Upon entering the slop tank, the Bosun collapsed onto the top platform of the slop tank, located 2 meters below the tank entrance. The Chief Officer immediately instructed the deck cadet to retrieve Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) sets. However, before the equipment arrived, the Chief Officer entered the slop tank to rescue the Bosun and also collapsed.
Seeing this, the cadet alerted the bridge. The Third Officer donned the SCBA and descended to the top platform. Thankfully, both the Bosun and the Chief Officer were successfully retrieved within approximately 7 minutes. They received first aid and were transferred to the ship's hospital. The company's doctor was contacted for further medical assistance. For the next 36 hours, both crew members were closely monitored by the onboard crew and the doctor (remotely) until they recovered fully.
Gas readings taken at the top of the platform after the rescue showed normal atmosphere. It is suspected that oxygen levels were lower and LEL higher at the time the Bosun entered the tank, as the hatch had only been opened moments earlier. Toxic gases, particularly lighter-than-air vapours, may also have been present. At the time of the incident, the vessel was approximately 400 nautical miles from the nearest port.
While the investigation is ongoing, preliminary findings have confirmed that no tank atmosphere check was performed, no enclosed space entry permit was issued, and no SCBA or rescue equipment was prepared at the entry point. What is clear is that the initial double collapse was followed by a swift and coordinated response from the remaining crew, ultimately saving two lives.
This case highlights the importance of understanding the human impulse of would-be rescuers to enter without proper safety equipment. Equally important, it demonstrates that a well-executed rescue, grounded in teamwork and adherence to safety protocols can mean the difference between tragedy and survival. Finally, it emphasizes the crew’s ability to provide effective medical first aid immediately after the rescue.
Reasons for fatalities of would-be rescuers
There can be multiple reasons behind the deaths of would-be rescuers. Some highlight psychological aspects, such as the “rescuer syndrome,” as referred to in InterManager’s submission to IMO (III 11/4/4, 2025 [KJ1] ), where people feel a compulsive urge to react instantly and instinctively. Research by Pearn and Franklin (2012) describes “rescue altruism” as a blend of:
- Ethos: Driven by the Good Samaritan or Golden Rule ethic. - Identity: Rescuer identifies with the victim, often due to a perceived duty-of-care. - Risk perception: Belief that there is a chance of success, even if the risk is high. - Courage: Personal bravery that often overrides rational risk assessment.
In emergencies, especially when a colleague or subordinate is in peril, this impulse can override training and procedural requirements, resulting in a chain of fatalities as each rescuer succumbs to the same unseen hazard.
There are also other contributing factors behind the fatalities:
- Holding breath: Some rescuers attempt to hold their breath, believing a quick entry is safe, as highlighted in MAIB Safety Bulletin 02/2008.
- Improper equipment: Emergency Escape Breathing Devices (EEBDs), designed for escape only, are sometimes misused for rescue entry, despite clear warnings. There have also been instances where would-be rescuers have entered the space using an air hose.
- Unrealistic drills: Practicing rescue in non-hazardous spaces or without full gear leaves crews unprepared for the realities of a true emergency.
- Misinterpretation of collapse: Would-be rescuers may not realize the initial casualty collapsed from asphyxiation, assuming a slip, trip, or fall instead.
- Delayed or uncoordinated response: Lack of immediate access to rescue equipment or poor coordination can delay effective rescue, reducing survival chances.
86 | ISSUE 115 | MAR 2026 | THE REPORT
“more than 60% of confined space deaths occur among rescuers”
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