many of the standard makers have their own firewalls or VPNs as a standard accessory, there are many who have neglected basic security precautions to make way for crisper budgets. More often than not, an array of devices and protocols from different vendors and technological eras are often “bolted together” to produce an integrated automation system. It is crucial for integrators, implementers, and operators of ICS to understand the system’s limitations and the vulnerabilities of its components and protocols.


However, ships continue to experience ECDIS failures attributed to this vulnerability. Additionally, more often than not, ECDIS software is run on legacy operating systems like Windows XP, which are no longer supported; with sensory feeds coming in from a multitude of other onboard systems such as Radar, Navtex, AIS, etc, each operating within their own OS, a wide surface for a compromise is created.


ICS – Industrial Control Systems


Onboard Industrial Control Systems (ICS) form the basis for automation in modern day shipping. Use of an ICS reduces man-power requirements, hence reduces human errors, increases efficiency and prolongs equipment life. ICS controls and monitors key


parameters onboard, including temperature, pressure, level, viscosity, flow control, speed, torque, voltage, current, etc. However, the process of inter-connecting many of these systems, without much concern for any cyber security elements, ends up producing a highly automated albeit vulnerable environment. Furthermore, most of these ICS are based on outdated operating systems like Windows XP and Windows Server 2000. It is surprising that even Industry leaders like Kawasaki Man and ABB, amongst others are still using these legacy systems on ships delivered as recently as 2019.


Much of the onboard ICS network is connected to the vessels ethernet network for onward transmission of data to vendors, office, etc. While


A major concern is that operators and engineers routinely bypass security for convenience and efficiency, which could have a very serious effect on the entire organisation. This behaviour is mostly attributed to the lack of awareness and competence, the commercial pressures (time and money) and unfortunately to plain non-adherence to security policies (unforgivable).


VSAT – Very Small Aperture Terminal


A Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) is a communications station used to send and receive data via a satellite network. VSATs enable a range of communication and safety services including GMDSS, ECDIS, AIS, phone, internet, cargo management, vessel routing, crew welfare, and weather forecast. Most of the VSAT IP’s stand exposed to open internet and coupled with default passwords being persisted with, are open to attack. This holds true even for ships delivered in 2020. Hence, while the ships geographic location is available via AIS aggregators, this vulnerability of the VSAT invites hackers to get into VSAT interfaces and make available all the details of the hardware in use.


Furthermore, vendors generally publish default credentials on their websites and many terminals run with unchanged default factory settings, for years, including administrator usernames and passwords. Once an attacker finds an open VSAT interface, they can upload malicious software and compromise the network, enabling access to critical control systems.


The Report • September 2020 • Issue 93 | 55


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