2.5 Cabin Aide Actions, Performance, and Training


The Safety Board evaluated the cabin aide’s actions, performance, and training during its investigation. PJM documentation and guidance regarding cabin aide and flight crew responsibilities was unclear; however, the cabin aide told investigators that she ensured that the cabin was “secure,” implying that seatbelts were used and other items secured, before the takeoff roll. Physical evidence and passenger statements indicated that this was not the case. For example, after the passengers boarded the airplane, the cabin aide offered the passengers a beverage and four accepted. The drinks were served in glasses or ceramic/china cups, several of which were recovered on or near passenger seats after the accident, which is not consistent with a secured cabin. One passenger told investigators that he had to pick up his coffee cup during the takeoff roll to prevent spillage. He believed that the lacerations on his right hand were caused by the coffee cup breaking in his hand during the accident sequence.


Additionally, post accident interviews indicated that at least four of the eight passengers were unrestrained when the takeoff roll began. Two passengers located and fastened their seatbelts during the takeoff roll; however, the other two (both seated on the side-facing divan seat) were unable to locate their seatbelts and were therefore unrestrained during the RTO. The two unrestrained passengers were thrown to the cabin floor during the accident sequence. Post accident examinations revealed that the seatbelts at the three divan seats would not have been visible to the passengers because they had been intentionally placed beneath the seatback cushions. Post-accident examination of another PJM CL-600 revealed that its divan seatbelts had also been intentionally placed beneath the seatback cushions. Positioning the seatbelts beneath the seatback cushions resulted in a tidier passenger cabin and was reportedly not uncommon among operators of corporate and charter airplanes. However, with the seatbelts stowed in this position, passengers would have had to either reach blindly between the seatback cushions or remove the cushions to locate the seatbelts.


The Safety Board concludes that the cabin aide did not perform a seatbelt compliance check before the accident flight, which resulted in two passengers being unrestrained during the accident sequence. Further, the Safety Board concludes that the intentional positioning of the seatbelts out of the passengers’ sight made them difficult to locate and use and resulted in reduced compliance with passenger seatbelt usage requirements. Therefore, the Safety Board believes that the FAA should require all 14 CFR Part 135 certificate holders to ensure that seatbelts at all seat positions are visible and accessible to passengers before each flight.


According to Federal regulations, no person may serve as a “flight attendant” on a Part 135 flight unless that person is knowledgeable and competent in the areas of crewmember functions and responsibilities during ditching and evacuation, briefing of passengers, the location and operation of all normal and emergency exits, portable fire extinguishers, and other items of emergency equipment. Additionally, regulations require that passengers on airplanes certificated to carry 19 passengers or less must be briefed on, among other things, the use of safety belts and the location and operation of the main cabin door and emergency exits. Further, regulations prohibit taxiing, taking off, or landing when any beverage provided by the operator is located at any passenger seat.


The cabin aide was not required to receive any safety-related training because she was not a required crewmember (flight attendant) for the accident flight. Nonetheless, PJM did provide its cabin aides with some training. The accident cabin aide stated that she had received verbal instruction regarding emergency main cabin door operation and had operated the main cabin door handle and electric toggle switch in a simulated emergency scenario during her training. Her description of her efforts to operate the door after the accident was consistent with the training she reported that she had received; however, it revealed that her training had not provided her with an adequate understanding of the door mechanism/operation. The cabin aide told investigators that she was not familiar with the arm/disarm handle and that she tried to use the electric switch at the top of the bulkhead to operate the door; however, this switch is not needed (nor should it be used) during emergency operations.


Emergency Evacuations 10


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