Russell Leigh Moses
108
Dean at a Center of Chinese Studies in Beijing
China’s U-Turn
Hope and danger collided at the recently
concluded National People’s Congress
in Beijing. The two-week conclave meets
annually, and while it is unfair and
inaccurate to characterize the Congress as a
rubber-stamp exercise, delegates tend, in the
main, to jump on the bandwagon of policies
constructed by the central government, and
by the Communist Party.
HE hope was that the Chinese leadership would
finally do something – preferably something bold
– to forestall further decline in the country’s major
economic indicators. Growth has slowed, exports
have plummeted, and unemployment has jumped, and the
prevailing view has been that a “blame america first” strategy
makes the most sense. analysts kept waiting for Chinese officials
to salvage capitalism by spelling out a plan to save its economy
first.
The danger is that this is exactly what China’s leaders did.
China’s government is divided on a number of matters, but
there is a strong, sharp-edged consensus that social stability is at
risk unless a robust stimulus package emerges to stave off further
job loss. (Never mind that Chinese history lacks evidence of a
clear, causal connection between unemployment and national
unrest.) premier Wen Jiabao confirmed that a major effort was
being made to extend and implement the previously announced
four-trillion-yuan plan, and that more funds were available if
conditions worsened.
Data on the scope of the stimulus package – for example,
investment per province or the number of new projects versus
those that more cash would restart or reinvigorate (and these
projects versus those that would be shut down) – are difficult
to determine. The transparency and consistency of official
figures lags well behind the authorities’ hyped promises about
government reform, streamlining of the bureaucracy, and the
retreat of the party apparatus.
Still, it is not what we don’t know about the stimulus plan
that is troublesome. China’s government, as prone to political
maneuvering and policy gridlock as any, appears to agree that
immediate economic growth is crucial and that an 8% annual rate
is essential. Many officials (and the analysts and advisers who
support them) assumed that this magic number represents the
minimum rate needed to provide jobs to workers and managers
and absorb the more than six million new graduates who spill out
april 2009
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100 |
Page 101 |
Page 102 |
Page 103 |
Page 104 |
Page 105 |
Page 106 |
Page 107 |
Page 108 |
Page 109 |
Page 110 |
Page 111 |
Page 112 |
Page 113 |
Page 114 |
Page 115 |
Page 116 |
Page 117 |
Page 118 |
Page 119 |
Page 120 |
Page 121 |
Page 122 |
Page 123 |
Page 124 |
Page 125 |
Page 126 |
Page 127 |
Page 128 |
Page 129 |
Page 130 |
Page 131 |
Page 132