and global financial centers, officials say. “There should have been a recognition
that Lashkar had the desire and the potential to attack theWest and that we needed to get up to speed on this group,” said Charles Faddis, a retired CIAchief of
KLMNO
SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 2010
PHOTOS BY REUTERS An officer helps an elderly man after the siege by a Pakistani terrorist group moved to aMumbai rail station. The attacks inflamed relations between India and Pakistan.
the Middle East and South Asia, said he triedandfailedtogetLashkardesignated as a terrorist organization in the late 1990s. “I said it had a huge potential for
damage,” Ackerman recalled. “People were not paying attention.” Lashkar trained tens of thousands of
holy warriors. It was easier to join than al-Qaeda, operating openly from store- front offices across Pakistan. Some for- eign Lashkar trainees went on to join al-Qaeda, and several led al-Qaeda plots againstNewYork and London. Mir became a deputy to the director of
Lashkar’s foreignoperationsunit.Hehad direct access to Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Lashkar’s military chief, and ties to al- Qaeda in neighboring Afghanistan, ac- cording to a French investigation. After the Sept. 11 attacks,Mir began grooming foreignvolunteerswhohad come toPaki- stan towagewar on theWest.
The Class of 2001 Willie Brigitte became one of Mir’s
favorites. Born in Guadeloupe and radi- calized in Paris, the Afro-Caribbean con- vert was dour, burly and nearsighted behind round-rimmed glasses. Fellow trainees called him“theGrouchy French- man.” Brigitte was part of an al-Qaeda con-
nected group of militants in Europe in- volved in numerous plots. In September 2001, he set off for Pakistan hoping to reach theAfghan battleground. Brigittemadehisway toLashkarhead-
The FBI investigation into the killings of Americans in the bloody siege has focused on a half-dozen accused masterminds of the attack who are still at large.
counterterrorist operations inSouthAsia and other hot spots. “It was amistake to dismiss it as just a threat to India.” Today,Mir personifies Lashkar’s evolv-
ing danger. The group’s longtime ties to the security forces have made it more professional and potentially more men- acing than al-Qaeda. “Lashkar isnot justatoolof the ISI,but
an ally of al-Qaeda that participates in its global jihad,” said Jean-Louis Bruguiere, a French judge who investigated Mir. “Today Pakistan is the heart of the terror- ist threat. And it may be too late to do anything about it.”
Lashkar’s beginnings Formore than a decade, SajidMir has
operated in a blurred underworld of spies, soldiers and terrorists. An Interpol notice lastmonth seeking
his arrest illustrates confusion about ba- sic facts of his life. The Indian warrant identifies him as Sajid Majid, not Mir, with a birthdate of Jan. 1, 1978, which would make him 32. But most investiga- tors think he is older—in hismid- to late 30s. They still call him Sajid Mir, saying Majid may be his true name or one of several aliases. Mir was born in Lahore, Pakistan’s
second-largest city and cultural capital. His family may have owned a manufac- turing business, according to court testi- mony. Mir was a teenager when a professor
named Hafiz Saeed created Lashkar-i- Taiba (the Army of the Pure) in the late 1980s with Abdullah Azzam, a Palestin-
ian Islamist. Azzamhad another claimto fame: He was an ideological mentor of Osama bin Laden and helped himfound the organization thatwas the forerunner of al-Qaeda. Lashkar joined the fight against the
Soviets in Afghanistan supported by the United States and Pakistan. Soon, Paki- stani strategists built Lashkar into a proxy army against India in the disputed territory of Kashmir. The groupwon vast support with its mix of extremism and nationalism and its array of schools, hospitals and social programs, especially inthePunjab,Mir’shome region. Indians called Lashkar “the government muja- heddin.” Mir joinedLashkarwhenhewas about
16, investigators say. Some senior U.S., British and French anti-terrorism offi- cials sayhealsospent time inthemilitary, although that remains murky. For years, itwas common for the Pakistanimilitary to detail officers to Lashkar, according to investigators and court testimony. Mir went into Lashkar’s international
operations wing, which embraced global jihad in the 1990s. Lashkar militants joined wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya and built global recruitment and financing networks. Those activities and Lashkar’s anti-American and anti- Jewish propaganda showed an increas- ingly internationalist bent, according to U.S. congressional testimony and Paki- stani andWestern officials. Yet the U.S. intelligence community
still viewed the group as a regional player focused on India andKashmir.Rep.Gary L. Ackerman (D-N.Y.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
