the country has too “limited resources in terms of funds and human capacity”.


Earlier incidents In disaster response, a good plan is not enough. Practical experience matters. Did Mauritian authorities encounter any real-life incidents? While not necessarily at the scale of the MV Wakashio incident, authorities had to deal with two major cases in the past years.


In April 2005 a collision occurred off Port Louis between the MSC Katie and the MV Nordsun. The MSC Katie sustained cracks and was grounded on a reef to avoid sinking. Mauritian authorities successfully prevented an oil spill.


An incident that was very similar to the grounding of the MV Wakashio occurred in June 2016. The MV Benita went aground not to far from the site of the current oil spill. While the vessel was damaged, a salvage company was quick on site. The contractors pumped the fuel out of the vessel, and only a very minor spill occurred. The company tugged the MV Benita away to India. On route the vessel sank.


As a result, Mauritius was not only aware of the risk and had elaborated planning tools, authorities also had experience with incidents of this kind.


Is this the explanation why the minister of environment was so confident that all was under control? It is likely the case.


The Mauritius oil spill tells us what can happen even if you are well prepared. Planning does not always go as intended. Capacity building and training has its limits.


A public inquiry: Questions to ask Mauritius will need to launch a public inquiry into the accident. The investigation will certainly establish that the government’s response was not perfect. It will identify areas in which the agencies could have performed better.


First, the authorities had stocked an insufficient amount of containment equipment such as booms. The response had to wait for equipment to arrive or rely on the improvised devices made by volunteers.


Second, was the right salvage company chosen and did the Dutch experts have the right strategy? The ship owner Nagashiki Shipping contracted the company. Yet, It is important to know how the experts cooperated and coordinated with the coast guard and the government overall.


A third major question concerns whether maritime situational awareness could have detected


Photo Credit: IMO IMO helping to mitigate the impacts of MV Wakashio oil spill in Mauritius https://www.flickr.com/photos/imo-un/50237544366


the ship early on. Better maritime surveillance might have recognized the ship earlier. We need to know if the disaster could have been prevented by a coastguard interception.


Finally, the regional dimension needs to be looked at. Why did the regional mechanisms for maritime security and environmental disaster developed in the diverse capacity building projects had no role at all in the response? Would it have made a difference if the government relied on the expertise of organizations such as the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center?


Learning these lessons will help other countries to prepared for and prevent the next disaster. Moreover, the lessons might lead to a better integration of Maritime security and environmental efforts in capacity building. Perhaps they will even assist in building a less fragmented regional architecture in the Western Indian Ocean.


This article originally appeared on


SafeSeas.net and


is republished with their permission.


88 | The Report • September 2020 • Issue 93


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