“The lack of gambling
regulation across much of Asia has led to a significant
unregulated market evolving. That involves direct links to criminality. Europol published a report in 2020 highlighting the link between sports corruption and organised crime: the characteristics of criminal
networks, their structure and their modus operandi. In addition, the report analyses the different types of match- fixing as the most prominent form of sports corruption monitored by Europol.” Khalid Ali
Tere are some well-resourced integrity units within sport like the ITIA in tennis and the IOC’s integrity unit, which set the bar in terms of their protocols and effectiveness. Tis is a critical element for any sport. Tere is, however, a limit to the investigative actions that sports can undertake and the penalties they can impose, and IBIA would like to see more law enforcement action both nationally and internationally.
We’d also like sports to consider the probity of the betting operators they authorise their event data to be sold to. Notably, to ensure that those operators are committed, not just in perception, but in reality, to protecting the integrity of sport and to monitoring and reporting suspicious betting to the relevant authorities. It is undoubtedly the case that selling event data that facilitates betting markets to operators who are unregulated or operating from poorly regulated jurisdictions such as Curacao or the Philippines will significantly heighten the integrity risk for a sport.
Why is it that Asia is the epicentre of modern game-fixing? Considering that many of these markets are unregulated, is there anything that can be realistically done to prevent Asian betting syndicates from tampering with the outcome of games?
Te lack of gambling regulation across much of Asia has led to a significant unregulated market evolving. Tat involves direct links to criminality. Europol published a report in 2020 highlighting the link between sports corruption and organised crime: the characteristics of
criminal networks, their structure and their modus operandi. In addition, the report analyses the different types of match-fixing as the most prominent form of sports corruption monitored by Europol.
Tat report stated that: “Te Asian betting market has been the preferred choice for OCGs [organised crime groups] due to two main reasons: the high-liquidity of this market offering higher winning rewards; and the most remarkable advantage of ensuring a high degree of anonymity and consequent lack of traceability that the multi-layer ‘agent system’ offers. Asian bookmakers operate on a low margin/high turnover business model. Bets may be placed via the phone, via betting shops or via internet betting websites. Tese two factors combined make this system favourable to OCGs for carrying out their activities in this field.”
Te key to addressing this is to establish well- regulated betting markets in Asia with requirements on operators to monitor and report suspicious betting, as is the case across much of Europe and now North America. In some cases such as Holland, Germany and Ontario, those regulatory regimes also require operators to be part of an international integrity monitoring system such as IBIA. As the Europol report points out, well-regulated operators, as in Europe, often restrict stakes, cooperate with law enforcement investigations (e.g., disclosing personal details of suspicious betting activities) and may ban customers from betting in suspicious cases or even temporarily freeze suspicious clients’ accounts as a means of deterring corruption and maintaining the integrity of markets.
Isn’t there a danger that by flagging up a potential fixed match or in-game event that someone’s career might be ruined? What steps can be taken to prevent this from happening? Is there a risk that mistakes may be made and integrity services might act overzealously?
Fundamentally, this is the domain of sports and law enforcement. IBIA and its members identify and pass on suspicious betting data which we hope will lead to sanctions being placed on those proven to be involved in corruption. Under the terms of our information sharing MoU we only disclose information to the relevant investigatory body such as a sporting integrity unit and we won’t make anything public. Te association has no role in how that might then be communicated publicly, either by a sport or public authority.
IBIA is also not an investigatory body, nor does it have any enforcement powers with regard to sporting participants. All we ask is that sports and public authorities, such as gambling regulators and law enforcement, thoroughly investigate the suspicious betting information we provide to them and, where corruption is proven, impose robust sanctions. Tat process, where executed effectively, is a major deterrent to further corruption taking place.
WIRE / PULSE / INSIGHT / REPORTS P47
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