quarters inMuridke outside Lahore. The complex featured amosque, a university, dormitories and houses for leaders. Bri- gittebriefly studiedArabic andtheKoran and met Mir, the coordinator of foreign recruits,who carried himself like a rising star. “He was in fact an important person-
age,”Brigitte testified later in France. “He was a man of about 30, very cordial and pleasant, with whom I had a good rela- tionship.” Of medium build, Mir had a dark
complexion, black hair and a thick beard. He spoke English, Urdu, Hindi and Ara- bic. His nicknames were Abu Bara (Fa- ther of Bara), Uncle Bill and Sajid Bill. A Makarov pistol on his hip, hewas accom- panied by two bodyguards and a driver, according to Brigitte’s testimony. Mir’s recruits included four militants
from the Virginia suburbs. They were part of a multiethnic crew of college graduates, U.S. Army veterans and gun enthusiasts whose spiritual leader was Ali Al-Timimi, an Iraqi-American imam based in Falls Church. Galvanized by the Sept. 11 attacks, the
men quit their jobs and traveled to Paki- stan to train with Lashkar. Another Vir- giniamilitantwho had already trained in Pakistan called a Lashkar contact from the parking lot of a 7-Eleven to arrange the trip, according to federal court testi- mony of Yong-Ki Kwon, a Korean-Ameri- can convert to Islam. “Itdidn’tmatterwhythewarwasgoing
to happen,” testified Kwon, a Virginia Tech graduatewho hadworked at Sprint. “The only thing thatmattered is that our brothersandsisters inAfghanistanneeds [sic] help against imminent attack.” The Virginia jihadis joined up in La-
hore at a Lashkar office decorated with posters depicting the U.S. Capitol in flames and the slogan: “Yesterdaywe saw Russia disintegrate, then India, next we seeAmerica and Israel burning.” Mir soon cleared the volunteers to train for holywar.
The camps To reach Lashkar’s mountain training
complex, recruits drove overnight past checkpoints manned by Pakistani sol- diers, according to court testimony. “Theywere deferential to us and let us
pass without difficulty,” Brigitte said. “Therewas no search and no verification of ourpassports,whichwere inthehands of the Lashkar bosses.” Fromabase camp, the recruitshikedto
an altitude of 4,000 feet for nine days of firearms instruction, then climbed an- other 4,000 feet to a camp that taught covert warfare. The Pakistani army sup- plied crates of weapons with filed-off serial numbers, Brigitte testified. The mountains teemed with more
than 3,000 trainees. Although Pakistanis dominated the ranks, there were Ameri- cans, Arabs, Australians, Azeris, Britons, Chechens, Filipinos, Kurds, Singapor- eans, Turks andUzbeks. “Itwas very impressive everymorning
when we would gather and shout ‘Allah Ouallah Akbar,’ ” Brigitte testified. “The setting was imposing because you could see the outline of theHimalayas.” The Frenchman bunked with the Vir-
ginia trainees in amud hut. His zeal and endurance impressed his instructors, who leddrills inEnglishandArabic.Over tea, Brigitte befriended several instruc- tors, who told him they were Pakistani Army officers on special assignment. “The close relations between the Paki-
stani Army and Lashkar were clear,” Brigitte testified. Brigitte became convinced that Mir
was also in the Pakistanimilitary.During Mir’s visits to check on training progress, everyone from the camp chief to army sentries treated him like a superior, Bri- gitte said. Itwas clear tohimthatMirwas amilitary officer, he said. “He never told me formally, but I
understood it because of many details,” Brigitte testified. “He was very respected by the instructors who were themselves members of the Pakistani Army but also at the checkpoints where he was well- known. . . . Nonetheless, I never knew what unit Sajid belonged to or what his rankwas.” U.S. andFrenchanti-terrorofficials say
Mir became an army major, although he may not have reached that rank in 2001. He eventually left the military, although it is not clear when or why, officials say. And some investigators are not con- vinced that he served in themilitary. But Bruguiere, the French judge, said
the case showed “that Sajid Mir was a high-ranking officer in the Pakistani Army and apparently alsowas in the ISI.” Other cases similarly describe Paki-
stani security forces in the camps. A BritonwhotrainedwithLashkar andwas later convicted as the ringleader of a foiled 2004 plot against London by al- Qaeda testified that ISI officers screened and trained foreign recruits in Lashkar camps in 2000. While Mir’s men drilled in the moun-
tains, a U.S-led military operation top- pledtheTalibanandal-Qaeda inAfghani- stan. The CIA focused on the Lashkar camps in Pakistan as well, asking Paki- stani intelligence to help find foreign militants whomight pose a threat to the West, according to court testimony. On four occasions, instructors temporarily evacuated foreign trainees before joint U.S.-Pakistani camp inspections, Brigitte testified. “The instructorswere informed by the Pakistani army because theywere part of
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