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African elephant crop foraging 783


TABLE 3 The top five results from binomial generalized linear models for the deterrent-use hypothesis, evaluating which farmers from the six study villages were using deterrents, based on demographic variables (n = 189). Model descriptions and terms are presented in Table 2 and full model results are in Supplementary Table 4. For each model, the table shows the Akaike information criterion adjusted for small sample sizes (AICc), the difference in AICc from the best-performing model (ΔAICc), the adjusted pseudo-r2 value, the Akaike weight (wi), log-likelihood (LL) and the number of variables (k).


Model 12


15 6


17 10


Intercept −0.93


−1.54 −0.04 −1.09 −0.05


AICc


253.71 255.05 255.55 256.30 257.61


ΔAICc 0.00


1.33 1.84 2.59 3.90


(deterrent-exposure hypothesis), the null model (1)pro- vided the best fit (Table 4). For the economic-barriers hy- pothesis, exposure to deterrents (model 6) was the best-fitting model for those who believed they could use de- terrents (Table 5). However, individuals who had not re- ceived information on deterrents were 2.78 (95% CI: 1.01– 7.63) times more likely to believe that they could implement deterrents than those who had received such information (P = 0.046). For the survey question associated with the deterrent-use


hypothesis, 54% of respondents used at least one form of deterrent to prevent crop foraging. Regarding the deterrent-exposure hypothesis, 22% of respondents had received information on deterrent methods and 10%had received information specifically on fences.The types of deter- rent methods about which villagers had received information were primarily traditional fencing methods (Supplementary Table 2), and most individuals (87%) who used deterrents used traditional types (Supplementary Table 3). Regarding the economic-barriers hypothesis, only 40%ofrespondents believed that they could invest in deterrents, and all who said they could not make such an investment (123 respon- dents) cited economic constraints as the reason. Elephants were cited as the main reason behind the crop


losses by 84% of respondents; 74% had actively chased ele- phants from their farms but few (6%) had attempted to harm the animals. When asked how much they fear ele- phants, 55% of respondents said they were very afraid,


Adjusted r2 0.07


0.07 0.04 0.07 0.03


wi


0.36 0.19 0.14 0.10 0.05


LL


−121.69 −121.29 −125.74 −120.84 −125.74


k 5


6 2 7 3


23% were somewhat or a little bit afraid, 15% were not afraid at all and 7% were unsure. Only 16% of respondents had re- ceived information on how to safely live with elephants.


Discussion


Over half of the participants in this study used some type of elephant deterrent, of which the majority were of traditional types. Education level and exposure to relevant information were the prevalent variables in the top models for the deterrent-use hypothesis. However, the adjusted pseudo-r2 values for these models indicated that not much of the vari- ation in responses was explained by the variables. Effect sizes weremore descriptive of the relationship between vari- ables and demographic categories as farmers were almost four times more likely to use deterrents if they had been ex- posed to information and if they had higher education le- vels. The deterrent-exposure hypotheses was supported in that higher education levels (model 3)were related to receipt of general information on deterrents, and those with tertiary education were more likely to have received such informa- tion but not specific information on deterrent fencing, for which the null model provided the best fit (model 1). Finally, the economic-barriers hypothesis was not sup- ported in terms of education level having an effect, but in- stead exposure to deterrent information (model 6)was associated with whether farmers believed that they could implement such deterrents. Those who had not received


TABLE 4 Results of binomial generalized linear models for the deterrent-exposure hypothesis, a two-part hypothesis evaluating whether farmers from the six study villages had been exposed to information on any type of deterrent information and specifically on fencing deterrents, based on demographic variables (n = 189). Model descriptions and terms are presented in Tables 2 and 3.


Model


24 1


24 Intercept


Any type of deterrent 3


Fencing deterrents 1 3


−1.61 −0.89 −1.32


−2.13 −2.40 −4.29


AICc


182.90 189.59 197.12


129.67 135.52 148.42


ΔAICc


0.00 6.69


14.22 0.00


5.86 18.75 Adj. r2


0.08 0.10 0.00


0.00


−0.01 −0.04


wi


0.97 0.03 0.00


0.95 0.05 0.00


LL


−87.34 −80.75 −97.55


−63.82 −63.65 −60.17


Oryx, 2024, 58(6), 779–787 © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Fauna & Flora International doi:10.1017/S0030605323001795 k 4


13 1


1 4


13


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