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Afghanistan Is a Failed State


fi ce, or how many more hundreds of billions of dollars we add to the national debt. It will not change the outcome — not because we ever lost an engagement on the battlefi eld but rather because we tried again to cre- ate a nation where one does not exist and imposed upon it an alien politi- cal system the people who live there are not willing to fi ght and die for. If you ask Americans to defi ne themselves, almost all of them will say fi rst, “I’m an American.” But ex-


I


t doesn’t matter how long we re- main in Afghanistan, how many more American lives we sacri-


Leave Dr. M.


Chris Mason


cept for a tiny handful of educated urban elites — the only Afghans our senior leaders ever talk to — virtu- ally no Afghans would say, “I’m an Afghan.” The largest circle of iden- tity and loyalty of the vast majority of Afghans is their clan or extended family. Afghanistan remains a me- dieval hodge-podge of more than a dozen languages and more than 10,000 independent clans and vil- lage republics. Afghans’ notion


(opening spread, left) On Dec. 17, 2013, members of the Guam National Guard board a CH-47 Chinook helicopter, marking Guam’s first series of rotations out of Afghanistan as Operation Enduring Freedom winds down.


of the rule of law is still literally throwing rocks at each other; in December 2013, the Afghan govern- ment planned to reinstitute stoning as the death penalty for those sus- pected of adultery. We should have learned from


Vietnam that installing a corrupt and unpopular national government in a primitive country, holding a few rigged elections, and endlessly repeating talking points about de- mocracy do not create a nation. In Saigon, the U.S.-imposed regime had almost no popular support, was comprised largely of opium war- lords, and was completely corrupt and incompetent. That is also an excellent description of the govern- ment in Kabul today, and outside the capital it is equally irrelevant. The war in Vietnam was not lost because Congress defunded the


Stay


Gen. John R. Allen, USMC (Ret)


Staying in Afghanistan: Sustaining Our Accomplishments


a light pole in the circle near the palace in Kabul. The implication was clear: The Taliban intend to hang Karzai from this fi xture just as they did President Mohammad Najibullah in 1996. While an unlikely


N


ot long ago, the Taliban sug- gested President Hamid Karzai might want to select


scenario as long as the West remains in Afghanistan, it could be a possible future should we not sustain our presence or depart entirely.


Most of us who have served in


Afghanistan learned three key les- sons from the post-Soviet era. First, the post-Soviet Afghan army gave good account of itself after the Sovi- ets departed until the Soviet Union began to crumble. When the Soviet advisors left, the Afghans held on, still suffi ciently resourced. Second, it was when the Soviet money dried up the Afghan security forces began to come apart. If we learned anything from watching this experience, it was that in the post-confl ict phase, advisors and funding were essential


(opening spread, right) Afghan and U.S. servicemembers gather with local dignitaries Oct. 5, 2009, to celebrate the activation of a new wing at Kandahar airfield, Afghanistan.


98 MILITARY OFFICER MARCH 2014


for long-term operational capacity and for sustaining the force. The third vital lesson we learned was our Western presence was a stabilizing force for the region. When the U.S. precipitously pulled out in the early 1990s, the result was a catastrophe for Afghanistan and Pakistan and set in motion a sequence of events that played out Sept. 11, 2001. And though diminished by 13 years of war, threats still remain. The post-2014 U.S. and North At-


lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy I and others have suggest- ed is not a military strategy reliant on continued combat operations, large formations, or extensive fund- ing. To remain true to the strategy we’ve pursued in Afghanistan since 2009, we need to remain engaged with this young army and police force beyond 2014. Why? First, a


PHOTOS: OPENING SPREAD, LEFT, SGT. EDDIE SIGUENZA, ARNG; OPENING SPREAD, RIGHT, STAFF SGT. ANGELITA LAWRENCE, USAF


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