Protected area law enforcement 751


local villages to provide intelligence and undertake foot pa- trols in partnership with Wildlife Police Officers from the Department of National Parks and Wildlife to detect rule-breaking behaviour and remove threats such as snares (Conservation Lower Zambezi, 2020). Community scouts are employed by Conservation Lower Zambezi, a non-profit organization, and local Community Resource Boards, and they receive a salary, training and field equipment (People Not Poaching, 2019). Firearms are provided, along with food rations, medicine, radios and solar chargers (Conserva- tion Lower Zambezi, 2021). In certain contexts, external supportmay bemore logistic-


al or financial in nature, whereas in other cases local residents may primarily receive technical support from external insti- tutions. For example, in the vicinity of Dja Biosphere Reserve in Cameroon, scientists have been working with Baka com- munities to address local concerns over wildlife crime (Hoyte, 2021). By listening to local voices, a tool has been co- designed to enable community groups to collect and visualize data on illegal activities using smartphone technology (Moustard et al., 2021). With training provided on how to use the smartphone application (Hoyte, 2021), the data col- lected by local residents have helped inform enforcement and contributed to 19 seizures without arrest and 36 arrests during December 2017–August 2020 (Moustard et al., 2021; Chiaravalloti et al., 2022).


Motivating forces for local participation in protected area law enforcement


Sources of motivation for participating in protected area law enforcement can be predominantly extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic motivation can be defined as ‘a construct that per- tains whenever an activity is done in order to attain some separable outcome’ (Ryan & Deci, 2000,p. 60), whereas in- trinsic motivation can be understood as ‘the doing of an ac- tivity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence’ (Ryan & Deci, 2000,p. 56). For some local community members, participation may be driven by extrinsic factors. For example, rangers in Kahuzi-Biega National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported the ability to receive benefits and earn an income as the principal reasons for wanting to work in front-line conservation (Spira et al., 2019). For others, participation may stem from intrinsic motivations to protect livelihoods, territory and cultural heritage (Turreira-García et al., 2018). This could be in response to a lack of regular patrolling and monitoring from formal protected area enforcement agencies (Roig-Boixeda et al., 2018) or come from a sense of duty, as has been found for rangers operating in Mana Pools National Park and Che- wore Safari Area in Zimbabwe (Kuiper et al., 2021). In prac- tice, extrinsic and intrinsic motivations can be interlinked. For example, extrinsic factors such as a salary and promotional


opportunitiesmay influence intrinsic motivations to protect biodiversity (Moreto et al., 2019). Motivational forces for local participation are contextual,


and involvement can be influenced by demographic and socio-economic attributes such as land tenure status and household size (Coulibaly-Lingani et al., 2011). Factors that motivate local residents to participate in protected area law enforcement may be economic, social and/or eco- logical in nature (Kimengsi et al., 2019). These factors could include local social norms being aligned with de jure regu- lations, social cohesiveness and a sense of belonging (Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2015; Oyanedel et al., 2020), perceived benefits from the protected area and its natural resources, and trust and regular interaction with protected area ran- gers (Anagnostou et al., 2020). In the community policing literature, social cohesion (i.e. feeling part of a neigh- bourhood) and police getting to know local residents are thought to influence local participation in crime preven- tion (Pattavina et al., 2006). Protected area rangers who are local to a conservation area have been found to have better relations with community members than non-local rangers (Parker et al., 2022).


Extent to which local participation in protected area law enforcement is formalized


Local residents can contribute to protected area lawenforce- ment in a formalized way if, for example, they represent the state (e.g. as rangers) and have the official capacity to en- force protected area regulations (Viollaz et al., 2022). Local residents can also operate in a formal capacity by carrying out the specific actions and responsibilities outlined in clearly defined terms of reference. In the Cardamom Mountains of Cambodia, for example, Fauna & Flora and community wardens sign a formal contract that outlines the duties of wardens, the conditions that wardens must abide by, monthly pay and working hours. In this case, community wardens are required to conduct a certain num- ber of patrols each month for the duration of the contract. In other contexts, local residents can formally contribute to enforcement processes by being employed on a full-time basis or by acting in a voluntary capacity. Local residents can also make substantial contributions


to protected area enforcement informally (Moreto & Charlton, 2021). They may serve as cultural brokers to facili- tate information flows and interactions between different stakeholder groups (Rizzolo et al., 2021) or by operating as ‘non-professionalized’ agents (Viollaz et al., 2022,p. 125), monitoring the activities and behaviours of others. One framing of this type of involvement is informal guardian- ship. Empirical research has shown that three key condi- tions are required for informal guardianship: local resident availability, knowledge of context (i.e. the ability to recognize when local behaviours deviate from the


Oryx, 2024, 58(6), 746–758 © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Fauna & Flora International doi:10.1017/S0030605323001758


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