\\\\\\\ WARNING /////// \\\\\\\ CAUTION /////// \\\\\\\ DANGER /////// VDR transcripts reveal


missed warnings before M/V Dali struck Baltimore Bridge


Recently released transcripts from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) are offering a chilling, moment- by-moment look inside the bridge of the Dali containership in the lead-up to the disaster on 26 March 2024 that brought down Baltimore’s Francis Scott Key Bridge, killing six construction workers in the process and severing a vital road artery in the Port of Baltimore.


The transcripts, which have been drawn from the vessel’s Voyage Data Recorder (VDR), span the period from the afternoon of 25 March through to the collision and immediate aftermath of the accident. They reveal an escalating series of technical problems aboard the Singapore-flagged vessel in the hours before departure — problems that went largely unmentioned during the pilot exchange and preparations for sailing.


Alarms ahead of departure


National Transportation Safety Board Office of Research and Engineering Washington, DC 20594


Starting at 14:20 EDT on 25 March, the VDR picked up numerous alarms on the bridge, many of them linked to the ship’s power management systems. Sounds consistent with automatic power changeover circuits and multiple loud electronic alerts persisted throughout the afternoon.


DCA24MM031 VOYAGE DATA RECODER – AUDIO


Group Chairman's Factual Report July 16, 2024


At one point, so many alarms were sounding that bridge conversations over UHF radio were unintelligible. Between 14:35 and 14:57, alarms again blared continuously — yet, notably, no voices were recorded on the bridge.


By 15:30, the Chief Officer informed the Master that the alarms were “nominal,” though no specifics were given. The crew reported that all alarms had been reset by 15:57.


VDR AUDIO Group Chairman’s Factual Report


DCA24MM031 Page 1


Then, at 17:49, the Master placed a significant call to the Chief Engineer, instructing him, speaking in Tamil, to prepare an incident report tied to the engine room. The Master stressed the importance of filling out the form completely and accurately, suggesting that whatever had occurred warranted documentation. The exact nature of the incident remains unclear, and no further references were made on the VDR.


98 | ISSUE 113 | SEP 2025 | THE REPORT


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