RESPONSE
What the teams need To consider tactical entry teams and necessary monitoring: in an article ‘Kit for Purpose’published in CBNW June 2012, I discussed the need for common-sense, safety-based monitoring prioritization for HazMat/CBRN response. Most of that initial information applies to tactical entry teams but, because tactical teams are not concerned with immediate identifi cation, and in many cases, are not concerned with concentrations, this can be simplifi ed. Also keep in mind that tactical teams have their own purpose and thus diff erent objectives to meet. At a minimum, a four or fi ve
gas monitor should be employed when tactical teams are entering a facility or area where there is a potential for chemical releases or concentrations. This will allow responders to identify volatile organic compounds (VOCs) which may be hazardous, oxygen (O2), lower explosive limit (LEL), and if the proper lamps are available, a specifi c suspected toxic chemical or toxic industrial chemical (TIC). In the case of a fi ve gas monitor, the
responders may have the ability to have two specifi c lamps based on the potential, and the availability of such lamps. With this one, basic and easy-to-use piece of equipment, the probability for safety, and thus success, can be increased greatly. But, it is extremely important that someone is constantly monitoring this equipment to ensure that timely and eff ective decisions can be made. And, the monitor (team member) must be trained on how to read and interpret the data. If not, responders may not know that an LEL exists and is rising, until they are in an explosive environment, which means that one squeeze of the trigger can spell doom for the entire team, and potentially for those they were sent in to rescue.
Moving in
With this in mind, the organization of entry/clearing teams must be examined. What is the best practice for setting up an entry team, in a hostile/non- permissive environment, with a potential for TICs, and possibly fl ammable or explosive vapours and or liquids? It would be great if the monitor could
move ahead of the team, detecting any potential atmospheric hazards prior to the entire team being at risk. But Principles of
Patrolling (Planning, Reconnaissance, Control, Security, Common Sense, and Communication), especially security in encountering potential hostiles – must also be applied. Therefore, the best case procedure for both Patrolling/Room or Facility Clearing and CBRN/HazMat monitoring is not possible. The best option available is to place the monitor in the Number Two position
decisions must be made based on those levels or concentrations, and the team must understand the role and employment of the monitor at all phases of the facility or area clearance. Average O2 concentration is around
21%. Below 19% is unsafe if personnel do not have supplied air such as SCBA (self-contained breathing apparatus). Above 22% means there is an oxygen
Leſt : Military CQB training with airsoſt weapons at the TAC Training Center in Smithfi eld, Rhode Island, USA, in June 2009.
Below: Many industrial facilities contain numerous hazards. Just one wrong move, misplaced bullet, or other ignition source can spell disaster. This is a fi re following an explosion at a Barsol Chemicals Plant in Kansas, USA.
so that frontal security is maximized. When approaching turns and doors the monitor can move forward as needed, check the readings and advise the point man or Team Leader on any potential hazards. Again, this isn’t the best-case scenario when there is a potential for low O2 – if the team is wearing APRs (air purifying respirators) – or for LEL when the point man could have to fi re. But it allows for the maximum security and safety possible, and simultaneously.
Atmospheric monitoring Proper Size-Up/Assessment, Planning, Equipping, and Training are of utmost importance in these situations. The monitor must know what levels/readings are safe or unsafe, must understand what
source, or an oxidizer nearby – and that you are entering an enriched atmosphere. This means that burn rates increase, and there is more potential for fl ame or explosion. Whether the O2 is high or low, teams should decide on what action to take. If enriched (22% or above), back out of the area and avoid fi ring. If on an APR or gas/protective mask, Low O2 means you need to back out or abort as you may soon have physiological eff ects if the concentration continues to drop. LEL is also expressed in percentage. In
a confi ned area such as enclosed spaces and small rooms, 10% should be your abort criteria, because the concentration can quickly increase to a dangerous level in a confi ned space. For open areas such as outside, 25% is a good abort criterion.❚❙
Dusty G. Kitzmiller is Chief Operating Offi cer and Senior Preparedness Consultant for Hazard & Homeland Security (HHSCG), LLC, which advises on HazMat and CBRN response planning, training and exercises.
68 CBNW 2013/02
©US Army ©Kansas City FD
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