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The Chilean abalone TURFs have been regarded as role models (González et al. 2006; Gelcich et al. 2017). They led to improved catch per unit of effort and sometimes substantial (as much as five-fold) improvements in economic returns. These successes were due to empowering local communities to develop and adopt instruments tailored to their geography and culture. However, illegal fishing continues (Andreu- Cazenave, Subida and Fernandez 2017), in some cases by fishers who abide by rules but fish illegally beyond their own TURFs, undermining ecological outcomes (González et al. 2006; Hauck and Gallardo-Fernández 2013; Oyanedel et al. 2018). Moreover, the sustainability of economic benefits from the system has seen competitive challenges from other markets and fishery products, and in one region only 5 out of 30 TURFs did well economically (Zuñiga et al. 2008). However, despite complaining that TURFs had not always provided significant financial returns and that monitoring costs had been increasing, Chilean fishers were reluctant to relinquish their TURFs, recognizing that they provided benefits across multiple dimensions, including ecological and economic empowerment (Gelcich et al. 2017). The transferability of this policy depends on having sedentary species, stable markets, and settled communities with an ability to exclude mobile, non-local fishers.


14.2.4 Individual transferable quotas


ITQs are a type of market-system approach that some governments use to manage fisheries (Selig et al. 2016). Typically, ITQs grant their owners exclusive and transferable rights to a given portion of the total allowable catch (TAC) from a fishery each season or year, which can then be bought, sold or leased in an open market. The logic is that because these quotas are individual and not collective, fishers cannot maximize earnings by racing to catch more fish from a common total quota or resource than other license-holders before depletion. Rather, income can only be increased by more strategically catching and marketing their share (for example, through more efficient fishing practices or timing the catch to market opportunities) and through resource stewardship by supporting stock growth so that their fixed percentage applies to a larger total quota. ITQs can thus generate substantial economic returns for society (Hoshino et al. 2017), promote economic efficiency by incentivizing reductions in fishing capacity (Blomquist and Waldo 2018) and create an economic incentive for the industry to value stock growth as well as present catch.


ITQs were first introduced on individual fish species in the late 1970s (Chu 2009) by the Netherlands (Hoefnagel and de Vos 2017), Iceland (Chambers and Kokorsch 2017; Kokorsch 2017) and Canada (Rice 2004; Pinkerton 2013; Edinger and Baek 2015; Gibson and Sumaila 2017). They have since been implemented at a range of scales, being first implemented as a national fisheries policy by New Zealand in 1986 (Mace, Sullivan and Cryer 2014) and Iceland in 1990 (Arnason 1993). ITQs have also been proposed as a potential reform option for the European Common Fisheries Policy (Waldo and Paulrud 2012; van Hoof 2013) and for international fisheries management (Pintassilgo and Costa Duarte 2000; Thøgersen et al. 2015), but they have not yet seen agreement at these scales.


A comprehensive review in 2009 found that 18 countries managed several hundred different fish stocks with ITQs (Chu 2009). They have been most vigorously adopted in tandem with the privatization of other common assets as a part of broader neoliberalist trends (Pinkerton 2017) – for example, in the United States of America (Porcelli 2017), Australia (Steer and Besley 2016; Emery et al. 2017), Argentina (Bertolotti et al. 2016) and Chile (Wiff et al. 2016), in addition to other countries listed above. Norway (Hannesson 2013; Hannesson 2017), Sweden (Waldo et al. 2013; Stage et al. 2016; Blomquist and Waldo 2018) and Denmark (Merayo et al. 2018) have seen more cautious adoption of ITQs, and other jurisdictions, such as France (Frangoudes and Bellanger 2017), have seen marked opposition. While several developing countries have shown interest in ITQs, they have not seen widespread adoption there, for various reasons that include concerns about economic participation, a backlash against ‘privatizing nature’, or the recognition that ITQs require sound stock assessment and reliable catch monitoring (see below).


Where conditions are favourable, ITQs are recognized as an excellent instrument for promoting economic efficiency in fisheries. However, their mixed record elsewhere has prompted the literature on marine policy and environmental economics to investigate the conditions for policy effectiveness. These conditions relate to scale, technology and capacity, as identified in Section 7.5.


First, ITQs operate best for relatively high-value stocks. Nonetheless, fishers’ high-grading (discarding less valuable species or sizes into the sea to maximize quota value) can still produce negative ecological impacts and can only be deterred by on-board surveillance (as with any quota-based harvesting system). ITQs may have positive ecosystem effects through a variety of indirect mechanisms (Gibbs 2010), but, ultimately, ITQs are a relatively targeted policy instrument that should be well considered.


Second, successful ITQ programmes require strong, independent, scientifically set TACs (Sumaila 2010); otherwise, scientific uncertainty or political interference may erode quota owners’ trust that the quotas are sustainable, restoring incentives to race for fish. For example, Nordic countries offer strong monitoring capabilities and high levels of trust in public institutions (Hannesson 2013; Merayo et al. 2018; Blomquist and Waldo 2018).


Third, the economic incentive value of ITQs is especially vulnerable to free-riding illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing (Costello et al. 2010). Again, strong monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) is required or target stock status will be undermined.


It should be acknowledged though that ITQs are a policy instrument for promoting economic efficiency in fisheries and not necessarily social equity (Costello, Gains and Lynham 2008; Høst 2015). Issues of social equity can arise during the initial allocation of ITQs or, later, upon their consolidation. Basing allocation on historical usage can exacerbate existing social inequities, particularly if the time frame used favours one group. The New Zealand Government spent considerable sums purchasing ITQs from the initial allocation to satisfy


14


Oceans and Coasts Policy


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