The British destroyer HMS Coventry (D118) enroute to the Falkland Islands in 1982. Source:
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6417241
Morale on board went sky high when the Argentinian cruiser Belgrano was sunk, and it hit rock bottom the next day when HMS Sheffield was hit by an Exocet missile. From then on, it was all very serious. The action became more intense as the invasion approached, but fortunately the Argentinian air force did little flying at night, so we had some respite.
My ship, HMS Coventry, was bombed on 25 May by A4 Skyhawk aircraft while we were occupying an air defence position to the north of Falkland Sound. The bottom was blown out of the ship, which capsized in about 20 minutes; 19 of the crew were lost and another 30 injured.
I was different after the Falklands, driven by a strong determination that, should I find myself in another conflict, my ship would not be one of those sunk by enemy action. I think something of that drive has remained with me through my working career.
Q3. How proud are you of the vital investigation work the MAIB undertakes and its output?
Immensely proud. Accidents almost always have consequences whether they be in human terms, such as the loss of the Titanic; economic terms, such as when the container ship Ever Given blocked the Suez Canal; or environmental terms, such as when the tanker Sea Empress grounded off Milford Haven spilling 72,000 tonnes of oil into our coastal waters. Fortunately, these major disasters are very few and far between but learning the lessons from lessor accidents and near misses will help prevent disasters in the future.
Q4. What are the fundamental causes of the incidents and accidents you investigate once the outcomes are known – mechanical or human failings, or a mixture of both?
Before answering that question, can I say that a swift and effective emergency response can usually prevent a drama becoming a crisis? A wise captain once said to me, it is not what happens but how you deal with it that matters. As such, practicing reversionary means of control and drilling emergency procedures can be time well spent.
Turning to the question; most accidents occur because someone or something is overwhelmed and fails. However, systemic weaknesses usually exist well before the accident occurs, and this is where remedial action can be preventative. Shortcuts in training, skimping on maintenance procedures, not following up on previous accidents or breakdowns can all lead to latent weaknesses in the system. Then just a little more haste or pressure on the day is enough to tip the balance and for the accident to occur.
A few years ago, I asked the head of a large boat building and maintenance operation what his highest usage spare part was. His answer was that he did not know, but he could find out for me. Actually, he had already answered my question. Paying attention to the small stuff can seem unnecessarily burdensome when things are going well, but no one wrote a training manual or a maintenance procedure for the good of their health.
144 | ISSUE 111 | MAR 2025 | THE REPORT
Q5. What one achievement are you most proud of during your career and why?
I’m not sure I can point to anything as my proudest achievement, but I’ll keep trying. I hope when I’m gone that someone will say, ‘he helped make a difference’; that would be more than enough.
Q6. As far as modern
technological developments are concerned are you in favour and what is their likely impact on the future safety of vessels at sea?
I am very much in favour of technological developments, but I feel we are at a challenging point in time where the marine industry is struggling to understand where humans fit in. I see two particular manifestations of this during accident investigations, at opposite ends of the spectrum of human alertness. The first, is that technology is now doing many of the time-consuming, perhaps mundane tasks, with the result that human watchkeepers can have little to occupy them. With insufficient stimulation from the job, they can self-distract or fall asleep, and are then slow to react when an emergency does occur. Secondly, for the most part, humans are still the decision makers. To alert them to the need for a decision, systems supply alarms, warnings and cautions, but currently these can be a very coarse tool. Too often, we find operators overwhelmed by information, sometimes to the extent that they turn off or mute the alarm systems altogether. If I had one wish that would improve safety at sea, it would be for manufacturers (and regulators) to focus on the role of the human in the digital workplace.
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