Next, for the DPA, “the implementation of the Company’s policy” naturally means the operation of the Safety Management System (SMS), which requires daily attention, whether on land or at sea, on all the Company vessels. For those who oppose the ISM Code, whether satisfied or not, this demonstrates the DPA’s responsibility in the operation (synonymous with implementation) of the SMS. The Company’s SMS may be created at the operational management level, but it is validated by senior management and then implemented and updated with the assistance of the DPA.
The SMS, on the other hand, and therefore the DPA, naturally follows the requirements of the code at a minimum. This includes the risk assessment of the Company’s activities and its vessels and their continuous updating, as well as regulatory monitoring, i.e., the monitoring of regulations concerning the Company’s activities and all advanced studies currently concerning the rapid modernisation of our industry, whether in new fuels or the digitalisation of all our operational processes.
To conclude partially again, the responsibility for implementing the SMS is certainly one of the most important for the DPA ... while not forgetting the other responsibilities listed in the circular.
3-2 “Evaluate and review the effectiveness of the SMS”
This is a well-established responsibility today and, to my knowledge, works well everywhere. It is generally the DPA in charge of implementation, who prepares the management review (SMS operating report) required by ISM Section 12.3.
Moreover, sometimes, like the OCMIF which, to the great “delight” of tanker crews, has introduced the TMSA (Tanker Management Self-Assessment) or “ISM+”. This effectiveness assessment is facilitated by using performance criteria. These performance criteria, cleverly chosen by the Company, allow for a rapid mathematical assessment of the level of operation, the strengths and weaknesses of the SMS, and the areas that require improvement. These evaluated criteria allow for a graphical representation in the form of an instantaneous or evolving dashboard ... which the bosses love: try it and see!
Internal audits, both on board and onshore, are already conducted every 12 months, with a possible three-month margin, given that the vessels will not necessarily be available in a port on the anniversary date. For a management review, an annual review can also be considered.
As a partial conclusion, the DPA prepares the management review by presenting, among other things, the results of the internal and external audits carried out during the past year.
NB: When valid reasons arise, the SMS is missing important items and certain ISM Code requirements are more or less well covered by the Company’s expansion. For example, a systems review is recommended to rectify or clarify what was not fully covered or not very well interpreted, or when the Company’s growth changes the situation. On this occasion, all “cross-functional managers” are invited to contribute, and the DPA ensures a synthesis of the day-to-day operations … this seems logical!
3-3 “Notify and analyse non-conformities/accidents and near-misses”
Daily reporting, i.e., the transmission of non-conformities discovered either by vessel operators or occasional auditors (inspections, PSC, audits, various reports), requires the DPA to analyse and develop corrective actions in agreement with operators and cross-functional managers. Not forgetting senior management when these corrective actions have a financial impact exceeding the limit set by senior management itself!
Unless there is a classic emergency endangering the vessel and its crew, appropriate corrective actions may be presented to management during the management review for approval or rejection.
An SMS procedure stipulates, in accordance with Section 9 of the ISM Code, that irregularities, accidents, or near misses be communicated to the Company, i.e., to the appropriate cross-functional managers. This is logical! The DPA’s responsibility, however, is to ensure that these irregularities are followed up on ... which is certainly one of the weakest points in the application of the Code. Indeed, while it is logical that irregularities/non-compliance/ accidents and near misses be communicated directly to those in charge in order to ensure it is monitored and followed up, it is equally logical that the DPA be on the information path along with the responsible person created by Section 6.3 of our circular.
Today, when communication between the ship and the land-based operational services is duplicated by email, it’s easy to copy the DPA! Moreover, in current attempts to digitise processes, the DPA is automatically informed. Furthermore, and this is quite unusual, accidents and “near misses,” which are mandatory internal investigations with the aim of improving prevention, are also entrusted to the DPA!
Quite unusual indeed, because would anyone want to entrust investigations to someone more theoretically independent, as with non-conformities? I would tend to say YES, of course! ... Always this problem of the investigator’s or auditor’s independence, alongside the operational responsibility of cross-functional managers!
Accidents must be investigated by the Company in accordance with Section 9.1 of the ISM Code. However, this requirement is often overlooked or botched, with the Company relying solely on the Master’s sea report and the MAIB (Marine Accident Investigation Branch) report, when it exists. This aspect seems unacceptable because, firstly, the MAIB (SOLAS requirement) does not always intervene, and internal investigations also have their advantages when conducted honestly and independently, a sort of “in-house washing of dirty laundry.” Not to mention the potential inaccuracies of official accident investigators unfortunately!
An important reminder: in 2006, the MSC and MEPC committees, again together, issued a circular (MSC-MEPC.2/ Circ.3) very much in line with current concerns (2006 was also the birth of MLC, remember!) that corresponded to a European directive on “workers at work” in 2001.
Finally, in the circular above, a valuable aid, internal investigations can be conducted according to the recommendations seen in an appendix.
THE REPORT | MAR 2026 | ISSUE 115 | 77
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