SAFE T Y
Briefings
MERI crane collision and bridge damage in Kiel canal The German Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty
Investigation (BSU) has published a report on an accident involving the Finnish-flagged heavy-lift vessel MERI while transporting a mobile harbour crane from Rostock to Esbjerg via the Kiel Canal.
Documentation indicates the ship and cargo exhibited a permissible height to pass the bridges on the NOK safely. However, while passing beneath the first bridges, the high bridges at Holtenau, on 30 November 2022, the mobile harbour crane’s tower head struck the hollow box girders of both carriageways of the bridges.
The force of the impact broke the lashings that were securing the 643 t crane to the deck. This allowed the crane to tilt far enough toward the stern to pass under both bridges. In the process, it lost eight counterweights, three of which fell into the water. In both cases, the crane then tipped forward again after passing beneath due to its centre of gravity, crashing back onto the deck with its running gear and supporting pads.
The crane was destroyed in the process. The MERI’s deck was also damaged. It was deformed and the crane jib penetrated part of it. The bridges sustained considerable damage. The bridges and the NOK were temporarily closed to all traffic. In particular, automobile traffic was seriously disrupted until the primary damage to the bridge was repaired on 21 December 2023. The cost of the bridge repairs stood at some EUR 6 million. Two investigators from the BSU immediately went to the scene of the accident to secure evidence and inspect the damage to the bridges, the MERI and her cargo, as well as to establish the consequences for safe passage of the canal as far as was necessary and possible.
In retrospect, the allision could have resulted in serious personal injury, although fortunately this was not the case. The MERI had cast off in the lock about eight minutes before the allision. However, since the deckhands working on the aft deck of the MERI had cleared and left the manoeuvring station immediately, nobody was in the crane’s danger zone.
Main causes of the accident – the transport was planned and contractually agreed on the basis of an incorrect transport drawing;
– an accurate transport drawing was not submitted subsequently. The actual tower height was not provided;
– the crane was loaded without using the information in the stowage plan. The different attachment points to the crane that was actually to be transported could possibly have been noticed;
– a clearly visible shipping label was attached to the loaded crane, indicating an incorrect tower height;
– when the special dispensation was granted, the submitted transport drawing could only be reviewed to determine whether the drawing was correct with regard to the measurements entered;
– it was not possible to measure the height in the lock. The crane’s tower height specified by the ship was not called into question for the verification.
Download the report at
https://bit.ly/3y0wBzK.
Loss of propulsion of ro-ro cargo vessel Mazarine: Transport Malta Report
Transport Malta’s Marine Safety Investigation Unit has published an investigation report into the loss of propulsion and subsequent grounding of the Maltese-registered ro-ro cargo vessel Mazarine, on Wolf Rock off Land’s End, UK on 10 July 2023.
At about 1040, the Maltese-registered, ro-ro cargo vessel, Mazarine ran aground on Wolf Rock, UK. The vessel sustained structural damage to the underwater section of the hull. In addition to the hull perforations, several deformations were observed, mostly on the port side.
The Transport Malta investigation determined that the ship ran aground following the failure of an elbow fitted on the vessel’s main engine lubricating oil system, leading to the loss of a significant amount of lubricating oil and a drop in the main engine lubrication oil pressure. The safety investigation identified how the engine-room crew members made two desperate attempts to restore the main engine’s lubricating oil system, working under significant time pressure given the vessel’s proximity to the rocks. This safety investigation report makes two recommendations to the Company and the engine manufacturer.
Immediate cause of the accident – It was not excluded that the initial cause of the pipe elbow failure was fatigue due to alternating stresses, possibly caused by high levels of vibrations and / or bending forces resulting from the degradation of the flexible rubber bellow;
Marine Safety Investigation Unit
– The loss of the main engine LO pressure was the cause of loss of propulsion, which eventually led to the grounding, after the vessel lost headway.
Read the full report at
https://bit.ly/3LqAe5i.
THE REPORT | SEP 2024 | ISSUE 109 | 21 MARINE SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT Safety investigation into the loss of propulsion and subsequent grounding
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