Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) after the U.S. withdrew. That is a myth. The ARVN had ample funds, and the invading North Vietnamese army overran de- pots with enough ammunition and supplies to fi ght for years. George Washington’s men at Valley Forge didn’t have warehouses full of sup- plies or money from Congress; they had something they knew was worth fi ghting for. The ARVN did not, and it collapsed in six weeks. The same thing is true of Afghan-
istan today. Twelve years of self- delusion and admiring the emperor’s new clothes have not changed the reality. Seventy-fi ve percent of the delegates to the Afghan Emergency Loya Jirga in 2002 signed a petition to make their beloved King Zahir Shah the interim head of state, but the CIA used briefcases stuff ed with
cash and backroom shenanigans to install its puppet Hamid Karzai instead. Window dressing aside, the truth is the U.S. dictated a system of government the Afghans are centu- ries from being able to make work and then foisted an unstable, third- rate political nonentity off on them to lead it. Today, Karzai refuses to sign a basing agreement and now is publishing deliberately falsifi ed anti- U.S. Taliban propaganda. Holding an election or two
doesn’t make a democracy. Democ- racy is not a coat of paint, and wish- ful thinking and messaging are not a substitute for literacy and centuries of social development. Over 90 per- cent of Afghans cannot read a ballot. The last “election” was a major em- barrassment of massive vote fraud. Fewer than one eligible voter in fi ve voted. Democ-
[CONTINUES ON PAGE 115]
— Dr. M. Chris Mason was a Navy offi cer from 1981-86 and is a retired State Depart- ment diplomat. He holds a master’s degree in military studies from Marine Corps University, Quantico, Va., and a doctorate in military history from George Washington University, Washington, D.C. He wrote the Marine Corps guide on Afghan culture and served in Afghanistan in 2005.
post-2014 strategy for years has been part of the overall NATO and Western approach to sustaining the real gains made by the Afghan Na- tional Security Force (ANSF) over the long term. That strategy re- mains on track as the ANSF acquit- ted itself credibly in 2013, its fi rst fi ghting season in the lead. Nothing has occurred in the operational en- vironment that requires us to aban- don or under-resource it. The conversation about the strat- egy has grown complex and often obfuscated over whether to announce post-2014 numbers, the vitriol over the bilateral security agreement, and Karzai’s provocations. All of that has confused the message, and an increas- ingly skeptical public, about our com- mitment. Seeing through the smoke and ignoring the noise, the strategy, which envisaged a post-2014 force,
PHOTOS: RIGHT, COURTESY THE BROOKINGS INSTI- TUTION; TOP, COURTESY DR. M. CHRIS MASON
remains sound and locks in the hard- won security gains that have provided so many societal advances in Afghani- stan, from increased life expectancy to vastly improved access to education. Second, this phase is not about combat. For sure the troops will be protecting themselves, but the NATO and U.S. eff ort will be focused on training, advising, and assisting the ANSF to continue its upward spiral of capability, professionalism, and institutional cohesion. To that end, in January 2013, I recommended 13,600 U.S. troops, with the hope of another 5,000 to 6,000 coming from NATO and partners, remain in Afghanistan. Figures less than that will require a curtailing of some of our envisioned activities, but still much can be done. Much below 10,000 and the force will be under-resourced and consumed in force protec-
[CONTINUES ON PAGE 115]
— Gen. John R. Allen, USMC (Ret), is a distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. His fi nal tours on active duty were as deputy commander, Multinational Force – West, Al Anbar province, Iraq; deputy commander, U.S. Central Command; and commander, International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan.
MARCH 2014 MILITARY OFFICER 99
Page 1 |
Page 2 |
Page 3 |
Page 4 |
Page 5 |
Page 6 |
Page 7 |
Page 8 |
Page 9 |
Page 10 |
Page 11 |
Page 12 |
Page 13 |
Page 14 |
Page 15 |
Page 16 |
Page 17 |
Page 18 |
Page 19 |
Page 20 |
Page 21 |
Page 22 |
Page 23 |
Page 24 |
Page 25 |
Page 26 |
Page 27 |
Page 28 |
Page 29 |
Page 30 |
Page 31 |
Page 32 |
Page 33 |
Page 34 |
Page 35 |
Page 36 |
Page 37 |
Page 38 |
Page 39 |
Page 40 |
Page 41 |
Page 42 |
Page 43 |
Page 44 |
Page 45 |
Page 46 |
Page 47 |
Page 48 |
Page 49 |
Page 50 |
Page 51 |
Page 52 |
Page 53 |
Page 54 |
Page 55 |
Page 56 |
Page 57 |
Page 58 |
Page 59 |
Page 60 |
Page 61 |
Page 62 |
Page 63 |
Page 64 |
Page 65 |
Page 66 |
Page 67 |
Page 68 |
Page 69 |
Page 70 |
Page 71 |
Page 72 |
Page 73 |
Page 74 |
Page 75 |
Page 76 |
Page 77 |
Page 78 |
Page 79 |
Page 80 |
Page 81 |
Page 82 |
Page 83 |
Page 84 |
Page 85 |
Page 86 |
Page 87 |
Page 88 |
Page 89 |
Page 90 |
Page 91 |
Page 92 |
Page 93 |
Page 94 |
Page 95 |
Page 96 |
Page 97 |
Page 98 |
Page 99 |
Page 100 |
Page 101 |
Page 102 |
Page 103 |
Page 104 |
Page 105 |
Page 106 |
Page 107 |
Page 108 |
Page 109 |
Page 110 |
Page 111 |
Page 112 |
Page 113 |
Page 114 |
Page 115 |
Page 116 |
Page 117 |
Page 118 |
Page 119 |
Page 120 |
Page 121 |
Page 122 |
Page 123 |
Page 124