Operation Panchai Palang Much has been written about Operation Panchai Palang, both at the time of the fight in the national press
and in subsequent briefs and articles. I will not presume to have a definitive view and I seek to offer only a taste of some of the experiences of my men as we fought through the early stages of the operation. This short piece aims to enlighten rather than educate and, having submitted the usual lessons identified pieces, I will leave the reader to draw his or her conclusions and lessons.
by Major P Ginn
The background was the need to open the ungoverned space between Lashgar Gar and Gereshk to shape conditions for the elections in August 2009. There are two themes within this aim – the enemy must be defeated and then you have the very much more difficult task of persuading people to vote. Panchai Palang was to achieve the first bit – defeating the enemy. It is interesting to note that, despite having a well worked up Company group that had undergone multiple Battlegroup and Company level operations in Garmsir before we crossed the line of departure, it did not really occur to us quite how “School of Infantry” the fight would be until we were in it. There is a general desire amongst soldiers to accept but sometimes not really believe the intelligence they are fed.
A Company was attached to the Light Dragoons (LD) Battlegroup (BG) throughout the tour. The BG started the tour as BG(S) in FOB Delhi, Garmsir. My sister Company, B Company, was also attached, ensuring that the LDs had a strong Infantry balance. I had had a double troop of CVR(T) attached from the start; we had worked together for two months in Garmsir, resolved our few differences and felt ready. Then followed the turbulence of a Relief in Place with 2/8 USMC BG and a convoy operation from Garmsir to Camp Bastion that would probably have been quicker had we walked. So, battle procedure in Bastion was curtailed; I remembered all those moments in all those exercises when I thought the timelines unrealistic. As I struggled to answer Questions One and Two, provide a decision brief to the CO and drip feed information to the Pl Comds and CSM, I could not help thinking that all the students I had ever taught were watching and chortling.
The Mercian Eagle
Eventually, the Company was briefed, attachments were integrated and we were complete in the forward assembly area, FOB Price. It was here that the morale factor really started to become relevant. Previously chirpy characters fell silent, time on the welfare phone became even more precious and the lads tended to congregate in small groupings of mates. The panorama was clichéd - long lines of vehicles strung with ponchos, every weapon system ready, soldiers cleaning, cooking, chatting and smoking in every corner, the sun dipping down, news crews snaking among the soldiers, rehearsals, briefs, checks… Looking around and, despite having received orders, I think it was here that the scale started to sink in to the lads - and the officers.
No plan survives contact. A phrase so deeply ingrained in our minds that you would think we were prepared for things to go wrong – it did. We were four hours late to the FPoL at Spin Masjed with the Danish BG because of an underestimated Viking move. The Company should have been delivered in one neat bundle to the LoD; we arrived exhausted in small groups. One of my CVR(T) was destroyed moving into the Fire Support position, incredibly with no serious injuries. Late, limited fire support and knackered? Crack on, fella. To be fair, morale had been given a boost by the sight of some (female) Danish APC crews walking around in skimpy shorts and vest tops. The incongruity of this compared to the Company was stark.
We then conducted a by-the-book OBUA operation through Objective 1B for 36 hours. Slowly, cautiously, expecting each alleyway, wall and compound to contain insurgents and each potential vulnerable point to contain an IED, we crept forward. Every
entry was explosive; the effect of literally blowing our way through the village must have had a disarming effect on the enemy, as they were reduced to a few harmless pot-shots. We found a few IEDs; the US Paladin counter-IED team attached dealt with each one in under ten minutes, proving their worth to a Company group reliant on manoeuvre. Crucially, we got the CVR(T) through without any further casualties.
We were the first Company from the BG across the LoD. We took two days to clear our first objective and already the BG was behind schedule. I could have pushed the Company harder, and taken risk by bypassing some compounds in the village. I decided not to and, on the morning of 5 Jul 09, we were poised to start clearing south. B Company, on our left flank, had crossed their LoD through the Abpashak Wadi the day before and was continuing their advance.
I was faced with a combination of a Company advance to contact and a concurrent deliberate route clearance. We started to find double-stacked 40-60 kg IEDs, both pressure plate and command detonated. The Paladin team really earned their keep. At one stage, they destroyed a device so large that the route was denied; they simply blew down a compound wall so the rubble filled the hole. We were in sporadic contact from the moment we left the village. The enemy were conducting delaying operations, attempting to slow us whilst they prepared coherent ambushes and laid fresh IEDs. They were committed, tenacious and near impossible to pinpoint. AH was fantastic against identified enemy, but tended to make them run away. The guns were good but constrained by having to observe fall of shot in the dense terrain. Mortars were highly
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