Protected area law enforcement 749
FIG. 1 A framework for structuring understanding of the contributions of local residents to protected area law enforcement.
system comprising seven elements: community engage- ment, detection, threat removal, arrest, prosecution, convic- tion and sanctioning (Fig. 2). Within this system, agents and institutions perform different roles and have different objec- tives and incentives (Robinson et al., 2010). In the context of protected area enforcement, for example, the number of rangers, the skills they possess and the availability of equip- ment influence the probability of detection (Arias et al., 2016). Although this element is predominantly field-based, the probability of arrest is dependent on factors such as available resources (e.g. rapid transportation) and evidence, whereas the probability of prosecution revolves around the capacity of the judicial system and coordination between legal institutions (Arias et al., 2016). Generally, the effective- ness of the enforcement system is reliant on each element functioning efficiently, meaning that if one element is weak (e.g. there is a low probability of detection or a low rate of prosecution), efforts made to strengthen other ele- ments will be less effective (Akella & Cannon, 2004). Protected area enforcement systems vary considerably
and, in some situations or circumstances, certain compo- nents may be bypassed. A sanction such as a monetary fine could, for example, be administered on the spot without processing and engagement with the courts. In addition, some components may be interlinked. For instance, the de- tection of rule-breaking behaviour could lead to the confis- cation of illegal equipment (i.e. threat removal) as well as apprehension. Theoretically, local residents can contribute directly
and indirectly to each element of the enforcement system. For example, community engagement can discourage rule-breaking behaviour before it happens. Local residents could conduct visible patrolling (Massé, 2020) or raise
awareness of rules through soft enforcement. Soft en- forcement aims to achieve voluntary compliance by foster- ing community relations and drawing on education (Pendleton, 1998). This approach to enforcement is pursued in areas surrounding Takamanda National Park in Cameroon, where Village Forest Management Committees have been established to help raise community awareness of the importance of biodiversity conservation (Akenji et al., 2019). A similar approach is followed in the Arapaima Management Project in Guyana, where community aware- ness campaigns and education have led to social pressure that is thought to have played a greater role in enforcing a harvest ban than the formal structures of a management plan would have achieved (Fernandes, 2006). Local residents can contribute to detection directly by
undertaking patrols and providing intelligence (Lotter & Clark, 2014; Anagnostou et al., 2020), and they can con- tribute indirectly by carrying out ad hoc activities such as maintaining and/or operating vehicles. Furthermore, local residents can remove threats such as snares, appre- hend or detain a suspected offender, serve as witnesses for the prosecution and impose different types of sanctions on rule-breakers (Wilkie et al., 2016). The role of local residents can also be extended to en-
compass oversight of the entire enforcement system (e.g. the monitoring of official enforcement agencies; Sabet, 2014; Fig. 2). By providing oversight, local residents can play a direct role in ensuring that protected area enforce- ment systems are functioning effectively and adaptable to changing circumstances. Although there are few published examples of this in the context of conservation, research into public security highlights the role that citizens can play in overseeing the activities of the police by, for example,
Oryx, 2024, 58(6), 746–758 © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Fauna & Flora International doi:10.1017/S0030605323001758
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