SAFE T Y
Briefings Benzene vapour death following unauthorised tank entry
Britannia P&I Club has cautioned its members on the dangers of entering an enclosed space after a benzene vapour death in the cargo hold of a tanker.
The final part of the cleaning process required physical tank entry to conduct manual wiping or “mopping”, of any residual wash water. As is standard, tank entry required an enclosed space entry permit to be issued by the master. This company’s policy was to mark the hatch cover of the space to show that a permit had been issued, and it was now safe for entry.
Some of the cargo tanks had previously carried benzene. Although the tanks had been rinsed and ventilated for gas freeing, residue benzene vapours remained a serious hazard. Benzene is highly volatile and toxic; in a confined or poorly ventilated environment, inhalation can rapidly cause dizziness, incapacitation, collapse, respiratory failure or fatal exposure.
This event developed rapidly and at a point where the tank had not yet been formally cleared for entry. Until an enclosed space permit is issued, a cargo tank must be treated as hazardous, regardless of whether the hatch is open, a fan is running, or the tank has been recently washed.
The purpose of the permit process is to confirm, through measured data and recorded gas testing, that it is safe to proceed. Tanks may look harmless from above yet can still harbour atmospheres that can quickly incapacitate or kill without warning. Therefore, visual appearance from the deck level cannot be relied upon; the atmosphere within a tank can remain dangerous even when it seems inactive or benign.
Download full details of the incident case study at
https://bit.ly/4pNBAZu.
RMI investigation into enclosed space death in tanker
The Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator has released an investigation report into the death of a crewmember from tanker TRF Kashima after the sailor and two other crewmembers had entered an enclosed space and fell unconscious.
The marine safety investigation conducted by the Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator determined the C/O had entered the No. 6 S CT to take pictures required by the Charterer and that the OS2 and Pumpman entered the cargo tank to aid the C/O after they saw him lying on the upper platform. The entry into the cargo tank by the three crewmembers was not conducted in accordance with the ship’s enclosed space entry procedures and without taking any required precautions. It was also determined that the C/O had previously made multiple entries into the ship’s cargo tanks, also to take pictures required by the Charterer, while cargo tank cleaning operations were conducted on 9–11 and 13–14 July 2024. Evidence of a lack of oversight by the Master, crewmember fatigue, and that records of work and rest hours were not being accurately maintained were also identified.
The following lessons learned were identified: - Enclosed spaces should never be entered for any reason, including to assist a fellow crewmember, without implementing established shipboard procedures.
- Masters and other senior officers must place safety above all else, and through both their words and actions, provide a positive example for junior officers and ratings.
- Deviations from established procedures increase the risk of accidents.
Conclusion
Causal factors that contributed to this very serious marine casualty included: - The C/O’s entry of No. 6 S CT and subsequent entry by the OS2 and Pumpman without implementing the Company’s enclosed space entry procedures or otherwise taking necessary precautions;
- The lack of oversight by the Master and Company of the cargo tank cleaning operations that were conducted on the ship on 9–11 and 13–14 July 2024;
- Onboard normalization of deviation from established procedures and requirements during the cargo tank cleaning operations that were conducted on board on 9–11 and 13–14 July 2024 as evidenced by:
- The C/O making multiple entries into the ship’s cargo tanks to take pictures without implementing the Company’s enclosed space entry procedures;
- Opening cargo tank access hatches without cargo tanks being gas freed, using cargo tank access to add the citric acid solution to the cargo tanks, and the cargo tank tagging system which was not implemented; and
- The deviation from the Company-approved plan for cleaning the cargo tanks. Download the full report at
https://bit.ly/49zY6jS.
THE REPORT | MAR 2026 | ISSUE 115 | 39
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