Human–wildlife coexistence 367
fragmentation and loss of connectivity between protected areas (Creel et al., 2013). This is particularly important in dryland and migratory ecosystems (Durant et al., 2015) such as the Maasai Mara in Kenya. Coexistence, on the other hand, is a ‘dynamic but sustainable state in which hu- mans and large carnivores co-adapt to living in shared land- scapes where human interactions with carnivores are governed by effective institutions that ensure long-term car- nivore population persistence, social legitimacy, and toler- able levels of risk’ (Carter & Linnell, 2016). Although it is difficult to influence the adaptation of carnivores, human adaptation can be promoted by minimizing the negative ef- fects of predators and fostering positive attitudes through various, usually financial, incentives, a strategy that has pro- liferated in the Maasai Mara (Homewood et al., 2012; Courtney, 2015). In Maasailand, efforts to reduce the costs of livestock pre-
dation by predators include compensation and insurance schemes (e.g. Maclennan et al., 2009; Bauer et al., 2017), for- tification of livestock enclosures (e.g. Lichtenfeld et al., 2015) and the use of deterrents (e.g. Ogada et al., 2003). Benefits are largely associated with wildlife-based activities such as tourism. Wildlife, and especially big cats, attract tourists (Mossaz et al., 2015). High predator densities in the Maasai Mara (Broekhuis & Gopalaswamy, 2016; Elliot & Gopalaswamy, 2017) together with the spectacle of the an- nual wildebeest migration have resulted in the Maasai Mara National Reserve being the highest-earning wildlife area in Kenya (Narok County Council & Trans-Mara County Council, 2012). However, some question whether tourism-related benefits really translate into coexistence with wildlife (Homewood et al., 2012). Other than socio-economic costs and benefits, factors
such as conservation politics could play a role in people’sat- titudes and behavioural intentions towards predators. Goldman et al. (2013), who describe conservation politics as the ‘uneven power dynamics related to land-use and con- servation decision making’, report cases where Maasai killed lions Panthera leo as a political statement as they felt in- creasingly alienated by management and let down by gov- ernment. There are many cases in Maasailand where the Maasai are resentful towards conservation efforts, especially when they are prohibited from cultural practices or excluded from key resources, such as grazing (Homewood et al., 2012; Goldman et al., 2013; Hazzah et al., 2013; Bedelian & Ogutu, 2017). It has been shown that providing access to resources (Measham & Lumbasi, 2013), including the local commu- nity in decision-making (Treves et al., 2009) and providing a sense of predator ownership (Dolrenry, 2013), can influ- ence positive attitudes and behavioural intentions towards predators. As such, it is increasingly being recognized that a collaborative, rather than a top-down, approach whereby local communities are actively involved in conservation- related decisions, is required for conservation initiatives to
be successful (Redpath et al., 2017). Taking a collaborative approach can also overcome human–human conflict, the conflict between humans over the value of predators, which can hinder conservation efforts (Redpath et al., 2015). In the Maasai Mara the relationship between coexistence
strategies and people’s attitudes and behaviours towards predators is unclear. Here we assess whether people’s atti- tudes and behaviours towards predators are influenced by the costs, benefits or factors relating to conservation politics. We hypothesized that costs, as measured by livestock lost to predators, would have a negative effect on people’s attitudes and behaviour towards predators, whereas the perceived presence of benefits would have a positive effect. As man- agement regimes of the various wildlife areas differ in their level of inclusion of the community we hypothesized that this, and a person’s sense of ownership of wildlife, would influence people’s attitudes and behavioural inten- tions towards predators.
Study area
The Maasai Mara landscape in south-west Kenya is home to the Maasai people who, historically, were a semi-nomadic pastoralist community but are now largely sedentary (Seno & Shaw, 2002). Traditionally, Maasai predominantly kept cattle but more recently there has been a shift to small stock, particularly sheep Ovis aries and goats Capra hircus, as these are more drought resistant (Bedelian&Ogutu, 2017; Broekhuis et al., 2017). Subdivision and privatization of communally owned
land surrounding the Maasai Mara National Reserve oc- curred in 1999 and gave rise to concerns that livestock pro- duction would decrease (Seno & Shaw, 2002) and cultivation and fencing would increase, leading to a decline in wildlife (Lamprey & Reid, 2004). As a result, tourism companies partnered with local landowners to form wildlife conservancies where landowners receive a fixed, monthly payment for leasing their land for wildlife-based activities on the condition that the landowner moves off that land and does not cultivate or develop it (Thompson et al., 2009; Osano et al., 2013). At the time this study was con- ducted, there were nine conservancies of varying size and with their own private management (Fig. 1). Each con- servancy comprises individually-owned parcels of land (46–850 landowners). Different lease agreements by the conservancies have resulted in varied management policies. Conservancy-specific management policies are not publicly available for all the conservancies (but see Osano et al., 2013; Bedelian, 2014; Bedelian&Ogutu, 2017), but some of the dif- ferences are as follows: lease fees vary per conservancy (USD 30–50 per ha per year); some conservancies utilize a percent- age of the tourism revenue to run various community devel- opment programmes (Bedelian, 2014; Courtney, 2015); some
Oryx, 2020, 54(3), 366–374 © 2018 Fauna & Flora International doi:10.1017/S0030605318000091
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