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NEW marine repor ts and guides
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TSB Canada releases Annual Report 2024-25
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada’s (TSB) annual report for 2024–25 has been published, marking 35 years of advancing transportation safety.
Since its inception in 1990, the TSB has completed more than 2000 investigations, made more than 630 recommendations, and issued hundreds of safety communications. Over the years, more than 84% of the responses to the Board’s recommendations have been assessed as Fully Satisfactory, demonstrating the TSB’s concrete impact on the improvement of safety.
“As we reflect on a year of meaningful progress, the TSB remains steadfast in its commitment to advancing transportation safety across Canada,” said TSB Chair Yoan Marier. “Our dedicated team continues to push for change, collaborate with industry and government partners, and advocate for improvements that make a real difference. As we look ahead, we do so with confidence and resolve—knowing that the work we do today helps create a safer tomorrow for all Canadians.”
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TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA ANNUAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 2024–25
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA ANNUAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 2024–25
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA ANNUAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 2024–25
Marine transportation safety – the year in review The TSB received 951 reports of marine transportation occurrences in 2024 (213 accidents and 738 incidents), including 12 fatalities.
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD OF CANADA ANNUAL REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 2024–25
The total of 213 marine transportation accidents represents a decrease from the 243 accidents in 2023 and is below the 10-year average of 274. In 2024, 85% were shipping accidents (when a ship, for example, sinks, founders, or capsizes), slightly more than 83% on average over the previous 10 years. The remaining 15% of accidents in 2024 were aboard ship (when a person is seriously or fatally injured, for example, when boarding a ship or by falling overboard), just below the 10-year annual average of 17%.
The 12 marine transportation fatalities represent a 33% reduction from the 2023 total of 18 and the 10-year average of 15. Of the 12 fatalities, eight involved shipping accidents, slightly fewer than the average of nine per year. As in previous years, a high proportion of the fatalities (10 of the 12) was related to commercial fishing (Canadian-flag vessels in Canadian waters). Due to this continuing trend, commercial fishing safety remains a key safety issue on the TSB’s Watchlist.
The 738 marine transportation incidents reported to the TSB in 2024 represents a 6% decrease from 2023 and is 13% below the 10-year average of 845. As in previous years, most reportable incidents (83%) were related to the total failure of machinery or technical systems.
According to Transport Canada, 2024 marine activity (commercial vessel-kilometres) for Canadian commercial non-fishing vessels with a gross tonnage of over 15 (excluding passenger vessels and cruise ships) was unchanged from the 2014-to-2023 average. The 2024 accident rate was 2.5 accidents per million commercial vessel-kilometres, lower than the 2014-to-2023 average of 3.7.
Marine transportation investigations In 2024–25, the TSB deployed to seven marine transportation occurrences (two fewer than in 2023–24), launched seven investigations, and completed 10.
TSB issues three recommendations following investigation into ferry collision with dock.
The TSB issued three recommendations related to passenger safety management to Transport Canada along with the publication of its investigation report (M22C0231) into the 2022 occurrence in Toronto, Ontario, where the passenger ferry Sam McBride, with six crew members and approximately 910 passengers on board, struck the dock while berthing at the Jack Layton Ferry Terminal. Twenty passengers were reported injured.
In its investigation, the TSB determined that at the time of the occurrence, the vessel approached the dock faster than it had on earlier trips that day. Also, it had only one of its two propellers turning as it approached the dock, which, considering the vessel’s speed and distance from the dock, was not enough to stop the ferry. Additionally, the investigation found that the City of Toronto did not have written procedures addressing issues like safe approach speed for docking, meaning that masters were left to operate in the way that they deemed appropriate. Without written procedures that defined safe practices for docking, decisions around travel or docking speed may have been influenced by operational pressures.
56 | ISSUE 113 | SEP 2025 | THE REPORT
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