750 W. Sharkey et al.


FIG. 2 Building on the concept of the enforcement chain (Akella & Cannon, 2004), local residents can contribute directly or indirectly to different elements of the protected area law enforcement system. Solid arrows highlight the successive nature of the system (in theory). Dashed lines illustrate how certain elements of the enforcement system may be interlinked or bypassed (in reality). Numbers correspond to the following hypothetical examples that serve to demonstrate how elements of the system interact: (1) members of local community groups are employed to conduct patrols and report rule-breaking behaviour; (2) community members dissuade others from engaging in rule-breaking behaviour; (3) local residents apply social sanctions (e.g. shame), and the identified rule-breaker is not arrested; (4) local residents mitigate risks to wildlife by removing threats such as illegal fishing equipment; (5) community scouts conduct patrols in collaboration with enforcement rangers who have the jurisdiction to make an arrest; (6) a rule-breaker is fined on the spot, and there is no engagement with the judicial system; (7) a local resident serves as a witness in court; (8) local residents confiscate valuable equipment (e.g. illegal logging machinery) whilst on patrol, and this removes a threat and constitutes part of a sanction; (9) the evidence provided by a local resident helps to convict a rule-breaker; and (10) community members sanction a convicted rule-breaker (e.g. by imposing a monetary fine).


contributing to the development and measurement of performance indicators (Sabet, 2014). The formation of neighbourhood committees can also provide a level of accountability and draw attention to situations in which enforcement could be improved (Sabet, 2014). In practice, different elements of the enforcement system


may bemore or less conducive to local community involve- ment. For example, there may be fewer barriers to becoming involved in detection efforts than in the judicial process, particularly in systems where courts often fail to prosecute. In these systems, local residentsmay have limited opportun- ity to provide evidence in court or have few incentives to stand as a witness, as the perceived costs (e.g. fear of retribu- tion) outweigh the potential benefits. Furthermore, to arrest a suspected rule-breaker legally, local residents must have jurisdiction (Wilkie et al., 2016), and governments may be unwilling to allow local residents to exercise this authority.


Nature of local participation in decision-making


In some systems of protected area governance, responsibility for management could be partially or fully devolved to local residents (Pomeroy&Williams, 1994). In these systems, local residents may participate directly in decision-making about how enforcement is carried out. Local participation in decision-making may relate to protected area enforcement systems more broadly (e.g. how should de jure rules be en- forced) or to particular elements of the enforcement system. For example, local residents may contribute to decisions on how, where and when to gather information and carry


out patrols and which personnel should be involved (Turreira-García et al., 2018). In the sameway, local residents could contribute to discussions on how prosecution proce- dures should work. In North Sulawesi, for example, staff from Proyek Pesisir, an initiative between the government of Indonesia and the US Agency for International Development, held formal and informal discussions with community groups to develop and agree on appropriate penalties for violations within proposed community-based marine protected areas (Crawford et al., 1998). Local residents can also participate by implementing de-


cisions across different elements of the enforcement system. For example, local residents could put detection-based deci- sions into effect by conducting patrols or providing intelli- gence and contribute to sanctioning by implementing decisions on how rule-breakers are penalized. This has been observed in Manus Province of Papua New Guinea, where clan leaders decide whether to impose community service or issue monetary fines for violations within re- stricted fishing areas (Cinner et al., 2005).


Type of external support provided to local residents participating in protected area law enforcement


The contribution of local residents to protected area law en- forcement can be characterized by the type of external sup- port provided. External support for local residents can take a variety of forms and can come from a range of stakeholder groups. For instance, in Lower Zambezi National Park in southern Zambia, community scouts are recruited from


Oryx, 2024, 58(6), 746–758 © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Fauna & Flora International doi:10.1017/S0030605323001758


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