STRATEGY AND BUSINESS ECONOMICS


Online Advertising, Data Sharing, and Consumer Control


JUSTIN P. JOHNSON DEANE W. MALOTT PROFESSOR


OF MANAGEMENT


Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management


Cornell SC Johnson College of Business Cornell University


Co-authors • Justin P. Johnson Deane W. Malott Professor of Management, Samuel Curtis


Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University


• Tomas Jungbauer • Marcel Preuss Assistant Professor, Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School


of Management, Cornell SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University Assistant Professor, Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of


Management, Cornell SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University


THOMAS JUNGBAUER ASSISTANT PROFESSOR


Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management


Cornell SC Johnson College of Business Cornell University


Summary When advertisers have strong property rights over data regarding consumers’


active purchase interests, competition between ad exchanges leads to too little sharing of data. Tis may harm consumers, who receive too few pertinent ads, and advertisers who may be bound in a situation “resembling a prisoner’s dilemma.” Te authors find that reallocating property rights to consumers, giving them the right to opt out of tracking, may benefit consumers who allow tracking by altering the incentives of ad exchanges to offer improved targeting options.


MARCEL PREUSS ASSISTANT PROFESSOR


Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management


Cornell SC Johnson College of Business Cornell University


CONTENTS TO MAIN


Considering intent advertising, a particular type of online advertising which refers to a situation in which a consumer has recently taken an action that indicates current intent to purchase in some category, they conclude that it is plausible that consumers prefer to see more rather than fewer relevant ads. In addition, they show that initiatives by Apple and Google to limit third-party tracking and to introduce alternative tracking systems such as Google’s Topics might benefit consumers by weakening the data property rights of advertisers. Because more data are shared by default under such systems, this can be true even if these systems are less accurate than third-party tracking systems.


Management Science 70, 11, November 2024 LINK TO PAPER


| RESEARCH WITH IMPACT: CORNELL SC JOHNSON COLLEGE OF BUSINESS • 2024 EDITION


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